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Despite efforts to provide safe, effective medical care, adverse events still occur with some 
regularity. While risk cannot be entirely eliminated from healthcare activities, an important goal 
is to develop effective and durable mitigation strategies to render the system ‘safer’. In order to 
do this, though, we must develop models that comprehensively and realistically characterize the 
risk. In the healthcare domain, this can be extremely challenging due to th  wide variability in the 
way that healthcare processes and interventions are executed and also due to the dynamic nature 
of risk in this particular domain.   In this study we have develop d a generic methodology for 
evaluating dynamic changes in adverse event risk in acute care hospitals as a function of 
organizational and non-organizational factors, using a combination of modeling formalisms. First, 
a system dynamics (SD) framework is used to demonstrate how organizational level and policy 
level contributions to risk evolve over time, and how policies and decisions may affect the 
general system-level contribution to adverse event risk. It also captures the feedback of 
organizational factors and decisions over time and the non-linearit es in these feedback effects. 
Second, Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) framework is used to represent patient-level factors and 
also physician level decisions and factors in the management of an individual patient, which 
contribute to the risk of hospital-acquired adverse event. The model is intended to support 
hospital decisions with regards to staffing, length of stay, and investment in safeties, which 
evolve dynamically over time. The methodology has been applied in modeling the two types of 
common adverse events; pressure ulcers and vascular catheter-associated infection, and has been 
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Despite efforts to provide safe, effective medical care, adverse vents still occur with 
some regularity. While risk cannot be entirely eliminated from healthcare activities, our 
goal is to develop effective and durable mitigation strategies to render the system ‘safer’. 
In order to do this, though, we must develop models that comprehensively and 
realistically characterize the risk. In the healthcare domain, this can be challenging for a 
number of reasons. In contrast to traditional engineering domains, there can be wide 
variability in the way that healthcare processes and interventions are executed. This 
variability is due not only to organizational and human performance issues, b t also to 
the high degrees of uncertainty associated with management of most clinical conditions, 
and variability in the quality/reliability of the information used to make decisions. 
Another modeling challenge is the dynamic nature of risk in this particular domain. 
Characteristics or conditions of the clinical care environment that might pose a hazard 
can change as a function of time, and/or the changing state of internal and external 
factors. Also, for individual patients, exposure to these internal and external factors varies 
as a function of time and underlying medical condition.  
The goal of this research is to develop a generic methodology for evaluating dynamic 
changes in adverse event risk in acute care hospitals as a function of organizational 
factors and non-organizational factors, using a combination of modeling formalisms. 
First, a system dynamics (SD) framework will be used to capture changes in the level of 
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risk as a function of: duration of hospital stay, complexity of the patient’s condition, 
Financial wellbeing of the organization, policies and decisions taken to respond to the 
financial standing of the organization and constraints imposed by external agencies (e.g., 
insurers and regulatory/certification authorities) on operational decisions. 
The SD framework enables us to capture feedback reinforcement of specific factors over 
time, and non-linearities in these effects. This would not be possible using conventional 
risk analytic techniques. Second, Bayesian methods will be applied to provide input to 
some of the variable nodes. The Bayesian Belief network is used to capture patient level 
factors and conditions and patient-provider level factors which correspond to provider’s 
decisions in treating a patient and patient’s responses to such interventions. Using nine 
years’ of clinical data and domain expertise from one of Harvard Medical Schools major 
teaching hospitals, we will also validate the performance of this methodology in studying 
this problem. 
1.2 Significance of the Problem 
In spite of increased attention to quality, and efforts to provide safe medical care, adverse 
outcomes are still frequent in clinical practice (Leape, 94). Reports from various sources 
indicate that a substantial number of hospitalized patients suffer treatment caused 
injuries, while in the hospital (Leape, 97). Harvard Medical Practice Study in 1991 
(Brennan, et.al., 1991), based on an study of injuries in patients in the sta e of New York 
in 1984, reported that nearly 4% of  all hospitalized patients suffered injuries that 
prolonged their length of stay in hospital, or resulted in some level of disability, and 14% 
of these injuries were fatal. Assuming a homogeneous population, with extrapolating, 1.3 
million people are harmed and 180,000 people die in United States only at least in part 
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because of an injury during their hospitalization. Moreover, it was found that 69% of 
those injuries were due to errors and therefore preventable (Leape, t.al., 1991). Other 
studies have reported different statistics. The Institute of Medicine (IOM) reported in 
1999 that 44,000 to 98,000 people die in hospitals each year as the result of medical 
errors (Kohn el al, 2000). This exceeds combined toll from motorcycle rashes, suicides, 
falls, poisoning and drowning.  The report also indicates that medical error costs the 
nation $37.6 billion each year where about $17 billion of those costs are associated with 
preventable errors. 
Before the IOM’s report in 1991, formal approaches to the analysis of adverse events 
were relatively uncommon.   Attention attracted to a number of highly publicized medical 
error cases that resulted in death or injury of patients (Bogner, 2001) combined with the 
realization of the fact that more could be done in hospitals to prevent injuries due to 
errors, led to a significant increase both in investigating the causes of error and finding 
effective error prevention methods. 
Despite the magnitude of the problem, current analysis of adverse events in healthcare 
settings continues emphasis on individual case studies. Efforts to understa  the nature of 
aggregate risk through formal methods have been limited. The lack of a comprehensive 
modeling formalism that is able to demonstrate the causal relationship between the 
factors effecting risk of adverse event and how this risk might evolve in time under the 
influence of organizational, individual and policy level factors, has been the major 
rationale for the currently proposed research. 
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1.3 Research Objective 
The broad goal of this research is to develop and apply a methodology t  evaluate 
dynamic changes in adverse event risk in acute care hospitals. Although some of the risk 
is related to the underlying complexity of care and severity of illness in the patient 
population, a significant portion may be related to the structure of the system – most 
notably, the operational policies, incentive structures, and constraints imposed by third-
parties who finance care. Any efforts to redesign the system, however, must be preceded 
by careful modeling and analysis to demonstrate exactly how the policies and features of 
the system influence risk. In this research, we attempt to build models that demonstrate 
these system-level influences and how they dynamically shape risk in the healthcare 
domain. 
1.4 Summary of Approach 
In order to make these models both realistic and useful (i.e., capable of providing new 
insight), we have adopted a hybrid modeling strategy that incorporates both system 
dynamics (SD) principles and Bayesian belief networks (BBN). The SD-BBN 
combination enables us to capture some of the more important features of th  healthcare 
environment. 
Input to the quantitative component of the model will be derived from clinica  data and 
information from domain experts. The model will use Bayesian data analysis techniques 




The major phases in this research are: 
1- Qualitative modeling 
2- Data collection 
3- Quantification and calibration 
4- Validation 
The model building process started with developing a qualitative und rstanding of some 
of the major risk scenarios, with an adverse event as the end state and some 
organizational level decision or policy as the initiating event.  
In data collection phase, the goal is to identify the type and quality of data available and 
to select data relevant to the factors in the model. This mainly involves studying the cases 
of adverse events and relating them to nodes in the model. Eight years years’ of clinical 
data from one of Harvard Medical School’s major teaching hospitals is available at this 
phase. 
Having built the qualitative model in a System Dynamic framework, the model is tested 
calibrated and fine-tuned with data obtained in phase 2. For this stage of the process, six 
year worth of data is used (from the available 8 years). At the last phase, the results of the 




1.5 Dissertation Outline 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation, reviews current risk assessment and risk analysis literature 
in healthcare domain, and highlights the fact that there is need for more comprehensive 
and realistic modeling and representation of risk in this domain, in order to provide 
insight to the decisions to be made and policies to be set. The hybrid methodology and its 
components, Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) and System Dynamics (SD) modeling 
formalisms, have been described in chapter 3. Chapter 3 also discussed the sources of 
information (i.e. clinical data and expert opinion) used in this research. 
In this research, we have developed two BBN models for the risk of two specific adverse 
events; pressure Ulcer and Vascular catheter-Associated Infectio  (i.e. line infection). We 
have also developed a system dynamics model to represent the organizational-level 
contributions to risk of adverse events. Chapter 4 through 6 describes these models, their 
development process, their quantification and their validation. Chapter 7 discusses the 
hybrid model that consists of the combination of the system dynamic module (for 
organizational level factors) and the BBNs for the 2 adverse events (pre sure ulcer and 
line infection). In chapter 7 we also present a set of uncertainty nalysis performed on the 
hybrid model. This chapter also contains a discussion on risk importance measures we 
have developed for the hybrid, dynamic model. 
Finally chapter 8, addresses the contributions of this research and also the potential future 
work needed to further improve the application of this approach as an decision making 
tool. 
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2 Related Work 
As noted above, prior to the publication of the IOM report in 1991, formal appro ches to 
the analysis of adverse events were relatively uncommon. In response to this, some quasi-
regulatory authorities (notably the Joint Commission, an independent body that accredits 
hospital and other healthcare facilities), and some Federally-sponsored research 
organizations (e.g., the Department of Health and Human Services’ Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality) have encouraged use of some mdeling formalisms 
originally developed for the engineering discipline and non-healthcare disciplines.    In 
most cases, their application to healthcare either has been experimental in nature, or 
informal.  We have categorized these approached, into two categories; Formal and 
Informal risk analysis methods. Generally informal risk analysis methods, such as failure 
mode and effect analysis; a)  lack a systemic view and perspective compared to the 
formal methods, such as probabilistic risk assessment methods, b) are mostly, essentially 
qualitative, and c) lack an explicit causal perspective. 
This section reviews these approaches and their application in healthcare and discusses 






2.1 Informal Risk Analysis Methods 
 
2.1.1 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) in Engineering 
 
Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) examines high risk processes to identify 
required improvements to reduce the probability of adverse events. It has been used in 
industry (e.g. manufacturing, aviation) for over 30 years to assess system safety. 
The FMEA procedure is well documented in the military handbook (MIL-HDBK-338 
and MIL-HDBK-338B) as a military standard. FMEA is done in two phases. The first 
phase is the identification of the potential failure modes and their effects. The second 
phase is performing criticality analyses to determine the severity of failure modes 
identified in phase one. 
2.1.2 FMEA in Healthcare 
 
 FMEA is perhaps the most popular engineering risk analysis methods use  by healthcare 
organizations.  Its use was promoted by the Joint Commission, an independent 
organization that accredits hospitals and healthcare delivery organizatio s. As a condition 
of accreditation, healthcare organizations are required by the Joint C mmission to 
conduct at least one FMEA annually on a healthcare process. The Veterans Health 
Administration has promoted the use of this technique, and has developed a mo ified 
version of the traditional industrial/military FMEA that emphasizes qualitative analysis of 
healthcare processes (DeRosier et.al. 2002). Published studies demonstrating the use of 
FMEA in healthcare include, an FMEA for reducing risk in blood transfusion 
(Burgmeier, 2002), FMEA in improving a drug distribution system ( McNally, et.al. 
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1997), drug prescribing process (Saizy-Callaert, et.al.,  2001) and intrave ous drug 
infusion ( Apkon et.al. 2004) and application in safety improvement of the production of 
pediatric parenteral nutrition solutions (Bonnabry, et.al., 2005). Figure 2-1is a sample 
form of the completed FMEA analysis for blood transfusion process (Burgmeier, 2002). 
2.1.3 Shortcomings of FMEA in Medical Applications 
 
To date, most healthcare organizations have found that much of the utility of an FMEA 
lies in having healthcare professionals gather and map out the medical pro esses and 
procedures. The FMEA process brings together a multidisciplinary tem, creating an 
opportunity for different types of providers to understand parts of a clinical process that 
without which they may not have been aware. This qualitative process modeling often 
results in a broader understanding (at the organizational level) of the dependencies and 
vulnerabilities of the healthcare process being modeled, and through this, probably 
contributes to some degree of risk management. FMEA activities in healthcare are rarely 
quantitative. Also, the FMEA process is highly subjective and dependent on the 
experience level of the analyst, and may not capture many potential failures. Shebl, 
Franklin and Barber (2009), conduct and study to test the reliability of FMEA analysis 
within a hospital setting, by recruiting two teams to conduct separate FMEAs in parallel 
on the same topic by following the basic FMEA steps including mapping the process of 
care, identifying potential failures of the process, determining the severity, probability 
and detectability scores for the failures and making recommendations to decrease the 
detected failures. The results indicated that even though each group identifie  50 failures 
only 17% of them were common to both teams, and due to different severity, detectability 
and risk scores, the prioritization of failures were different. They conclude that these 
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discrepancies make it impossible to reliably identify failures that are to be prioritized, and 
optimally allocate resources, time, effort and money to improve patient saf ty. 
 FMEA might be a useful tool to investigate a particular risk, but is completely 
ineffective in identifying and describing how policies and decisions which are dominant 









2.1.4 Miscellaneous Approaches to Risk Assessment 
 
Outside the realm of informal and formal risk assessment regimes, which have been the 
trend since the publishing of the IOM report, literature also contains  number of 
retrospective studies on some adverse events, titled under the umbrella of “risk 
assessment”. The core of these studies is usually a linear regression between the adverse 
event and a few clinical factors. For example, Fortinsky et al. (2004); assess the risk of 
falls finding balance disturbance, multiple medications, sensory deficits, environmental 
hazards etc., among dominant influencing factors. Mrdovic, et al. (2011), use regression 
analysis to determine predictors of 30-day major adverse cardiovascular events (MACE) 
after primary percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI), and based on these factors 
propose a scoring system to assess the risk. Calvillo-King, et al. (2010), proposes a 
scoring system to predict probability of death or stroke after carotid endarterectomy in 
asymptomatic patients. Ammann, et al (2010) develop a scoring system  to predict risk of 
adverse events (i.e. serious medical complications, infection, etc.) in pediatric patients 
with cancer who experience fever and neutropenia (FN). We couldn’t find any studies in 
which the investigators attempt to predict the risk of an adverse event. Instead, they tend 
to be retrospective/descriptive, deconstructing adverse events and tryi g o simply 
identify what factors might have contributed to their occurrence. Th  weakness in all of 
the published studies is, that there is not a systematic assessment of a control group. In 
other words, there is no effort to determine how frequently the so-called contributing 
factors were present in cases that did NOT result in an adverse event/outcome. 
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Also among these miscellaneous methods, are a few checklist types, and coring system 
approaches that create simple numerical scoring systems that ca egorize patients by their 
susceptibility to certain adverse events. Many scoring systems to categorize patient’s risk 
of developing pressure ulcers (or bedsores; an area of skin that breaks down due to 
constant pressure against skin) have been developed, which are discussed in more detail 
in section 5.1.1.1.  
However, the reliability and validity of these scoring systems are not clear. For instance, 
in the case of risk scoring systems for pressure ulcer, some exp rts believe that often 
people who are identified as high risk for say pressure ulcer, do not experience pressure 
ulcer since resources would be dedicated to them to prevent the adverse e nt, but on the 
other hand patients with low scores in pressure ulcer risk end up developing pressure 
ulcers since some precautionary interventions might be ignored because they have been 
identified as a low risk patient.  
 
2.2 Formal Risk Analysis Methods 
 
Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) is a systematic methodology to assess the risk of 
complex systems, and is currently being applied to many sectors fr m chemical 
processing to financial management. It has also had limited use and application in 
healthcare domain.   
In many cases human performance, cognition and decision making are also involved in 
the performance of complex systems. Since humans can both initiate and mitigate the 
severity or the likelihood of accidents, the influence of humans on system risk and 
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reliability must be considered for a comprehensive PRA (Bedford and Cooke, 2001). 
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) consists of a set of tools and methods that generally 
assess the probability of human error in certain tasks. Due to complexity and difficulty of 
quantifying human reliability, as compared with determining the reliability of mechanical 
or electrical components, extra steps are involved in modeling and quantifying the human 
element, before it can be used as an input to standard PRA tools such a  fault trees or 
event sequence diagrams. A number of studies in healthcare domain are only focused on 
assessing the reliability of human elements (the HRA element of PRA). In our literature 
review, we have separated these studies from more systemic PRA studies in healthcare. 
2.2.1 PRA in Engineering 
 
Probabilistic risk analysis originated with the Reactor Safety Study WASH-1400 in the 
1970’s. PRA is mostly used in high-risk industries such as nuclear power plants, aviation 
and chemical industry. PRA provides a formal systematic way to identify and represent 
the factors that contribute and the chain of events leading to adverse events in complex 
technological systems. These factors include hardware failure, software failure, and 
human actions, interactions between involved parties and organizational factors 
(Wreathall and Nemeth, 2004, Stamatelatos, 2002). Common tools used in a conventional 
PRA are Event Trees (ET), Event Sequence Diagrams (ESD) and Fault Trees (FT). 
The PRA ultimately presents a set of scenarios, frequencies and associated consequences. 
A scenario (represented by an ESD or ET) contains an initiating event (IE) and one or 
more pivotal events leading to an end state. Each pivotal event must be modeled in 
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sufficient detail to support valid quantification of scenarios. ESDs and ETs, use a forward 
reasoning logic that works forward through a causal path to model risk.  
 Complex pivotal events are frequently modeled using Fault Trees (FT). A FT is a picture 
of a set of logical relationships between more complex events such as system level 
failures, and more basic events such as component level failures.  FTA, in contrast with 
ETs and ESDs, uses a backward reasoning, deductive and top-down logic, that 
deconstructs the top event (a failure) to the elements that cause and contribute to the 
occurrence of the top event. FT modeling is applicable to modeling hardware failure as 
well as other complex event types such as software failure and crew action (NASA PRA 
guide). Figure 2-2 depicts the typical format of a classical PRA methodology 




Figure 2-2.Classical PRA methodology (Figure originally composed by Futron corporation, NASA 
contractor for ISS PRA) 
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2.2.2  PRA in Healthcare 
 
Although PRA has proven to be very effective in high-risk industries, mainly, nuclear 
power plants, a small number of studies using formal risk assessment tools (i.e. event 
trees, event sequence diagrams, fault trees) have been published in healthcar . That may 
also be because of the differences that exist between healthcare and the domains that 
PRA has traditionally been applied to. The diversity of the medical procedures, the 
treatments specific to a patient, the wide range of medical personnel are among the most 
notable of these differences. Exploring the use of PRA in anesthesia (Pate-Cornell, et.al. 
1997), PRA in radiation brachytherapy (Ostrom, et.al., 1994), a fault tree analysis to 
understand why people deviate from prescribed protocols (Hyman, 2005), a fault tree to 
model risk in distributed healthcare information system ( Maglogiannis and Zafiropoulos, 
2006) and a model for medication system failures in long-term care facilities using PRA 
(Comden, et.al., 2005) are among the studies on PRA application in healthcare. 
2.2.3  Shortcomings of PRA in Medical Applications 
 
Formal PRA modeling tools typically represent top-level failures or faults (termed 
adverse events in the medical domain) as the outcome of a linear sequenc  of events or 
component failures. This is by no means the case about the risk scenarios i  healthcare. 
Much of what happens in healthcare is subject to feedback. For instance, an initiating 
event might not lead to an adverse event at time “t”, but because of th reinforcing effect 
of feedback might end up leading to an adverse event at time “t+n”. Additionally, the 
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number of contributing factors in the healthcare domain, are much greater th n in 
mechanical systems. Even though conventional PRA methods can be useful in modeling 
specific aspects of healthcare-related risks, such as medication error which is a much 
more linear process, they are not adequate for modeling risk in healthcare for 
aforementioned reasons. 
2.2.4 HRA in Engineering 
 
Human Reliability Analysis can be considered as an extension of human-factors 
engineering that is basically concerned with identification and classification of human 
error and causalities involved and the prediction of operator performance. The common 
methods used are mainly cognitive control based techniques such as Contextual Control 
Model (COCOM) (Hollangel, 1993), Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method 
(CREAM) (Hollangel, 1998). While PRA has been used in high-risk industries including 
nuclear power plants and aviation for the past thirty years to develop an understanding of 
risks involved in complex systems and the underlying causalities, HRA as an important 
part of the PRA, has increased the understanding of human performance issues that affect 
risk and safety in such systems. 
2.2.5 HRA in Healthcare 
 
There have been few if any well-designed efforts to understand human reli bility and 
performance in healthcare settings. Instead, as evidenced in the published terature, 
investigators or theorists have mostly reviewed what historically was done in engineering 
domains, ‘cherry picked’ parts of existing theory or ‘cherry picked’ tools that might be 
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applicable to a small part of the immensely diverse set of human tasks and activities in 
healthcare. It is important to emphasize that: 
• Healthcare is an enormously diverse domain 
• The tasks are extraordinarily diverse, involving both skill-based and cognitive 
functions 
• The humans performing these are diverse 
• The ‘plant’ response, or ‘system’ response to a human’s actions are often 
unpredictable and subject to random as well as yet-to-be defined factors. This 
makes it really difficult to measure how much of the outcome was due to the 
human’s performance 
• There is a wide range of tolerance to incomplete or imperfect task execution 
and it is really context sensitive – in other words, in some cases, th  precision 
of a surgeon’s actions with a scalpel and suture may make the difference 
between life and death; other cases, it may not impact the overall outcome at 
all. 
These are some of the reasons why there is not a unified set of theories or tools to 
confidently assess the human contribution to system safety 
While human reliability analysis (HRA) has been well established and integrated into 
safety analysis in other industries (nuclear, aviation…), its application to healthcare is 
limited (Lyons, et.al. 2004).  HRA studies human operator performance in th  context of 
a specific task environment. It is often focused on estimating the probability of human 
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error, and how this probability might increase or decrease when coupled with various 
performance shaping factors.  
Some work has been done trying to identify performance-shaping factors that are either 
unique or applicable to healthcare domain (Vincent 2000, Carthey et.al.2000). There have 
been a few foundational research activities directed at formally studying human 
reliability or performance shaping factors that might be unique to healthcare domain and 
healthcare transactions. For instance, Lyons, et al., 2004, conducted a lit rature review 
and lists 35 HRA primary techniques that might have a potential applic tion in 
healthcare, based on common and general tasks in healthcare environment. They group 
these techniques into five categories of techniques for formally measuring performance in 
either controlled or naturalistic settings, as appears in Table 2-1. Note that these are not 
theories that might be useful in understanding performance shaping factors that 
contribute to human error. 
 
Table 2-1.Categories of HRA techniques (Lyons, 2004) 
 
Data collection techniques used in HRA have also been used in some healthcar  
applications. What is important to understand though, is that some healthcare tasks, with 
well-defined bounds for correct and incorrect performance, such as pharmacy dispensing. 
Applying a relevant and useful technique for many other tasks in healthcare that are 
Type of Technique Description
Data Collection Collection of information on incidents, goals, tasks, etc.
Task Description Taking the data collected and portraying this in a useful form
Task Simulation Simulating the task as described and changing aspects of it to identify problems
Human Error Identification and Analysis Uses task description, simul;ation and/or contextual factors to identify the potential errors
Human Error Quantification Estimates the probability of error identified
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messy, with poorly defined bounds for correct or incorrect performance, poorly defined 
end points, and are influenced by the feedback effects is extremely chal enging. As an 
example, American Society of Health-System Pharmacists (ASHP) conducted a national 
survey of drug dispensing and administration practices (Pederson, et.al. 2002). An 
analysis of human error in anesthesia (Nyssen, 2001) and studies on incide t reporting in 
anesthesiology (Staender et.al. 2001) and Case record review of adverse events 
(Woloshynowych, et.al.2003) are also among these studies.   
Another study sets out to document the nature and incidence of surgical errors enacted 
during laparoscopic surgery using Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction 
Approach (SHERPA), which is a technique involving task analysis (Joice, et.al.1997). 
The same approach also has been used (Malik, et.al, 2003,) to detect surgi al error in 
endoscopic DCR surgery.  
Some of the more recent HRA studies in healthcare include; Inoue and Koizumi (2004), 
developed a model called EDIT (Error type, Direct threat, and Indirect threat) to 
characterize individual errors by evaluating error type, performance shaping factors 
(direct threats), and organizational factors (indirect threats) and applied this model to 
nursing practices in six hospitals. They find violation of rules, failure of labor 
management and defects in the standardization of nursing practices to b  the three major 
organizational factors underlying medical error. Phipps et al. (2010), use a social 
psychological approach to investigate the anesthetists’ beliefs about clinical practice 
guidelines to study determinants of intention to deviate from clinica practice guidelines. 
Gauba et al. (2008) and Cox et al. (2008) conduct studies to identify and quantify human 
errors in cataract surgery. Chadwick and Fallon (2011), use a modified version of Human 
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Error Assessment and Reduction technique (HEART) to analyze Record Abnormal Blood 
Results, a critical nursing task in radiotherapy treatment. 
 Other HRA techniques such as Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method 
(CREAM), and Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) have not been 
applied in healthcare domain.  
2.2.6 Shortcomings of HRA in Healthcare 
 
The main reason that human reliability analysis has not caught on in healthcare domin as 
well at it has in industry, is that healthcare is very different in some respects, despite 
some similarities) and it cannot be treated the same way as  nuclear power plant or a 
chemical plant. In a broader sense, power plants, aviation, chemical plants and healthcare 
are high-risk complex activities performed in large complex organizations, some aspects 
of healthcare are closer to some industries in comparison. For instance a pilot’s work is 
similar to the high-tech monitoring of anesthetist, but very different from what a surgeon 
does (Lyons et.al. 2004).  There are also profound differences between healthcare and 
other high-risk industries.  Healthcare consists of extraordinarily diverse s t of activities. 
Routine surgeries can sometimes be unpredictable and potentially harmful; t eatment of 
acute psychosis may require quick decision making and response to the p ssible violent 
or bizarre behavior of the patient. Considering the wide range diversity of tasks in 
healthcare, some routine such as blood work, others as unpredictable as emergency 
medicine, and one can realize that the comparison with other high-risk industries with 
usually a limited set of activities is not a very meaningful comparison. Additionally, there 
is more uncertainty involved in healthcare practices than it is in industries such as nuclear 
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power plants where tasks are ideally, routine and deviation from usual practice is unusual 
and is to be avoided.  For instance a patient’s disease may be masked or difficult to 
diagnose or the result of the tests might not be clear. There is a higher level of uncertainty 
tolerance expected in this domain than other industries. Also most of interactions in 
healthcare are human-human as opposed to than human-machine interactions in other 
high risk industries. 
Moreover, HRA focuses on the individual operator’s performance in a controlled 
environment, and it is only as good as the level of expandability of this test environment 
to the real world setting. Conventional HRA methods also do not offer a causal picture of 
operator error. HRA approach provides a very limited insight when implemented in 
healthcare domain, since the results of analysis performed in controlled settings with 










3.1 Overview  
The approaches that have been adapted from engineering discipline and industry, 
reviewed in the background section, have had limited utility when used to model system-
based risk in the healthcare domain.  In particular classical PRA framework looks at risk 
scenarios as a linear chain of events that lead to an unsafe condition, which is by far not 
the case in healthcare. Most of the underlying causal chains in healthcare which result in 
an adverse event are subject to feedback and also the number of contributing factors is 
much greater than that of mechanical systems, and the magnitude of effect is non-linear. 
Hence, In order to realistically model system-based risk in healthcare settings, it is 
necessary to account for dynamic factors and reinforcing loops, display the complexity of 
contributing factors, capture feedback and incorporate temporal factors. 
The modeling approach adopted here consists of two components: a systemd na ics 
framework and a Bayesian belief network (BBN) structure. This formalism has been 
introduced in Mohaghegh, et.al. (2008) and applied in aviation safety context. The system 
dynamics formalism enables us to represent change over time and ch ge due to 
feedback.  The Bayesian belief network formalism enables us to represent networks of 
causality and capture stochastic characteristics of the systm and the uncertainty related 
to that. BBNs also enable us to incorporate new knowledge and update the model as new 
evidence becomes available. The next sections briefly explain the components of the 
proposed model and the advantages that the combination of the two offers t  more 
accurately and realistically capture risk dynamics in the healthcare domain. 
 
3.2 Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN)
3.2.1 Introduction 
 
Probabilistic networks in general, are graphical models that depict causal relations and 
interactions between a set of variables, where nodes in the graph represent variables and 
arcs or edges represent direct connections (direct dependenc
Figure 3-1. If a pair of nodes is not connected, independence between th
represented by these two nodes is assumed. Graphical models are intuitive and compact 
representations of (causal) dependencies and indepencies between problem
variables. The advantage of graphs in probabilistic modeling is threefold; 
convenient means of expressing modeling assumptions, t  facilitate representation of 
joint probability functions and to facilitate efficient inferences from evidence and 
observation (Pearl 2009). 
                                                 
Figure 3-1.A simple belief network; event X (parent node, cause node), causes/influences event Y (child 
node, effect node) 
 
More specifically, Bayesian Belief Networks or Bayesian Networks are a class of 
probabilistic graphical models for reasoning under uncertainty, where nodes represent 
discrete or continuous variables and arcs represent direct causal connections 
(relationship) between them. The graphical aspect of probabilistic networks can be used 
in a qualitative manner to represent relationships between a set of variables 
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and Madsen, 2008).  While the arrangement of the nodes and arcs of the graph/network
structure can represent the qualitative relationships betwe n variables, the 
causal relationship between variables on the other hand, can also be quantified using 
probability calculus. Specifically, each variable (node) in the network is represen
finite set of mutually exclusive states, and a conditional probability table can be created 
for each variable (node) and its parent(s)
associated with each node. This probabilistic and numerical aspect
networks is referred to as quantitative
Figure 3.2, nodes X and Y are called parent nodes or input nodes and node Z is called the 
child node or the target node. If we assume binary stat
with probability distributions
 our objective is to calculate 
                                                   
Figure 3-2.Input and output nodes 
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 aspect.  To elaborate, in the simple Bayesian net in















The only constraint is that BBNs are directed acyclic graphs (DAG), meaning that 
starting from a node, you cannot return to that node simply by following the directed 
arcs. 
BBNs, which are compact networks of probabilities that capture probabilistic relations 
between variables and contain historical information about their relationship, have proven 
to be powerful tools for modeling causes and effect in many domains. They are also very 
effective in modeling situations where data are uncertain and vague or incomplete and 
only partially available. This uncertainty in information can arise n many situations; 
domain experts may be uncertain about their knowledge, there might be uncertainty about 
the accuracy and/or availability of the information or the situation being modeled might 
be inherently uncertain. (CRA, 2004) 
3.2.2 BBN Elements 
 
To explain the structure of BBNs and how they are built and used for inferences, we will 
use a previously published example of a Bayesian net intended to support a medical 
diagnostic task for lung cancer. 
The example, through which we will review the structure of BBNs in this section, is a 
simplified and modified version of a problem known as Asia problem (Lauritzen and 
Spieglelhalter, 1988, and Korb and Nicholson 2004).  
A patient, who is experiencing shortness of breath, visits his doctor in fear of lung 
cancer. The doctor knows that possible candidate diseases that may cause 
shortness of breath or dyspnoea, are lung cancer, tuberculosis or bronchitis. 
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Dyspnoea can also be due to presence of a number of these candidates or none of 
them. She also knows that smoking is a risk factor for both lung cancer and 
bronchitis, and that exposure to air pollution can be a contributing factor in lung 
cancer. The positive result of a chest X-ray would indicate either tuberculosis or 
lung cancer. The doctor would like to know the chance that lung cancer is present. 
3.2.2.1 Structure of BBNs 
 
The structure of the network represents the qualitative relationships between different 
variables. Two variables (nodes) are connected if one affects or causes the other and the 
connecting arc indicates the direction of the effect. For instance i  our simplified 
example, we have assumed factors that affect a patient’s chance of having lung cancer, 
are pollution and smoking. Similarly having lung cancer will cause breathing problems 
and will increase chances of a positive X-ray result. Hence the list of variables, their 
types and a set of possible values or states (chosen arbitrarily for this example) and the 
structure of the network will be as appears in Table 3-1 and Figure 3-2, respectively. 
 
 
Table 3-1.List of variables and their states 
 
Node States
Pollution (P) Low, High
Smoker (S) True, False
Cancer (C ) True, False
Dysponea (D) True, False
X-Ray (X) Positive, Negative
 




Bayesian networks have a qualitative aspect and a corresponding 
Once the qualitative model (graphical representation) s established, we will need to 
quantify the strength of the relationship between connected nodes, by assigning a 
conditional probability table, CPT, (in form of a distribution for 
point estimate for discrete ones) to each node. Conditi al probabilities represent the 
likelihood based on historical data or our prior knowledge and belief.
 Mathematical representation of conditional probability is
probability of variable being in state
in the states , respectively. Therefore for each parent and each possible state 
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likelihood that the child will be in some state. In our lung cancer example, from Figure 
3-2, we can read . 
 
3.2.2.3 Inference with Bayesian Networks 
 
One of the most important features of Bayesian networks, is that can be used for updating 
our prior beliefs and calculating new beliefs as new information and observations or in 
other words “evidence” becomes available. In fact, up until this point, there is nothing 
Bayesian about the Bayesian networks. As Bayesian networks often represent causal 
relationships of the nature of , the task of inference is then to derive the 
posterior probability distribution of , , where is a set of observations 
(evidence), and Y is the variable that is important for prediction or diagnosis (Pearl, 
2009). This is a straightforward application of Bayes’s rule which yields: 
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For instance if the doctor receives a piece of information indicating that the patient has 
been exposed to high level of pollution, then this evidence is set in the Bayesian network 
as:  
,and consequently . Using Bayes’s rule from equation above, 
probability of the patient having lung cancer  will increase from 0.02 
to 0.03. 
3.2.2.4 Types of Evidence 
 
Evidence is any type of information about the current situation of a vari ble /node. For 
instance, in our example, if we find out that the patient is a smoker; ur belief about the 
probability of him having a lung cancer will change. In general there are two types of 
evidence available for BBNs: 
• Hard evidence: Assigns a zero probability to all but one state of the variable 
• Soft Evidence: Bayesian networks also support evidence that is vague or 
incomplete or uncertain. This type of evidence is called soft evidence, which is 
any evidence that is not hard evidence. In our example, if the doctor knows that 
there is 90% chance that the patient has been exposed to pollution (but heis not 
100% sure), in  lung cancer BBN model he will assign a probability of 0.9 for the 
node “pollution” as evidence. If he knew for sure that the patient was definitely 
exposed to pollution (i.e. had hard evidence) he could assign a probability of 1 to 
this node. 
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3.2.3 Construction and Quantification of BBNs 
 
A Bayesian belief network could be constructed manually (i.e. Based on expert 
knowledge, literature, etc.), automatically from data (i.e. Data driven BBN construction) 
or through a combination of manual and data driven approaches.  To inducethe structure 
of the network i.e., the graph, from a source of data there exist different classes of 
algorithms such as search and score algorithms, constraint based algorithms and 
combinations of the two (Kjaerulff and Madsen 2008), which require considerable 
amount of data.  The BBNs constructed in this thesis are built using manual approaches. 
When faced with a problem, the first step would naturally be figurin  out whether 
Bayesian networks are the right tool and approach for the problem based on the nature of 
the problem.  Generally, when dealing with problems where there is uncertainty 
associated with the cause and effect relations and mechanisms; Bayesian belief networks 
seem to be the ideal framework. 
A Bayesian belief network has two major components; the structure and the parameters 
(i.e. conditional probabilities).  The structure of a BBN is usually referred to as the 
qualitative part whereas the parameters and the conditional probabilities are the 
quantitative part. Consequently the model elicitation process consists of two phases; first 
the variables and the causal relations between them are identified and second, once the 
structure of the model (i.e. the graph) has been established and verified the values of the 
parameters and conditional probabilities are elicited. The manual construction of the 
Bayesian net could be a labor-intensive task requiring some level of creativity and also 
close interaction with domain experts.  
 32 
3.2.3.1 Construction of the BBNs 
 
The qualitative part of building a Bayesian network involves identifyig the variables 
(i.e. nodes in the graph) and identifying the causal relations between the variables ( .e. the 
edges or the arrows). Kjaerulff and Madsen (2008) categorize variables types into four 
different classes.  
• Background variables: usually the root variables of a Bayesian network 
• Problem variables: the variables of interest, for which we want to compute the 
posterior probability distribution given the observations 
• Mediating variables: directly unobservable variables for which posteri r 
probability is not of interest but they play an important role in establishing 
accurate conditional independence and dependence relations in the model and ar
most often influenced by the background and problem variables 
• Symptom variable: observable as the consequence of the presence of problem 
variable and influenced by it 
 
Given the above classification, typically the overall causal structu e of a Bayesian 
network will be as depicted in Figure 3-3. 
 
 
Figure 3-3.Overall causal structure of BBN (Kjaerulff and Madsen, 2008)
 
Kjaerulff and Madsen (2008) also present two structured ways of el
structure in their book. First, a basic approach that relies on the causal ordering that exist 
between the variables and identifying model variables (in any of the above mentioned 
categories) and identifying the causal links between these var
refined approach that constructs models using five commonly occurring substructures 
called idioms. A vast majority of Bayesian nets areclaimed to be constructible using 
these idioms or substructures. Our approach in this the is to b
is the basic approach, hence the readers interested in the second, more refined approach 
referred to Kjaerulff and Madsen (2008) and Neil et al. (2000).
One should note that building a network often requires a careful and delicat
between desire to build a large, rich and super comprehensive model that covers every 
little detail to obtain the highest level of accuracy possible on one hand, and the 
feasibility and the cost of construction, and the complexity of probabilis






iable.  Second, a more 
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3.2.3.2 Quantification of the BBNs; Eliciting the Numbers 
 
After establishing the structure of the network (the qualitative part) through the iterative 
process of model verification revision, identification of new variables, deletion or 
modification of the existing variables, and the addition or deletion of the causal links 
(edges), the next and probably the most challenging phase is the elicitation of the 
conditional probability distributions or populating the conditional probability tables 
(CPTs). The amount of effort that goes into building the structure of the model and even 
more so into obtaining the numerical parameters, is probably the biggest obstacle in the 
way of applying Bayesian nets in many practical problems (Onisko, Druzdzel and 
Wasyluk, 2001). 
Since the process of eliciting the quantitative information required for this stage of 
constructing BBNs is often very demanding, it is important to carefully verify the 
structure of the Bayesian net before proceeding to the quantification phase. Nevertheless 
making minor adjustments to the structure of the network, in order to reduce the number 
of parameters, is sometimes inevitable. The parameters of the ne work can be obtained 
from databases in literature or elicited from subject matter experts (Druzdel and van der 
Gaag, 2000).  
For the variables that field data exists, the task of computing the marginal and conditional 
probabilities is quite straightforward. Very often there is incomplete or no data available 
and the analyst has to rely on the subjective assessment of probability obtained from 
domain experts (Diez, 93). 
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In this section we will focus on the most intimidating task in building Bayesian networks, 
obtaining the required probabilities. 
3.2.3.2.1 Sources of Information 
 
In most applications, probabilistic information is available through one or more of three 
sources; Statistical data (field data), Literature and Subject matter experts. In data rich 
applications it is usually not too difficult to collect data, on the variables of interest. If 
comprehensive data is available, both the qualitative part (the graph) and quantitative part 
(the probabilities) can be automatically constructed. There are two approaches to learning 
the structure (graph) of the Bayesian network from data. First the constraint-based search 
and second Bayesian search for graphs with highest posterior probability given data. 
Since we have not constructed our BBNs learning from data, we will not cover these 
approaches but for more information on the former please see Pearl and Verma, 1991, 
Spirtes et al., 1993 and for the latter please see Cooper and Herskovits, 1992. Once the 
structure of the network is established, the task of acquiring probabilities will consist of 
studying the subsets of data that correspond to the various conditions (combinations of 
various states of the variables). 
However, in most cases where reliable statistical data is scarce other forms of data should 
be considered. Literature often provides a good source of probabilistic information. For 
instance, more specifically in the field of medicine, many studies report on the disorders 
and symptoms and the causal relations between them, but one has to be careful since this 
probabilistic information are not always directly useable in Bayesi n nets. For example, 
one could find the conditional probabilities of symptoms given the disorder  the disease 
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is present, but conditional probabilities of symptoms given the disorder is absent are 
rarely reported. Also most often the probabilities required for the intermediate disorder 
states that have been modeled in the network are not studied or reported (Druzdel and van 
der Gaag, 2000 and 1995). 
Finally, if there are few or no reliable data available experts’ knowledge and experience 
is used as a source of probabilistic information. Although the role of experts in providing 
the parameters of Bayesian nets and the probabilities should not be understimated, the 
problems and challenges in eliciting probabilities from experts which have been 
discussed in many books and articles should be acknowledged. Nevertheless, many 
techniques have been developed for eliciting well-calibrated, unbiased and reliable 
probabilities from domain experts (Druzdel and van der Gaag, 2000, O’Hagan, et al., 
2006).   
Bayesian networks typically consist of tens and sometimes hundreds of variables (nodes) 
and hence require hundreds of probabilities, and a good part of these probabilities –if not 
the majority- has to be assessed by domain experts. Given that expert’s time is an 
expensive commodity supplementary techniques have to be utilized to reuce the burden 
on the experts.   
The amount of information and the number of probabilities to be elicited is dependent on 
the structure of the graph and the number of variables in the graph. The number of 
required probabilities grows exponentially with the size of variable’s parental set. To 
reduce the number of probabilities to be elicited, two approaches are commonly used. 
The first approach is based on the modifications made in the structure of the Bayesian 
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net, i.e. the graph, and the second approach is based on using parametric probability 
distributions. The first approach uses techniques such as parent divorcing and introducing 
an intermediate variable, temporal transformation, etc. to adjust the structure of the model 
with the goal of easing the process of eliciting the probabilities and making network 
quantifications manageable. These techniques have been discussed individually or 
collectively in Kjaerulff and Madsen (2008), Olsean et al. (1989), van Engelen (1997) 
among others. 
Noisy-OR gates, Noisy-AND gates and their generalizations (Drudzel and van der Gaag, 
2000, Heckerman and Breese, 1996, Pearl, 1988, Lemmer and Gossink, 2004) on the 
other hand, are examples of using parametric probability distributions to reduce the 
number of probabilities to be elicited. Methods based on this second approach, are based 
on the assumption that the parents of a variable in the network are causally independent. 
With these methods, the number of probabilities to be assessed for a variable grows 
linearly rather than exponentially as the number of its parents increase. For instance, in 
Noisy-OR gate, for a node that has “n” parents with binary states, th  number of 
probabilities to be elicited is “n” rather than “ ”.  That is for a node with 10 parents, we 
only need to ask experts for 10 probabilities rather than 1024 probabilities, using the 
Noisy-OR model. 
Using these two approaches, modifications to the structure and/or parametric probability 
distributions, however, will probably compromise the accuracy of the model but then 
again as mentioned before we are dealing with a trade-off between accuracy and 
feasibility (by carefully reducing the model using the above approaches) in building 
Bayesian networks.  
2n
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Although the process of eliciting the probabilities is done after th  analyst reaches a 
steady, reliable and robust structure for the Bayesian net, to think that this elicitation is a 
one-shot process is rather unrealistic. That being said, literatur  could be found on the 
ways and tools to support the elicitation process. For instance, after collecting the first 
round of probabilities, which is probably raw and less accurate and less calibrated, using 
the sensitivity analysis the analyst would be able to discover th  most important 
probabilities and refine them (Coupe et al., 2000, Philips, 1982). Also this process 
highlights the less influential probabilities in the network that could probably be 
eliminated or further simplified without seriously compromising theaccuracy of the 
model.  This process is done iteratively until the cost of further refining elicitation 
outweighs the benefits of more accuracy achieved, or the till the accuracy could not be 
improved any further simply because we don’t have further knowledge available. 
Given the scarcity and the high value of expert time, this will help focus the efforts and 
resources on the parts of the model that simply put, matter most. 
3.2.3.3 Construction and Quantification of the BBNs in This Research 
 
To develop the BBNs in this research we first started with a set of factors in the literature 
and one of the experts added, deleted and modified these factors and identified the causal 
relations between the factors, which resulted in the first draftof the BBN. This first draft 
was then discussed with domain experts using the interview guides in Appendix A and 
Appendix B in multiple sessions and each expert provided their opinion about: 
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• The variables of the model; whether they thought there should be other facto s 
considered. If they had other factors they added to the model and made any 
modifications to the existing factors they thought were necessary. 
•  The causal relations between the variables 
After incorporating all the changes made to the model by the exp rts the latest version of 
the model was discussed with the experts in another interview and the experts were asked 
to score the model in the scale of 1 to 100 in the terms of model completeness, model 
accuracy, ease of understanding and perceived predictive validity, to ensure sufficient 
confidence in the structure of the model before proceeding to model quantification. We 
have discussed this further, in BBN validation and verification part of this dissertation, 
sections 5.1.4.2, and 5.2.4.2.  
In quantification of the Bayesian Belief Networks in this thesis we have used both 
structural techniques and parametric probability distribution techniques, which have been 







3.3  System Dynamics (SD) 
3.3.1 Introduction 
 
A rather popular approach to understanding the behavior of complex social and economic 
systems is the application of non-linear differential equations (DEs). System dynamics 
(SD) is a simulation based, differential equation modeling tool that is widely used in 
situations where the formal model is complex and an analytical solution is impossible or 
very difficult to obtain (Sterman, 2000). It is a method to enhance learning in complex 
systems. Just as airlines use flight simulators to train their pilots, SD develops 
“management flight simulators”, to help us learn about dynamic complexity, predicting 
the impact of policies and decisions, understand the sources of policy resistance and 
design more effective policies. System dynamics is fundamentally interdisciplinary. 
Since our concern is the behavior of complex systems, SD has its roots in the theory of 
non-linear dynamics and feedback control developed in mathematics and engineering. 
Because we apply these tools to human behavior as well as technical systems, SD also 
draws on cognitive and social psychology, economics and social sciences as well, that 
helps us better understand the sometimes counterintuitive behavior of social ystems 
(Sterman 2000, Forrester1975). The purpose of building system dynamics models is to 
explain and understand the behavior of complex systems and how they evolve o ertime, 
since they can take into account (multiple) feedback mechanisms and non-linear 
relationships between system variables. 
Over the years, SD has been applied to a wide variety of situations, ranging from 
corporate strategy to the dynamics of diabetes and from cold war arms race to HIV 
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combat with human immune system. It can be applied to any dynamic system, with any 
time and special scale. In the case of our research problem, for capturing the effects of 
organizational decisions and policies on risk of adverse events, the feedback effects and 
nonlinearities, system dynamics formalism is a well suited and efficient tool. 
 
3.3.2 Building Blocks 
 
 There are two major building blocks of system dynamics models: stock and flow 
diagrams and feedback or causal loops. Below, we will provide a brief overview on these 
building blocks which will hopefully facilitate the interpretation of the system dynamics 
model proposed in this research. 
3.3.2.1 Feedback loops 
 
Feedback is one of the core concepts of system dynamics and our mental odels often 
fail to include critical feedbacks that determine the dynamics of our systems. These 
feedbacks are modeled using causal loop diagramming in system dynamics. 
Feedback processes take place, if a system component (variable) initiates changes in 
other components (variables) of the system that in return; affect th  very component that 
had originally initiated the change (Ruth, 2001). This process usually occurs through non-
linear relations between system components and can involve time delays. 
An essential part to system dynamics modeling is to understand and present the feedback 
mechanisms, that along with the stock and flow structures, nonlinearities and time delays 
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form the dynamics of a system. Most complex system behaviors are usually due to the 
feedback relations between the components of the system rather than the complexity of 
the components themselves.  (Sterman, 2000)  
There are only two types of feedback that form all dynamics; Po itive (self-reinforcing) 
feedback and negative (self-correcting) feedback. More complex interactions may be 
captured through a combination of these two types. Positive loops, cause reinforcement 
or amplification of the events in the system. For example, the more money you invest in a 
savings account, the higher interest you will receive. 
 Negative loops, on the other hand, oppose the change. Negative feedback processes 
usually lead systems towards equilibrium states (Ruth, 2001). The less th  strength of a 
pain killer, the more pills you have to take to soothe your headache. 
Figure 3-4, is a very simple illustration of these loops. More eggs result in more chickens 
(figure 3 A, reinforcing loop). The more the chickens cross a road, the hig r the chances 
of them getting hit by cars, hence, the higher rate of mortality and fewer chickens (figure 















Figure 3-4.Balancing and reinforcing loops 
 
Even though feedback loops are principally limited to two types, positive and negative 
loops, models can contain thousands of these loops interacting with one another with time 
delays and through nonlinear relations. The dynamic of the systems are the product of 
these interactions.  
 
3.3.2.2 Stock and Flow Structure 
 
Besides feedback loops, stock and flow structure is the other building block of any 
system dynamics model. Stock (population Figure 3-5) represents accumulation of some 
measurable entity (e.g. people, money, inventories of products or even intangibles such a  


















information upon which decisions are made (Sterman, 2000). Stocks change with the 
inflows and outflows. 
 Flows (Birth and death in Figure 3-5) are the physical or conceptual entities that enter or 
leave the system and move over time. Auxiliary variables (death and birth rate in Figure 
3-5) help describe the flow. 
Figure 3-5, represents a very stock and flow structure. 
                   









Birth Rate Death Rate
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3.4 SD/BBN Combination 
 
As mentioned briefly above, the system dynamics part of the model demonstrates how 
organizational level and policy level contributions to risk evolve over time, and how 
policies and decisions may affect the general system-level contribution to adverse event 
risk. Also, it captures the feedback of organizational factors and decisions over time and 
the non-linearities in theses feedback effects. BBN part of the model, represents patient-
level factors and also physician level decisions and factors in the management of an 
individual patient, which contribute to the risk of an adverse event.  
Each patient, considering his or her individual medical condition and physician’  
decisions in treating this patient is exposed to a certain level of risk of specific adverse 
events (e.g. infection, pressure ulcer). This is captured with a BBN. On the other hand, 
the system dynamics section in the model, based on the financial situation of the hospital, 
level of dedication to safety and organizational and policy level factors and decisions 
with regards to staffing, pressure to reduce length of stay and investment in safety, which 
evolve dynamically over time, provides a background that determines wh re hospital is 
standing in terms of risk when the next patient walks in. 
In our methodology, the system dynamics module (representing system level factors and 
decisions) and the Bayesian network module (representing patient level and patient-
provider level factors), are integrated in a way that each module can provide input to a 
node(s) and/or receive input for its node from the other module allowing the entire hybrid 
environment to capture feedback and delay effects. The interface of SD and BBN can be 
captured by importing and exporting data from and to the system dynamics model. For 
 
instance, the variable “Staff Adequacy”, that is an outcome of managerial decisions to 
reduce operational costs (captured in the system dynamics module), is also an important 
factor that may determine whe
staff which ultimately impacts patient’s “Risk of Pressure Ulcer” (captured in pressure 
ulcer BBN). So the input from system dynamics model to the Bayesian network for 
pressure ulcer is “Staff Adequac
updated value for “Risk of Pressure Ulcer” as an input to the system dynamics module.
Figure 3-6, depicts this interaction.




t r or not a patient is moved frequently enough by the 






3.5 Information Sources for Quantification of Models 
3.5.1 Data form Actual Operating Experience  
 
Eight years of clinical data from one of Harvard Medical School’s major teaching 
hospitals was made available for this study. Also will use data obtained from domain 
experts in all the steps of model development, quantification and validation. 
Quantitative modeling will be informed by data stored in the administrative and clinical 
databases from a major teaching affiliate of Harvard Medical School. The clinical 
information system in the medical center has SQL servers that support 62 linked 
relational databases storing contemporary and historical clinical dat  (FY’99-FY’09) and 
disease registries for all major clinical areas (e.g., ED, Inpatient floors, outpatient areas, 
procedural suites, laboratory, pharmacy, radiology, etc.) as well as the more recently 
implemented computerized order entry data. The SQL Servers are accessible using the 
Microsoft Management Console tool kit and SQL Server Enterprise Manager Software. A 
series of SQL queries and stored procedures have been developed to extract the following 
data from these administrative data sources: 
patient and provider scheduling data for procedural and inpatient units; acuity levels and 
patients volume in both the target population as well as concurrent levels in other units of 
the hospital; total resource utilization at the unit and case level; nursing scheduling 
cycles; drug utilization (both standard and emergency pharmaceutical agents); laboratory 
results matched to the pre-, intra-, and post-procedural phases of care in procedural areas 
and; sub-process time stamps for procedural areas. The process data in these sources is 
remarkably detailed and will enable us to model durations of key phases of care such as 
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pre-procedure preparation, sedation phase, prep/drape phase, post-procedure recovery 
phase, admission and discharge times and room turnover times. Raw data for process 
durations, emergency case interruptions to the elective scheduled, delays in scheduled 
cases due to emergency issues, transition times between pre-procedure, procedure and 
recovery phases for each of the procedural units in the medical center, delay times and 
reasons for delays in initiating emergency interventions in these units as a function of day 
of the week and hour of the day. length of stay in recovery units as a function of time of 
day or proximity to shift change that are acquired using the stored procedures will be 
fitted to standard distributions using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov algorithm. The 
administrative data sources have been used extensively by risk analysts t the medical 
center to identify unreported adverse events or near misses using clusters of data as 
triggers. Examples of triggers include the identification of computerized order entries for 
blood product use in ‘low-bleeding-risk’ procedures, sedative reversal agents (e.g., 
flumazenil or naloxone used during the recovery phase) or physical restraints (suggesting 
agitation) in combination with specific procedures. We will use these cluster-based 
triggers to identify unreported adverse events, and update frequency estimates established 
from the self-reported events.   
3.5.2 Adverse Event Data 
 
 Additional data is derived from an adverse event reporting system that currently contains 
approximately 10,000 cases, and 400 root-cause analysis reports that contin 
reconstructed causal sequences that will help inform the qualitative 
modeling phase of this work. All clinical data used in this study, has been de-identified 
and provided to us by one of the members of the advisory committee, and no direct 
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access to databases was possible for the author of this thesis due to confidentiality 
concerns. 
The root cause analyses used at this medical center provide a rich classification of system 
and human factors thought to have contributed to the initiating or propagation of the 
event. It is unclear whether the frequency data are reliable to use for the quantitative 
analysis, since reported events do not accurately reflect prevalence or frequency. 
However, they serve as a fairly comprehensive source of data for the qualitative modeling 
of event initiation and propagation.  
The adverse events that are of interest in this study are a set of twelve hospital acquired 
conditions (HAC) that patients could experience while in the hospital, which are thought 
to be preventable and Medicare is considering not to reimburse. Table 3-2 shows the list 



















Table 3-2.Hospital acquired adverse events  
 
3.5.3 Expert Elicitation 
 
Graphical tools could be used to support the network quantification process and eliciting 
the probabilities (Wang and Druzdzel, 2000). Graphical tools provide an interactive way 
to elicitation of probabilities. Allowing the expert to manipulate a ch rt, or choose from a 
set of functions that have been graphically presented will offer more support to the expert 
and is most likely help the expert to provide his estimate more confidently and more 
accurately. Probabilities could also be expressed through verbal expressions such as more 
very likely, certainly, or improbable (Renooij and Wittman, 1999), though verbal 
expressions could cover a wide range of numbers. Perhaps a combination of verbal 
Selected HAC 
Foreign Object Retained After Surgery 
Air Embolism 
Blood Incompatibility 
Pressure Ulcer Stages III and IV 
Falls and Trauma: (Fracture, Dislocation, Intracranial 
Injury, Crushing Injury, Burn, Electric Shock) 
Catheter-Associated Urinary Tract Infection (UTI) 
Vascular Catheter-Associated Infection 
Manifestations of Poor Glycemic Control 
Surgical Site Infection, Mediastinitis, Following Coronary 
Artery Bypass Graft (CABG) 
Surgical Site Infection Following Certain Orthopedic 
Procedures 
Surgical Site Infection Following Bariatric Surgery for 
Obesity 
Deep Vein Thrombosis and Pulmonary Embolism 
Following Certain Orthopedic Procedures 
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expression approach and the number approach could produce better results (Van der 
Gaag, et al., 1995).  
Decision makers have always been interested in subjective knowledge using experts for 
their opinion. In fact, in many cases subjective knowledge may be the only source of 
information that exists for a particular problem of interest. The task of expert elicitation is 
ultimately threefold; selection of experts, elicitation of their opinions and judgments, and 
the aggregation of their opinions in the case of multiple experts. These tasks have been 
extensively discussed in the literature (Ayyub, 2001, O’Hagan, et al., 2006), but here we 
will briefly overview the process, with an emphasis on the needs of this research. 
3.5.4 Who is an Expert? 
 
When major decisions are to be made in presence of uncertainty and expert judgment is 
essential to minimize and characterize uncertainty, the choice of experts becomes one of 
the most phases of the elicitation process, and the success and usefulnes  of such process 
is directly dependent on the experience, knowledge and technical background of 
individual expert (O’Hagan, et al., 2006). Generally an expert could be efined as a 
skillful person with great knowledge of and extensive training in a specific field. 
However, to be precise, in the realm of expertise, there are m ny other psychological 
factors that may be determinant parameters in how a person uses and organizes his or her 
own knowledge. Interested readers are encouraged to see O’Hagan et al. (2006) and 
Wood and Ford (1993), among others, for detailed discussions. 
Expert’s opinion is then defined as expert’s formal judgment on the specific subject 
within his realm of expertise. On the other hand, an opinion is a judgment, belief or 
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subjective assessment of the quality or quantity of the unknown of interest, based on 
uncertain information (Ayyub, 2001).  
In selecting the experts it is important to understand that dependencies may exist between 
the experts. The analyst may try to recruit multiple experts from different organizations 
and backgrounds to reduce these dependencies, and eliminate the sources of strong 
dependencies. Weak dependencies however, do not seem to effect the value of expert 
judgment. 
As a general guideline, Cooke (1991) formulates principals that should be considered in 
order for results to be considered scientific; 
• Scrutability/accountability: All data, including experts’ information and 
assessments, should be open to peer review and results must be reproducible 
• Empirical control: Quantitative expert judgments should be subjected to mpirical 
quality control 
• Neutrality: The method for evaluating and aggregating expert assessments should 
encourage experts to provide their true opinion  
• Fairness: Experts are not prejudged 





3.5.5 Elicitation Methods 
 
When planning an elicitation, to issues need to be considered first. First, when we are 
seeking the subjective knowledge of an expert about an uncertain parameter, we would 
often like to gather opinions from several experts and consolidate their input into one 
probability distribution. If we collect experts’ judgments separately we would need to use 
some type of algorithm to combine their opinions, and the process is known as 
mathematical aggregation. If we bring the group of experts together in the group and 
elicit one judgment from the group, the process is known as behavioral aggeg tion. The 
second issue is to decide whether the elicitation will be done through a face-to-face 
interview with the experts, or through using questionnaire. Face to face interview, should 
the means exist for the analyst, is without the doubt the best approach, since the analyst is 
present and could clarify any ambiguities and would be otherwise much ore time 
consuming using a questionnaire. Also the analyst could much more effectiv ly explain 
the model and the parameters to be elicited, and the type of expert in ut that would be 
most useful to the analyst. However, arranging interviews, especially individually with 
each expert, could be very challenging given that experts are usually busy professionals. 
Ayyub (2001) attributes the first structured methods for expert opinion elicitation to the 
RAND Corporation in early 1950s. These two methods are Delphi method and Sce ario 
analysis method.   
Delphi method is probably the most known method of expert elicitation, which was 
developed for U.S. Air Force and used throughout the 1960s and 1970s in variety of 
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applications from technology forecasting and policy making to space rogress and 
weapons systems. The basic Delphi method has 8 steps, which basically includes: 
1- Developing questionnaires 
2- Selection of experts 
3- Familiarization of the experts with the issue of interest 
4- Elicitation of experts opinion on the issue 
5- Aggregation of experts’ opinion 
6- Review of the aggregation results by experts and revision of their initial opinion 
7- Revision and review to achieve a complete consensus 
8- Reporting results with justifications on the out of range opinions 
Many elements and factors have been suggested in the literature as b ing critical to a 
good elicitation process (Clemen and Reilly, 2001, Walls and Quigley, 2001, Grathwaite, 
et al., 2005, NUREG 1150, 1989, O,Hagan, et al., 2006), but the heart and soul of all of 
these methods/processes are really the same. The steps that all have they common are; 
Preparation, Expert selection, training of the experts, Elicitation using appropriate format, 
Aggregation of experts’ input.  In the expert elicitation process we have carefully 
considered and used the processes suggested in the literature. 
3.5.5.1 Aggregation of Experts’ Opinions 
 
A large number of methods exist for combining experts’ opinion, from older methods like the 
Delphi method, to more involved Bayesian models.  Among many Bayesian methods proposed in 
 55 
the literature a few have had actual applications and even fewer have been applied more than 
once with the exception of proposed model by Mosleh and Apostolakis (1986) (Bedford and 
Cooke, 2001). The objective is to aggregate experts’ point assessment  for the unknown of 
interest, X. If are estimates of X obtained from experts , and our prior belef about 
X is expressed with , the updated belief about X, given the estimates from the 
experts using Bayes’ theorem is: 
 
And assuming that experts are independent we could write the likelihood term as: 
 
The objective then reduces to determining .Mosleh and Apostolakis (1986) suggest to 
error models; 
• Additive error model ,  
• Multiplicative error model ,  
Where is expert input, is the true value of the unknown of interest X, and is the error 
term. The model also assumes that the error term has a normal distribution with mean , and 
standard deviation  the decision maker has to choose these parameters based on each expert’s 
bias and accuracy. Of course where past performance data is available, choosing these parameters 
is a much more straightforward task. Given these assumptions, the likelihood of getting 
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estimate from expert I, given that the true value of X is x, is obtained from a normal 
distribution with mean and standard deviation . 
3.5.6 The Panel of the Experts 
 
The experts were selected on the basis of their recognized expertise and experience in the 
field of medical risk assessment, patient safety, quality of medical care and also the 
specific adverse events that are of interest in this project. The experts were selected from 
a number of extremely reputable medical institutions i cluding but not limited to, 
Harvard Medical School, Beth Isreal Deaconess Medical Center, Johns Hopkins 
University School of Medicine, George Washington University School of Medicine, 
Federal Food and Drug Administration and Sibley Memorial Hospital.  Table 3-3 
summarizes the expertise and the background of the exp rt panel, whose opinions were 
elicited in different stages of model building and model validation in this research. The 
panel includes experts from academia as well as private practice. 





Expert 1 MD, Surgeon Faculty,Directo,Clinical System Analysis (15+ years), Physician (23 years)
Expert 2 MD, Surgeon VP Patient Safety and Quality (2 years), Physician (36 years)
Expert 3 MHA, RN Director, Quality Improvement and Risk Management (6 years), Nurse (30 years)
Expert 4 MD, PhD Faculty, Critical Care Medicine (14 years)
Expert 5 MD Risk management, CMO (1 year), Physician (20 years)
Expert 6 MD Pathologist, Neuclear Medicine, Rsik Mmanagement (4 years)
Expert 7 MD, Surgeon Patient Safety,Physician (20+ years)
Expert 8 MD Faculty, Internal Medicine and Residency Program Director, Physician (25 years)
Expert 9 MD Attending physician, Oncologist (8 years)
Expert 10 MD, PhD Faculty, Director, Quality and Safety Research Group
Expert 11 MD Deputy Director, National Clinical Public Health Program, Physician (4 years)
Expert 12 MBBS Patient Safety
Expert 13 MM Anesthesiologist with Expertise in Formal Risk Analysis
Expert 14 MD Pediatric Anesthesiologist
Expert 15 LSW Hospital Director of patient Safety and Risk management, Former Clinical Social Worker
Expert 16 MD Hematologist
Expert 17 MD Primary care
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Table 3-3.Panel of experts 
 
Some experts from this panel contributed only to parts of the modeling and quantification 
process, and some of the experts were involved in all st ges of the modeling and 
quantification. 
3.5.7 Eliciting the Structure of the Models; Qualitative Part 
 
To construct the structure network (i.e.) for each of the Bayesian networks for specific 
hospital acquired adverse events that are studied for this research, namely Pressure Ulcer 
and Vascular catheter-Associated Infection (Line Infection) , and also the system 
dynamics part of the model, we started off by the factors existed in the literature and with 
the help of one the experts we drafted the sketch of t e model. This first draft was then 
taken to each of the experts and was discussed with them in face-to-face interviews. The 
interview process was carried out in 3 different phases: 
Phase One: 
First the big picture of the research was presented. This included: 
1. The methodology that was used and the combination of system dynamics 
and Bayesian belief network formalism. 
2. Our hypothesis that healthcare organization’s decisions in response to 
unfavorable revenue gap to reduce costs and close the gap may in the long 
run affect the risk of adverse events in the hospital and ultimately increase 
the costs in many ways. Each of the formalisms (SD and BBN) was 
explained through several examples. 
 58 
Each of the individual sub modules; a system dynamic odel to address 
organizational level decisions and two Bayesian networks to depict a 
causal model for two specific adverse events (PU and Li e infection), 
were then discussed in several interviews. 
Phase Two: 
In the second phase the first draft of each individual model was discussed, that is 3 
interviews for 3 sub modules (the system dynamics model, the pressure ulcer BBN and 
the line infection BBN) were conducted at this phase. This phase of interview included 
the following steps: 
1. Giving a brief introduction/mind refresher of the problem under study and 
the tool. For instance, if pressure ulcer BBN was the subject of the 
interview , a brief introduction to Bayesian belief networks (e.g. how they 
are constructed, what type of problems they could solve, what the 
variables and probabilistic relations meant, the conditional probability 
tables etc. ),was presented through several examples using the forms that 
can be found in appendix A&B. 
2. Expert was asked to look the first draft model (built based on literature 
and one of the expert’s opinion) and include, exclude, modify or edit in 
way, any variable or any causal relation between th variables. The analyst 
would record the expert’s justifications on his/her modification to the first 
draft model. 
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This phase of the interviews is purely qualitative. The goal of this phase is to reach a 
model that experts agree on and believe is sufficiently representative of the problem 
under study. 
Phase Three: 
After collecting expert’s opinions, their addition, deletion and modification to the first 
draft model, the analyst included all these modifications into the model, which resulted in 
an updated version of the model. This phase was done under the supervision of the expert 
who provided the original draft of the models. 
Next, this updated version of the model was taken back to each individual expert and 
each expert was asked to review the structure of this version (with all experts’ 
modifications and corrections included). In the case that experts still felt the need to make 
modifications, these modifications were discussed with other experts as well and after 
reaching a consensus was finalized into the model. This phase of expert interviews may 
have been done in more than one interview session. Then the experts were asked to rate 
the model on the scale of 0 to 100, in each of the ollowing categories:  
1. Completeness. From your perspective, to what extent does this model 
capture all important and relevant phenomena for the particular problem 
that we are studying? On a scale from 0 to 100, 0 would correspond to a 
model that does not include some important and relevant details, whereas 
100 would correspond to a model that includes all details that you 
consider important. What number would you assign? 
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2. Accuracy: From your perspective, how accurately or realistically does the 
model depict important factors that influence risk of experiencing 
pressure ulcer? On a scale from 0 to 100, 0 would correspond to a model 
that is unrealistic, over-idealized or inaccurate, whereas 100 would 
correspond to a model that is realistic and accurate. What number would 
you assign? 
3.  Ease of understanding: From your perspective, how easy is it to 
understand the overall logic of the model. On a scale from 0 to 100, 0 
would correspond to a model that is difficult to follow, even with 
extensive explanation, and a 100 would correspond t a model that is 
readily understandable. What number would you assign? 
4. Perceived predictive validity: From your perspective, if you were to use 
this model, how well could you predict the risk of pressure ulcer?  On a 
scale from 0 to 100, 0 would correspond to a model that does not help at 
all with predicting effects, and a 100 would correspond to a model that 
predicts the effects very well. What number would you assign? 
 
The final product of these three phases, were models that were qualitatively verified and 
validated by experts and were ready for quantificaton. Phase four of the interviews was 
concerned with eliciting the parameters of the model, which will be discussed in the next 
section. 
 
Figure 3-7, summarizes the phases of model construction and the validation of the 
qualitative part of the models.
 
  
Figure 3-7.Model construction and q
 
It is worth mentioning that for elicitation of the structure of the models, for each sub 
model, each expert took part in four 30 minutes interview sessions. That is each expert on 
average spent about 6 hours in the course of 
validation of the qualitative (structure) part of the models (Pressure Ulcer BBN, Line 




ualitative validation process 
12 months, on the construction and 
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of the models, who dedicated on average half an hour of her time per week during this 
period. 
 
3.5.8 Eliciting the Parameters of the Model (Model Quantification) 
 
Expert judgment techniques are useful for model quantification where for various reasons 
including cost, uniqueness of the situation under study, difficulties and other reasons, 
none or not enough observations have been made in order to quantify data with real 
observed data. 
3.5.9 Formats of Elicitation 
 
Expert’s opinion on the quantity of interest can be elicited in different ways and forms.  
A. Direct Elicitation 
In this form of elicitation, we elicit a direct estimate of expert’s degree of belief on the 
issue under the study, which simply involves asking the expert to state his or her response 
and degree of belief on the subject. Different approaches and formats of elicitation may 
fall in this category. For instance, Response Scale; wh re experts choose between ranges 
of feasible responses presented to them, also is another method in this category 
(O’Hagan, 2006). 
Although direct elicitation is the most straightforward method of elicitation, some 
concerns in the literature have been raised about the reliability of the results of this 
method. Especially when probabilities are being elicit d and from experts who are not 
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quite familiar with the notion of probabilities (Ayyub, 2001). Educating the experts with 
the basic concepts of probability, and finding an effici nt way for asking the questions 
from experts, in a way that is closer to expert’s day to day experience may help alleviate 
this problem. For example if probability of the disea e X is being elicited, instead of 
asking the experts “what is the probability that a patient will develop disease X?” it may 
be more efficient to ask “if you have 100 patients, how many of them would develop X, 
to your opinion”. In other words, asking the questions in terms of relative frequency 
rather than probability. 
B. Indirect Elicitation 
The indirect method is based on betting rates, in order for the experts to reach to a point 
that they are indifferent between the options that are presented to them. For instance, if 
you are presented with an opportunity to win 100$, and have an option to bet on event A 
or bet on throwing a “1” on a dice, which would you pick? If you pick betting on event 
A, it shows that your subjective probability of event A is greater than . A sequence of 
bets may be used to refine and specify the subjective probabilities of experts more 
precisely (O’Hagan 2006, Ayyub, 2001). 
 
3.5.10 Challenges and Generic Issues in Eliciting Expert Opinion 
 
Besides the task of selecting a group of experts that are able and willing to contribute to 
the elicitation process, which could turn out to be quite a demanding task, other issues in 




Expert opinion is subject to biases; that is the possibility of overestimation, 
underestimation and overconfidence. Experts may provide their opinion with more 
certainty than is justified with their knowledge on quantities being assessed.  
Overconfidence is especially more common in assessing confidence intervals on an 
estimated quantity (Ayyub, 2001). Biases appear at m ny levels. Discussions in the 
literature (Bedford and Cooke, 2001, Otway and von Wi terfeldt, 1992) could be found 
on mindset (unstated assumptions used by experts), structural biases (occurring through 
the level of detail in one parts of a study), motivational biases (when expert has a stake in 
the outcome of the study), cognitive biases (overconfidence for example), anchoring 
(when expert bases his or her opinion on an estimate given to him or her) and availability 
(when overestimates about events that can be recalled nd underestimates about the 
events that are difficult to recall). 
Even though these problems could not be entirely avoided, it is possible to guard against 
and control them, at least to some extent, by taking effective measures such as providing 
needed training to the experts and the use of calibration techniques (Ayyub, 2001). 
Another challenge relating to quantitative expert elicitation, which could be seen in the 
literature is eliciting probabilities and the presentation format for communicating 
probabilities. For instance van der Gaag, et al. (2002), express that their experts had 
considerable difficulty understanding conditional probabilities using probability scales. 
For quantitative elicitation (including probabilities and conditional probabilities) we 
asked the experts for their opinion both in terms of pr babilities and frequencies and 





3.6 Validation and Verification 
 
Model verification and validation (V&V) are essential phases of model development 
process. Verification is the process that ensures that the conceptual model has been 
translated into a computer model with no mistakes and with sufficient accuracy. 
Validation on the other hand, ensures that the model a dresses the problem at hand with 
sufficient accuracy, and meets the intended requirements from the methodology and 
results perspective. In other words, with validating a model we want to ensure that the 
model addresses the problem of interest and provides sufficiently accurate information 
about the system being modeled. We are emphasizing the term “sufficiently accurate”, 
since no model of the real world is 100% accurate, but validation ensures sufficient 
accuracy with reference to the purpose the model is be ng used (e.g. demonstration 
models vs. others) (Robinson, 1997). 
In Figure 3-8, Sargent (2004), shows how a verification and validation process needs to 
be involved in each step of the model building process, and also shows various forms of 
validations. There are many methods of verification and validation available to modelers, 
and unfortunately no study shows which are more effctive and efficient, but below is a 
summary of some of the more common techniques (Robins n, 1997). 
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Figure 3-8.Simulation model verification and validat on in the modeling process (Sargent, 2001) 
 
• Conceptual Model Validation (i.e. is the level of detail in this model sufficient to 
answer the question at hand? are the assumptions correct and are all important 
variables included in the model),  
• Data Validation (i.e. are data needed for model building and quantification 
accurate and reliable?),  
• White-Box Validation (i.e. does each part of the model represent the real world 
with desired level of accuracy?),  
• Black-Box Validation (i.e. does the overall model rp esent the real world 
accurately?) 
Carson (2002) also proposes a simple rather intuitive framework for verification and 
validation; 
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• Testing the model for face validity , i.e. examining the model’s output measures 
of performance for a given scenario and determining how reasonable they are 
• Testing the model over a range of input parameters, i.e. run sensitivity analysis 
and look for anomalies in the output 
• Compare model predictions to past performance of the actual system 
Much of what we have discussed in this section, is a reflection of simulation models’ 
validation literature, but in general could be applied to any type of model building 
activity.  In validating and verifying the models in this work, we have applied this general 
framework. The methodology presented in this work includes a system dynamics 
formalism (a simulation model) and Bayesian belief n twork formalism (a probabilistic 
network). The V&V process used to validate the models in research is twofold; 
qualitative validation and quantitative validation. Since the models in both cases have 
been developed using subject matter experts’ input, m ch of the qualitative validation 
(both in system dynamics and Bayesian belief network models) are rather built in the 
model development process. The models have been develop d and matured to the current 
version through much iteration in many rounds of interviews with as many as 11 experts. 
The quantitative validation process in a nutshell, consists of using a few years of 
available data to build and calibrate the model andusing data available for years other 
than the ones used for model building and calibration, to evaluate the performance of the 
models. More details are discussed on V&V for each of the models in chapter 4, where 
each model is discussed and the development and quantification steps are explained.  
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4 Model Development for Adverse Events; Pressure Ulcer 
In this chapter we will discuss the BBN model develop d for risk of hospital acquired 
pressure ulcer. The chapter provides a background on pressure ulcer, risk assessment 
tools used to assess the risk of pressure ulcer, and finally development, quantification and 
validation of the pressure ulcer BBN. 
4.1 Introduction 
 
A Pressure Ulcer (PU) is a skin break that does not heal and often causes irritation. Heels, 
elbows and buttocks areas of the body are most at risk. As the National Pressure Ulcer 
Advisory Panel (NPUAP) defines it “Pressure Ulcer (PU) is a localized injury to the skin 
and/or underlying tissue usually over a bony area, as a result of pressure in combination 
with shear and/or friction”. The NPUAP further categorizes the severity of PUs in the 
following stages in Table 4-1: 
Stage 
1 
Intact skin with non-blanchable redness of a localized area usually over a bony 
prominence. Darkly pigmented skin may not have visible blanching; its color 
may differ from the surrounding area 
Stage 
2 
Partial thickness loss of dermis presenting as a shallow open ulcer with a red 




Full thickness tissue loss. Subcutaneous fat may be visible but bone, tendon or 
muscles are not exposed. Slough may be present but does not obscure the depth 
 69 
of tissue loss. May include undermining and tunneling 
Stage 
4 
Full thickness tissue loss with exposed bone, tendon or muscle. Slough or eschar 
may be present on some parts of the wound bed. Often include undermining and 
tunneling 
 
Table 4-1.Different stages of pressure ulcer 
  
Though pressure ulcers are potentially preventable, unfortunately they present a common 
condition especially among high-risk population such as elderly and patients with 
impaired physical mobility (Reddy, Gill and Rechon, 2006).  
In the United States, studies suggest that in acute car  the prevalence of pressure ulcer 
ranges from 3.5 to 29% (estimated at 15% by NPUAP ) (Ayello and Barden, 2002) , 2.2 
to 26% among those in long-term care and 10 to 17% in homecare (Reddy, et al., 2006). 
Some studies suggest that the prevalence figures in spinal units are as high as 50% 
[Keller, et al. 2002].  Literature also suggests similar prevalence statistics in European 
hospitals (Papanikolaou, et al., 2007). 
Pressure ulcers are painful for patients and costly to care for. An estimated 1.3 to 3 
million pressure ulcers are treated in U.S. hospitals every year with an estimated cost of 
$500 to $40,000 to heal each ulcer [Lyder, 2003,] and may even cost up to $ 75,000 per 
patient [Keller, et al. 2002, Reddy et al., 2006].  U S. expenditures on treating pressure 
ulcers have been estimated to be $11 billion each year. This number in the UK has been 
estimated in a 1993 study to be in the range £180-£231 million, which accounts for 0.4 -
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0.8% of their health spending (Bennett, Dealey and Posnett, 2004). The development of 
pressure ulcers may also indicate neglect and mismanagement and have legal 
implications; 87% of litigation settlements regarding pressure ulcers in long-term care 
(LTC) settings have been in favor of LTC residents [Reddy, et al., 2006]. If pressure 
ulcers are to be prevented and the risk of PUs is to be controlled and reduced it is 
essential to identify patients who are at risk of experiencing this adverse event. Moreover, 
a range of preventive measures including use of pressu  reducing mattresses and patient 
repositioning are available -even though limited information on their effectiveness exists-
(Baldi, et al., 2010) but before any prevention plans re put in place, some form of risk 
assessment of individual patient’s chances of PU should be carried out (Papanikolaou, et 
al., 2007, Borlawsky, 2004). Though some clinicians may believe that performing an 
informal PU risk assessment would suffice, research has shown that when a formal risk 
assessment is not undertaken, clinicians have consiste tly tended to intervene only at the 
highest levels of risk of PU, leaving many patients susceptible to the risk of hospital 
acquired pressure ulcer. It has also been shown that in studies where formal risk 
assessment was performed and preventive measures were taken accordingly, the 
incidence of PUs had dropped by 60%, with decreased severity of PUs and cost of care 
[Ayell and Braden, 2002]. In the next session, some of the more popular PU risk 
assessment tools are reviewed.  
4.1.1 Risk Assessment Tools 
 
Since a comprehensive and detailed risk assessment of every individual patient’s 
vulnerability to pressure ulcer, based on the principals of wound healing, requires 
gathering a vast amount of knowledge and may become practically impossible. Several 
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risk assessment tools or risk assessment scales (RAS) have been designed since the 
1960’s, as a shortcut to produce a quick assessment and help practitioners identify 
patients who are at risk of developing pressure ulcr. Current guidelines underline that 
RASs should be used as an addition to provider’s clinical judgment and not as a 
replacement. To date over 20 of such scales are describ d in the literature (Papanikolaou, 
et al., 2007]). These tools include, among others, the Norton scale [Norton, McLaren, 
Exton-Smith, 1962], the Gosnell scale (Gosnell DJ., 1973). , the Braden scale 
(Bergstrom, Braden, Laguzza, Holman 1987), the Waterlow scale (Waterlow, 1985). 
Some of these scales such as Norton’s and Waterlow’s have been developed in Europe 
and others were created in the United States.  
Typically, these scales produce assessments of a set of internal and external factors (e.g. 
mobility, nutrition, etc.) that are generally believed to be contributing factors in 
development of pressure ulcers. A numerical value is assigned to each of these factors 
based on patient’s conditions, and these values are then summed to create a total score. 
The total score is usually compared to a critical value or a cutoff point, and hence it is 
used as an indication of patient’s susceptibility to experiencing pressure ulcers.  
  Keller [2002] has summarized the risk factors considered by some of the well-known 
risk assessment scales. 
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Figure 4-1.Pressure ulcer risk factors (Keller, 2002) 
 
Between the above mentioned risk assessment tools, he Braden scale is perhaps the most 
widely used in the United States.   As a representative of this set of RASs , the Braden 
scale is discussed in the next session. 
4.1.1.1 The Braden Scale 
 
Following an observation that despite nursing staff’s attention to repositioning and care 
of the skin of nursing home’s patients in the US, poor nutritional condition was a major 
contributor to the formation of pressure ulcer, theBraden scale was developed in the 
1980’s to assess the susceptibility to the risk of pressure ulcer [Papanikolaou, et al., 2007, 
, and Braden et al., 1987]. The Braden risk assessmnt tool is a linear combination of six 
risk indicators, formally shown as: 
SB
 = Z1+ Z2+ Z3+ Z4+ Z5+ Z6 
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Where the parameters are: 
SB : The Braden score which represents the risk of developing  pressure ulcer; 
Z1 : Sensory perception 
Z2 : Activity score 
Z3 : Mobility score 
Z4 : Nutrition score 
Z5:  Moisture score 
Z6:  Friction and shear score 
 
Factors Z1 to Z3, sensory perception, activity and mobility cover the clinical situations that 
expose patients to intense and prolonged pressure. Factors Z4 to Z6, Nutrition, moisture 
and friction and shear cover the conditions that have an adverse effect on skin’s tolerance 
for pressure. Given that the nurses have received proper training, they can provide 
necessary preventive interventions based on an individual patient’s needs determined by 
the Braden score [Papanikolaou, et al., 2007, Ayello and Braden, 2001]. Figure 4-2, 
shows a formal worksheet for assessing a patient’s risk for developing pressure ulcer 
using the Braden scale. 
Each of these subscales is scored from 1-3 or 4, for total scores that range from 6-23. A 
lower Braden scale score indicates a lower level of functioning and, therefore, a higher 
level of risk for pressure ulcer development. A score f 19 or higher, for instance, would 
 
indicate that the patient is at low risk, with no need for treatment at this time. This is 
based on the initial suggested critical score for the B
breakdown, was thought to be commenced. This cut off point has since been disputed, for 
instance Bergquist and Frantz (2001) [Bergquist and Frantz, 2001, Papanikolaou, et al., 
2007] have suggested 19 as the cut off score. It has also been suggested that it may be 
more efficient for healthcare units to determine thir own critical point, consi
needs of their patient population and local clinical settings.
 
 
Figure 4-2.Braden scale risk assessment worksheet
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4.1.1.2 Validity and Reliability 
 
Given the number of available RASs, the question may be raised, whether and why one 
scale may be preferred over another. Literature suggests the clinician should decide to use 
a scale by examining its reliability and validity [Ayello and Barden 2001]. What is meant 
by reliability here is consistency, i.e. the degree of agreement among raters (inter-rater-
reliability). A common measure of reliability for a RAS is percentage agreement or the 
percentage of cases in which different clinicians/raters assign the same score to the same 
patients. Validity or accuracy on the other hand is the RAS’s ability in correctly 
predicting whether a patient will develop pressure lcer. Predictive validity is twofold; 
sensitivity and specificity. Sensitivity is the perc ntage of patients who do develop a 
pressure ulcer and were indeed identified as patients ‘at risk’ by the RAS. Therefore good 
sensitivity for a risk assessment tool means correctly identifying “true positives” with 
minimum “false negatives”. Specificity is the percentage of patients who do not develop 
a pressure ulcer and were in fact identified as patients ‘not at risk’ by the RAS. Hence 
good specificity for a risk assessment tool means corre tly identifying “true negatives” 
with minimum “false positives”. 
Even though the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) guidelines has 
mentioned two of these RASs (the Braden Scale and the Norton Scale) to be appropriate 
tools in assessing the risk of pressure ulcer due to the larger number of clinical research 
in support of their reliability and validity and having received the most clinical attention 
(Smith , 95) –although some studies have argued otherwise about their effectiveness ( 
Defloor and Grypdonck, 2004)-, unfortunately the validity and reliability of many of the 
pressure ulcer risk assessment scales are questionable and no general agreement exists 
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with respect to the usefulness of these scales (Keller, 2006, Pandorbo-Hidalgo, et al., 
2005). Many studies have reviewed these scales and a good number of them have 
examined the predictive validity of these risk asses ment scales and have reported 
substantial variations in the predictive validity both within the same scale and across 
different scales when used in different health care settings and/or different patient 
populations (Papanikolaou, et al., 2007). For studies on the validation of some of these 
scales please see (among many): Spera et al, 2010, Seongsook, etal. 2003, Defloor and 
Grypdonck, 2004… 
 
4.1.1.3 Pitfalls of Scoring Approach to Risk Assessment 
 
Despite the fact that using risk assessment tools, in addition to clinician’s judgment, 
provides some useful information in identifying the patients at risk in developing pressure 
ulcer and helps practitioners make an informed decision in implementing appropriate 
preventive interventions, there are methodical shortcomings that are common between 
these RASs. 
In the scoring system that is used in these risk asessment scales to identify patients at 
risk and patients not at risk, every risk factor contributes equally to the overall risk score. 
In other words the scoring approach to risk assessmnt assumes that all the factors have 
equal effect on the overall risk of developing pressure ulcer. The equal-weighting 
approach while being the simplest way to scale scoring, fails to recognize that some 
factors may play a more significant role and therefore should have a larger contribution to 
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the overall risk score (Papanikolaou, et al., 2007). For a more accurate predictive 
measure, the magnitude of the effect of each of the risk factors on the overall risk of 
developing pressure ulcer has to be considered, based on the importance that these factors 
empirically demonstrate. Failing to do so may project unrealistic risk scores that could 
possibly influence the effectiveness of the interventions and affect the allocation of 
resources. 
Another rather important deficiency of most of risk assessment scales is that the effect of 
all risk factors contributes linearly to the overall isk score. This completely overlooks the 
fact that a certain factor in presence of other factors may, for instance, exponentially 
increase the risk of pressure ulcer. For example, consider the Braden scale. Given that 
Sensory and Nutrition are influencing factors in risk of pressure ulcer but the magnitudes 
of this influence is in a) presence of impaired mobility and b) un-impaired mobility could 
be very different. 
4.2 Pressure Ulcer BBN Development 
 
To assess the risk of developing pressure ulcer as a function of individual patient’s risk 
factors and patient-provider (i.e. intervention relat d), a Bayesian Belief Network 
framework has been chosen. Use of BBNs in modeling the risk of experiencing pressure 
ulcers, not only alleviates the major criticism to the scaling risk assessment approach, 
namely the equal weighting of the risk factors, butalso offers capabilities that could 
possibly provide more realistic, relevant and meaningful assessments; 
• Since we construct the Bayesian Network based on the conditional 
probabilities, no equal weighting of the factors is assumed. Based on the 
 78 
importance of each factor and the strength with which these factors 
influence the risk of pressure ulcer (obtained from field data and also 
expert judgment) we can determine the conditional probability that a 
patient will experience pressure ulcer given the state  of all the risk 
factors. 
• Using BBNs enables the analyst, to take into the account the fact that the 
degree of influence of one factor in risk of pressure lcer may be different 
given the presence or absence of other risk factors. 
• Bayesian Belief Networks are probabilistic in nature and the uncertainty 
of our assessment of pressure ulcer risk, given the stat  of all relevant risk 
factors can be expressed explicitly. 
 
A Bayesian Belief Network, that includes or reflects the factors introduced in literature as 
factors influencing risk of pressure ulcer, has been d veloped. Additionally factors that 
the panel of experts thought to be of importance, and missing from the current risk 
assessment scales, have also been included. Figure 4-3 depicts this BBN. The validation 







Figure 4-3.Pressure ulcer BBN
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a. Circulation Impairment:  
Poor blood circulation makes patients more susceptibl  to pressure ulcer. Although 
impaired circulation can be resulted from various conditions, in this model we have 
considered two major factors that may result in impaired circulation; diabetes and 
peripheral vascular disease (PVD). 
This is a binary factor in the BBN and the possible states are Impaired and Unimpaired. 
 
b. Peripheral Vascular Disease (PVD):  
Peripheral vascular disease refers to diseases of blo d vessels located outside the heart 
and brain. It is a circulatory problem in which narrowed vessels reduce blood flow to the 
legs, arms and kidneys [American heart association, www.americanheart.org]. 
This is a binary factor in the BBN and the possible states are PVD present and PVD 
absent. 
 
c. Sensory Impairment:  
Sensory impairment refers to a defect in sensing or passing on the impulse, which affects 
patients’ ability to respond to pressure related pain and discomfort. Factors that may 
affect sensory impairment include diabetes, peripheal vascular diseases and focal 
neurological deficit. 
This is a binary factor in the BBN and the possible states are Impaired and Unimpaired. 
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d. Skin Integrity: 
Skin integrity is a description of whether or not patient’s skin is intact. A number of 
conditions/factors may affect the integrity of skin, which include: Nutrition (food intake), 
Moisture level (the degree to which skin is exposed to moisture), Steroid use, Mobility, 
and Circulation impairment. 
This is a binary factor in the BBN and the possible states are Normal and Abnormal. 
e. Mobility: 
Mobility refers to patient’s ability to change and control his/her body position. In the 
BBN this is a binary node with states Impaired and Unimpaired mobility. Mobility is 
generally considered the most important risk factor in developing pressure ulcer and a 
necessary condition [Allman, et al., 1995, Lindgren, t al. 2004]. Factors affecting an 
individual’s mobility impairment include: focal neurological deficit, central nervous 
system impairment, weakness and debilitation and morbid besity. 
f. Frequency of Move: 
Another important factor in risk of developing pressure ulcer is whether the patient is 
being moved to different body positions frequently enough, especially when patient’s 
own ability to move and mobility is impaired. This node reflects whether the staff can/do 
move the patient as often as the patient should be repositioned -it is important to note that 
detecting and preventing pressure ulcers systematically s labor intensive (Perneger, et al., 
1998)- in order to reduce the risk of developing ulcer. This is also a binary node with 
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states: Adequate frequency of move and inadequate frequency of move. Adequacy of 
frequency of move on the other hand is influenced by staff adequacy (whether or not we 
have enough staff at the time to be able to frequently reposition the patient),  C-I Move 
(Counter indication to move ) (are there any limitations that may prevent the staff from 
moving the patient, for instance a patient recovering from open heart surgery) and morbid 
obesity (the heavy weight of the patient may make it extremely difficult for the staff to 
move the patient). 
Currently, there is no empirical evidence to show the optimal frequency of repositioning 
the patient and it should be done based on patient’s need, also taking into the account the 
surface upon which the patient is lying or sitting (Gunningberg, 2005). 
g. Assistive Devices: 
To relieve pressure, several strategies may be used including manual repositioning of the 
patients, which is discussed in “Frequency of Move” node of the BBN, and also use of 
assistive devices. These assistive devices include s pport surfaces such as cushions, 
mattress overlays, replacement mattresses or pressure relieving beds (Nixon et al., 2006),  
which reduce the risk of pressure ulcer (Reddy, et al., 2006, McInnes, et al., 2010). 
EUAP suggests that a patient receives appropriate preventive measures while in a chair or 
a bed if he or she is allocated one of the following (Gunningberg, 2005): 
1. A powered device (i.e. with an electrical supply) 
2. A non-powered device (i.e. low pressure foam mattress) and being repositioned 
every 2, 3 or 4 hours 
3. No special device but being repositioned every 2 hours 
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 The use of these assistive devices depends on their availability and also staff adequacy 
(whether or not the high level of workload prevents staff from providing patients with 
these devices). 
 
4.3 Pressure Ulcer BBN Quantification 
 
As discussed previously, building a Bayesian network f  a certain application has three 
steps and involves three tasks. First, important variables and their possible states have to 
be identified. Second, the relationships between these variables are identified and are 
represented graphically with edges between the variables. The third phase is to obtain the 
numerical parameters, i.e. probabilities required for the quantification of the network 
from data or through domain expert elicitation (Druzdel and van der Gaag, 2000). The 
first two tasks that are concerned with establishing the structure of the network typically 
involve iterative and interactive sessions with domain experts. Multiple iterative cycles 
are required to revise the model(s), identify new variables and links or perhaps delete 
other variables and links and converge on a valid representation of the phenomenon that 
is being studied. For the first and the second task we have followed the process proposed 
by Marcot et al. (2006), for the peer review of theBBNs, were we started with a basic 
influence diagram as base model and followed the peer review process using the panel of 
domain experts to develop, refine and validate the BBNs (both pressure ulcer and line 
infection BBNs). The process of peer review of BBNs has been discussed in detail in 
section 3.5.7. While the first and second tasks requi  moderate effort and time, 
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experience indicates that the third task, which is the elicitation of the quantitative 
information including the conditional probability table or CPT, requires the most effort 
(Kjaerulff and Madsen, 2008). Certain Modeling techniques are available to make the 
third task more manageable, without (or with minimum) compromising the accuracy of 
the results. We have used some of these techniques in quantifying the BBNs in this study 
such as parent divorcing and Noisy-OR gates which are explained in the next section. 
4.3.1 Modeling Techniques  
 
There are a number of modeling techniques and methods that could be used to simplify 
the specification of a Bayesian network. One of the reasons that these methods may be 
applied is to simplify the knowledge elicitation process. Kjaerulff and Anderson (2008), 
cover these methods and techniques in two categories:  
1- Structure related techniques, that are used to adjust the structure of a 
probabilistic network 
2- Probability distribution related techniques for thespecification of conditional 
probability distributions, including techniques for capturing uncertain 
information and for reducing the number of parameters to be specified 
Parent divorcing is technique from the first category, that reduces the number of 
probabilities to be assessed with making changes to the graphical structure of the BBN 
and Noisy-OR gates (and its generalizations) are an approach that falls into the second 
category which uses parametric probability distributions. Both of these techniques have 
been used in quantifying the BBNs in this research. Sections 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.1.2 explain 
these methods. 
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4.3.1.1 Parent Divorcing 
 
Parent divorcing is a modeling technique that is commonly used to reduce the complexity 
of specifying and representing the effect of a large number of cause variables (parent 
nodes) on a single effect variable (child node) in a Bayesian network, with adjusting the 
structure of the network. The idea is to introduce an intermediate variable or a dummy 
node between the cause node (i.e. parent node) and the effect node (i.e. child node), such 
that the dummy node captures the impact of its parents on the child variable, in order to 
limit the size of the parent sets. 
Figure 4-4, below depicts this idea through a simple Bayesian net. Child node “Y” has 
three direct parents . Applying the parent divorcing technique to Y and its 
direct causes results in creating a dummy variable “I” between Y and a subset of its 
parents , hence variable I will have as parents and v riable Y will have  
and I as its parents. 
If we assume binary states for all of the variables in this example, and also assume the 
conditional probability distribution for the original network as depicted in Figure 4-4 
With the creation of dummy variable I, the BBN will change from figure 4-4.a to 4-4.c 
our conditional probability table will change to from figure 4-4.b to 4-4.d In other words 
instead of dealing with one distribution table of size 16 we create two tables of size 8 
(Kjaerulff and Madsen, 2008). Figure 4-4.d top, shows the probability distribution for
, and figure 4-4.d, bottom for . 
1 2 3, ,X X X
1 2,X X 1 2,X X 3X
1 2( , )P I X X 3( , )P Y X I
 
Figure 4-4.Parent divorcing 
4.3.1.2 Noisy-OR Gates 
 
In quantifying BBNs, some types of conditional probability distribution can be 
approximated with methods that require fewer parameters, and very often they 
approximate the true distribution sufficiently well while reducing the model building 
effort significantly (Onisko, et al., 2001). Noisy
generalizations is one of such approaches. Noisy
interaction between causes 
assumptions are: 
• s are each suffic




-OR gates by Pearl (1988) and their 
-OR gates are used to describe the 
and their common cause Y. Two crucial 
ient to cause Y in absence of other causes
 




If each of the causes , has a probability of being sufficient to cause Y, then the 
Noisy-OR gate methods enables us to populate the entire conditional probability table 
(CPT), with only n parameters, , where is the probability that effect Y will 
be true if cause is present and all other causes are abs nt. In mathematical 
representation; 
 
And the probability of Y given any subset of causess, that are present will be: 
 
This formula is sufficient to derive the whole conditional probability of Y, conditioned on 
causes  (Pearl, 1988, Onisko, et al., 2001). 
Extensions have been developed for the basic Noisy-OR gate such as Lemmer and 
Gossink (2004) propose a recursive Noisy-OR gate whre the independence assumption 
of causes could be relaxed, and Henrion (1989) proposes a Leaky Noisy-OR gate for 
situations where the effect Y is true and all the causes are absent. This 
extension could be used where a model is not capturing all the possible causes. In Leaky 
Noisy-OR gate, a parameter called the leak probability is introduced and its value is 
the combined effect of all causes of Y that are not m deled; 
 
iX ip
1 2, ,..., np p p ip
iX ,jX j i≠
1 2( , ,..., ,..., )i i np pr y x x x x=
pX iX
:




pr y X p
∈
= − −∏
1 2, ,..., nX X X
1 2, ,..., nX X X
0p
0 1 2( , ,... )np pr y x x x=
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Which represents the probability that all causes, , are absent but the effect Y 
is true. Henrion (1989) then derives the probability distribution of Y given a subset  
of the s which are present and the leak probability of as; 
 
Diez (1993), also proposes an extension to Noisy-OR gates that includes multiple states 
for variables rather than binary states in the original Noisy-OR.   
 
4.3.2 The Quantification Process 
 
To proceed with the quantification of the Bayesian net for pressure ulcer the following 
steps in modification of the net, without compromising the causal structure of the 
Bayesian net and the accuracy of the output, have been taken. 
 




















Figure 4-3, shows the pressure ulcer risk BBN, as it was qualitatively validated (factors 
and casual effects) by our panel of domain experts.  
Data to establish the conditional probabilities was obtained by querying a clinical data 
archive at a large urban US medical center. This data repository contains diagnostic codes 
and clinical outcomes for 70,090 inpatients hospitalized over a 2-year period. After 
obtaining IRB approval, structured queries were constructed to identify conditions that 
were present in two distinct cohorts of patients: 1) patients who did not acquire a pressure 
ulcer during hospitalization and 2) patients who did acquire a pressure ulcer during 
hospitalization. At the time of discharge, expert codification of up to 15 physiological or 
disease condition codes are assigned to characterize the patient and the episode of care. 
Pharmacy and laboratory data for some of the patients a alyzed in some cases either to 
confirm one or more diagnostic codes, disambiguate clinical conditions or identify 
additional patients in the cohort. As an example, in the case of the node “Skin Integrity”, 
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which may be affected by Nutrition, Moisture Level, Steroid Use, Circulation Impairment 
and other factors not specified in the model, we extracted all cases of compromised skin 
integrity due to any reason (specified or unspecifid in the BBN model), to ensure that 
any patient with skin integrity issues is accounted for in this model. Similarly, for the 
nodes “Circulation Impairment” and “Sensory Impairment” the two most prevalent 
causing factors for these conditions as experts have identified are “Diabetes” and 
“Peripheral Vascular Diseases or PVDs”, among others (which data may or may not exist 
for). In the quantification of this model, we have id ntified all the cases of circulation 
impairment and sensory impairment among the hospital opulation regardless of the 
cause, to make sure that all patients with these conditi ns are included in the model. One 
important step was to distinguish those patients who acquired a pressure ulcer during 
their hospitalization from those who were treated for the condition, but had the condition 
at the time of admission to the hospital. To do this, we constrained the queries using a 
special ‘Present on Admission’ code that is used to classify patient conditions at this 
medical center.  
Additionally, as it was explained in section 4.2, Mobility is a binary factor with states; 
Impaired Mobility =1, Un-impaired Mobility=0. The factors/conditions affecting a 
patient’s mobility are “Focal Neurological Deficit”, “CNS Impairment”, “Weakness 
/Debilitation” and “Morbid Obesity”. With the approval of experts, in quantifying this 
BBN we have assumed that if one of these causes is present then the patient will be 
considered to have mobility impairment. Since the factor “Mobility” is not readily 
available in datasets, to calculate the relative frequency of each state of the node 
“Mobility”, one can instead count the number of cases where at least one of the causes of 
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impaired mobility is present. This frequency divided by the total number of cases under 




Figure 4-5.Pressure ulcer BBN, transformation 1 
 




Figure 4-6.Pressure ulcer BBN, transformation 2 
 
Frequency of Move is one of the most important and determining factors in a patient’s 
risk of experiencing pressure ulcer. Unfortunately due to the difficulty in collecting 
information for this node and determining whether the patient’s movement was adequate 
or not, this data does not exist in data bases [NOTE: some data exists, but it is unreliable, 
and there are a lot of false negative or β errors]. But we do have crisp data on the factors 
that experts think affect the frequency of move in a patient (e.g. mobility, CNS 
impairment, C-I move and Obesity (figure 4.6)). To deal with this situation and obtain the 
conditional probabilities of adequate and inadequate frequencies of movement and to 
capture the effect of four parent variables (Mobility, CNS impairment, Morbid Obesity 
and C-I Move) on the frequency of move, we are using the "parent divorcing technique" 
introduced in section 4.3.1.1, and creating a dummy node called "Aggregate Effect on 
Frequency of Move”, a binary variable with the following states: 
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1) High: when at least one of the four factors (Mobility, CNS Impairment, 
Morbid Obesity or CI move) is present 
2) Low: otherwise 
The probability of Frequency of move being adequate or inadequate is then conditioned 
on this “Aggregate Effect on Frequency of Move” node and "Staff Adequacy". Figure 4-7 
depicts this modification to the structure of BBN. 
 
 
Figure 4-7.Pressure ulcer BBN, final transformation  
 
4.3.3 The Conditional Probability Table (CPT) 
 
Between years 2008 and 2010, we have used 70,090 patient records to construct the 
conditional probability table. Out of these patients a total of 149 patients had developed 
pressure ulcers while in the hospital. Since only hospital acquired pressure ulcers were of 
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interest in this study, we have started with the year 2008 patient data because only after 
this year whether the pressure ulcer was acquired while in hospital or not, was actually 
specified in data bases. 
4.3.3.1 Marginal and Conditional Probabilities 
 
After importing the data to Microsoft Access, the number of patients with condition(s) 
specified as risk factors in pressure ulcer BBN were counted, and relative frequencies of 
these factors and the conditional probabilities required to populate the conditional 
probability table and quantify the BBN were calculated as follows. 
4.3.3.2 Marginal Probabilities   
 
1. Skin Integrity 
 States: 
i. Skin Integrity Compromised =1 
ii. Skin Integrity Uncompromised=0 
Total number of patients with Compromised skin integrity = 22905 
Total hospital admissions = 70090 
22905
(   ) 0.327
70090
(   U ) 0.673
p Skin Integrity Compromised







2. Circulation Impairment 
 States: 
i. Circulation Impaired = 1 
ii. Circulation Normal = 0 
Total number of patients with impaired circulation = 29202 
Total hospital admissions = 70090 
29202
(  ) 0.417
70090






3. Sensory Impairment 
 States: 
i. Sensory Impaired = 1 
ii. Sensory Unimpaired = 0 
Total number of patients with impaired sensory = 17743 
Total hospital admissions = 70090 
17743
(  ) 0.253
70090











i. Mobility Impaired = 1 
ii. Mobility Unimpaired = 0 
Any patient with Focal Neurological Deficit, Central Nervous System Impairment, 
Weakness/Debilitation or Morbid Obesity has been counted as a case of impaired 
mobility. 
Total number of patients with impaired mobility = 26289 
Total hospital admissions = 70090 
26289
(  ) 0.375
70090







5. Aggregate Effect on Frequency of Move 
 States: 
i. High = 1 
ii. Low = 0 
Any patient with Central Nervous System Impairment, Morbid Obesity, Impaired 
Mobility or Counter Indication to Move (C-I Move) has been counted as patient with 
high aggregate effect on Frequency of Move. 
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Total number of patients with high aggregate effect on frequency of move= 26608 
Total hospital admissions = 70090 
26608
(   ) 0.389
70090
(   ) 0.621
p High Aggregate Effect





6. Staff Adequacy 
 States: 
i. Adequate = 1 
ii. Inadequate=0 
Data on staff adequacy is not properly reported and recorded. The available data for 
627,595 patient cases used to quantify pressure ulcer BBN, indicates that in less than 6% 
of the cases staff adequacy was reported as being adequ te and in over 94% of these 
cases data on staff adequacy was not recorded at all. Hence a more reliable estimate on 
the probability of “Staff Adequacy” would be obtained from subject matter experts. Some 
experts believed that this estimate would be different from one hospital to the other and 
the difference could be significant and pointed outthat their estimates reflect their 
experience in their own institution. Table 4-2, shows experts estimates on the probability 
of staff adequacy. We will use these estimates as aprior, and update the probability of 
staff adequacy, with the staff adequacy probability obtained from the system dynamics 
part of the model, which calculates this probability as a function of patient complexity 
scores and the pressure to reduce operational costs, discussed in section 6.2.3. 
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Table 4-2.Expert opinion; staff adequacy 
 
4.3.3.2.1 Aggregating Experts Input 
 
To aggregate experts’ inputs which are given in the form of a point estimate, we will use 
a Bayesian framework, for treating non-homogenous data (Droguett and Mosleh, 2008, 
Droguett, 1999). The objective is to find the population variability distribution of x 
(e.g. Probability of Staff In-Adequacy). To simplify matters we assume a parametric 
distribution for . Let be the set of m parameters of , so that
. For instance, in the case of Lognormal distribution and: 
 
Uncertainty distribution over the space of ’s, is the same as the uncertainty 
distribution over the values of . Also, for each value of , there exists a unique  
and vice versa. Now our goal of estimating  reduces to estimating . Given the 
information/evidence available to us (denoted as E), in our case the estimates provided by 
our experts, and a prior distribution for , we can obtain an updated state of knowledge 
probability distribution over . That is, 
                            Staff Adequacy
Expert Adequate In-adequate
Expert 1 0.95 0.05
Expert 2 > 90% < 10%
Expert 3 80% 20%
Expert 4 85-90% 10-15%
Expert 5 95-98 % 2-5%
Expert 6 90% 10%
( )xφ
( )xφ 1{ ,..., }mθ θ θ= ( )xφ



























=Prior distribution of  
=Posterior distribution of , given the information/evidence E (m-dimensional 
joint probability distribution over values of ) 
=Likelihood of information/evidence E given  
The average distribution, of the distributions of x, is given by: 
 
The expected value of is given by: 
 
Using the expected (average) value of as the set of parameters of , we will obtain 
another point estimate of . In other words, , is the distribution with the 
mean value parameters.  
The likelihood function , is the probability of observing/eliciting the information 
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Assuming that data from individual sub population (i.e. estimates from each expert) are 
independent, the likelihood function can be written as the product of each sub population 
likelihood function: 
 
Where is the i’th expert’s estimate. 
To aggregate experts’ opinion, using the Bayesian fr mework for non-homogenous data, 
discussed above, we are using version 1.5 of the R-DAT software (Prediction-
Technologies.com).  
The specification of the likelihood function depends on the type of information that is 
available. Expert-based likelihood that corresponds to the estimates of possible values of 
a quantity of interest (e.g. Probability of Inadequate Staffing) could be expressed with a 
lognormal likelihood model, and is specified in terms of median values and the analyst’s 
confidence in terms of standard deviation or error factor values. In this case we are 
assuming an error factor of 2 for all of our experts. 
Figure 4-8, shows the joint distribution of the parameters, of the distribution of 
“Probability of Inadequate Staffing”, and Figure 4-9 shows the average distribution of the 
population variability distribution set, with mean 0.105 and variance 3.24 E-3. 
* * * *
1 2
1











Figure 4-8.Joint distribution of the parameters, of the distribution of “Probability of inadequate staffing” 
 
Figure 4-9.Average distribution of the population variability distribution set 
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4.3.3.2.2 Conditional Probabilities 
 
7. Assistive devices 
 States: 
i. Used = 1 
ii. Unused = 0 
The probability of using assistive devices such as pillows, cotton blankets etc., which 
expand weight-bearing surface (e.g. using pillows under the calf to elevate patient’s heels 
off the bed surface) or reduce friction and/or shear is influenced by and conditioned on 
adequacy of staff. In other words do we have enough staff and does the workload allow 
them to utilize these devices that may reduce the risk of pressure ulcer. It should be 
mentioned that in the quantification of pressure ulcer BBN, we have assumed (with the 
approval of experts) that  items such as pressure reducing mattresses and pressure 
reducing mattress overlays would be used automatically if they are available since they 
will ultimately be charged to the patient and hence would not be a variable in this BBN. 
Unfortunately, data on usage of assistive devices is also not recorded as rigorously either 
and similar to the case of the node “Staff Adequacy” here in approximately 95% of cases 
no data at all was recorded and in 5% of cases data indicated that assistive devices were 
in use, and not a single record was found were no usage of assistive devices was reported. 
Once again experts’ opinion would be a more reliable source in obtaining the 
probabilities (conditional) of usage of assistive dvices given different states of the 
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variable “Staff adequacy”. The information experts were to provide answers to the 
following: 
1- What is the probability of assistive devices being used, given we DO have 
adequate staff? i.e. :  
2- What is the probability of assistive devices being used, given we do NOT 
have adequate staff? i.e.:  
3-  What is the probability of assistive devices NOT being used, given we DO 
have adequate staff? i.e.:  
4- What is the probability of assistive devices NOT being used, given we do 
NOT have adequate staff? i.e.:  
To ask experts these questions a frequency approach w s taken. For instance experts were 
asked :” If you have 10 patients, and you know thatyour staffing level is adequate , on 
how many of your patients assistive devices to reduc  the risk of pressure ulcer will be 
used?”. 
From what experts provided, the following probabilities (Table 4-3) for usage of assistive 
devices given all possible states of staff adequacy were determined. 
 
Table 4-3.Expert opinion; probability of using assistive devices, given staff adequacy 
(  1  1)p Assistive Devices Staff Adequacy= =
(  1  0)p Assistive Devices Staff Adequacy= =
(  0  1)p Assistive Devices Staff Adequacy= =
(  0  0)p Assistive Devices Staff Adequacy= =
       Prob. Assistive Devices Used  Given Staff Adequacy Situation
Expert Adequate Staffing In-adequate Staffing
Expert 1 100% 20%
Expert 2 100% 25%
Expert 3 90% 40%
Expert 4 90% 30%
Expert 5 > 95% 20%
Expert 6 90% 25%
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To aggregate the experts’ estimates, we will use the Bayesian methods for treating non-
homogenous data, detailed in section 4.3.3.2.1. 
Figure 4-10, shows the average distribution of the population variability distribution set 
for “Probability of Assistive Devices NOT Used, Given Adequate Staffing”, with mean 
0.0477 and variance 0.0148. 
 
 
Figure 4-10.Average distribution of the population variability distribution set for “probability of assistive 
devices NOT used, given adequate staffing” 
 
Also the same procedure estimates the “Probability of Assistive Devices NOT Used, 
Given Inadequate Staffing”. Figure 4-11, shows the av rage distribution of the population 




Figure 4-11.Average distribution of the population variability distribution set for “probability of assistive 
devices NOT used, given inadequate staffing” 
 
8. Frequency of Move 
 States: 
i. Adequate = 1 
ii. Inadequate= 0 
Inadequate frequency of move can increase the risk of developing pressure ulcers. As 
discussed before the frequency of move is influenced by many factors including 
Mobility, CNS impairment, Morbid Obesity, C-I Move and Staff Adequacy. As it was the 
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case for the nodes “Staff Adequacy” and “Assistive D vices”, no actual field data is 
recorded or available from data. To determine the conditional probabilities of adequate 
frequency of move and inadequate frequency of move gi n the different states of the 
abovementioned five parent nodes (cause factors), experts’ opinion in sought.  
To facilitate the process of ease the process of expert elicitation we discussed and 
employed “parent divorcing technique” in 4.1.3.1.1. To implement this technique we 
created a dummy node that would capture the aggregate ffects of four of five influencing 
factors of Frequency of Move and creatively called it “Aggregate Effect on Frequency of 
Move” with two possible states High and Low. The primary purpose of using this 
technique was to reduce the amount of information and estimates of probabilities we 
needed to elicit from experts, to ensure the estimates that are provided by experts are 
more robust and reliable. Using this dummy node, instead of original 5, Frequency of 
Move had now 2 parent nodes which reduces the number of question to be asked from 
experts from 32 ( ) to 4 ( ) questions. After explaining to the experts what the 
aggregate effect on frequency of move being high or low meant, following type questions 
were asked to obtain their judgment on the probability of frequency of move being 
adequate or inadequate given the states of its parent nodes (cause factors). For instance; 
What is the probability of frequency of move being adequate, given that the 
aggregate effect on frequency of move is high and we DO have adequate staffing? 
i.e.:  
The following estimates in Table 4-4 were provided by the experts: 
52 22
(   1  1,  1)p Frequency of Move Aggregate Effect Staff Adequacy= = =
 
Table 4-4.Expert opinion; conditional probability of adequacy of frequency of move
 
We aggregate these probabilities that have been provided by experts using the Bayesian 
method discussed in 4.3.3.2.1
follows. 
Pr(    ,  )
( 0.126, var 0.012) 
Frequency of Move Inadequate Aggregate Effect
Log Normal mean iance
= = = =
− = =
 
Figure 4-12, shows the average distribution of the population variability 
Figure 4-12.Average distribution of the population variability distribution set for probability of inadequate 
frequency of move (a) 
Prob. Frequency of Move 
Aggregate Effect                                    High
Staff Adequacy Adequate                               In-Adequate
Expert 1 95%                                                   85%
Expert 2 > 80%                                                50%
Expert 3 70-80%                                             50-60%
Expert 4 >80%                                                 40-50%
Expert 5 98%                                                   80%









. The results of experts’ estimates aggregation are as 
High Staff Adequacy Adequate
distribution set.
Adequate Given the States of Aggregate Effect and Staff Adequacy
                                         Low
Adequate                                               In-Adequate
99%                                                                    99%
>95%                                                                 >90%
>90%                                                                  85%
1                                                                         >90%
> 99%                                                                >90%




Pr(    ,  )
( 0.336, var 0.0174) 
Frequency of Move Inadequate Aggregate EffectHigh Staff Adequacy inadequate
Log Normal mean iance
= = = =
− = =
 
Figure 4-13, shows the average distribution of the population variability distribution set. 
 
Figure 4-13.Average distribution of the population variability distribution set for probability of inadequate 
frequency of move (b) 
 
 
Figure 4-14, shows the average distribution of the population variability distribution set. 
Pr(    ,  )
( 0.025,var 0.006)
Frequency of Move In Adequate Aggregate EffectLow Staff Adequacy Adequate
Log Normal mean iance




Figure 4-14.Average distribution of the population variability distribution set for probability of inadequate 
frequency of move (c) 
 
Pr(    ,  )
( 0.06, var 0.0032) 
Frequency of Move Inadequate Aggregate EffectLow Staff Adequacy Inadequate
Log Normal mean iance
= = = =
− = =
 
Figure 4-15, shows the average distribution of the population variability distribution set. 
 110 
 
Figure 4-15.Average distribution of the population variability distribution set for probability of inadequate 
frequency of move (d) 
 
The last step in quantifying pressure ulcer BBN, is to construct the conditional 
probability table for the node “Risk of pressure ulcer”, given all the risk factors. Given no 
hard data is available for “Assistive devices” and “Frequency of move”, we won’t be able 
to populate the CPT for “Risk of pressure ulcer” from data. On the other hand, if we want 
to elicit expert opinion for the CPT, it will be probability estimates, given that it 
has 5 parent nodes. Further, we have data for 3 of the parent nodes for 70,090 patients, 
that if we will leave rather unused if we only rely on subjectiv  data. To make the best 
use of the existing hard data and to minimize the amount of infrmation elicited from 
experts to ensure the reliability of the outcome of the elicitation, we will use the Noisy-
OR gate algorithm, explained in section 5.1.3.3.1.2. 
We have the probability of experiencing “Pressure Ulcer”, due to “Circulation 
impairment”, “Skin integrity”, and “Sensory impairment”, independently, from data. We 
52 32=
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elicited experts’ assessment on the probability that “Frequency of move”, and “Assistive 
devices” will independently cause pressure ulcer. Using these 5 probabilities (3 from data 
and 2 from experts), and using Noisy-OR gate algorithm, we can construct the whole 
CPT for “Risk of pressure ulcer”.  
To elicit the probability that inadequacy of “Frequency of move”, and “Assistive 
devices” not being used, independent of any other factor will cause pressure ulcer, the 
experts were asked the following questions.  
“To your opinion, out of 100 patients, how many are likely to experience pressure ulcer, 
because their frequency of move has been inadequate, regardl ss of any other risk 
factor?” 
“To your opinion, out of 100 patients, how many are likely to experience pressure 
ulcer, because their no assistive device was used during their hospitalization, regardless 
of any other risk factor?” 
Using Bayesian Framework that we discussed previously, we aggregate expert responses 
and assessments recorded in Table 4-5, and Table 4-6. 
     
Table 4-5.Expert opinion; probability of pressure ulcer due to inadequate frequency of move (left) 
Table 4-6.Expert opinion; probability of pressure ulcer due to lack of assistive devices (right) 
 
 
Expert Probability of PU Due to Inadequate Fqcy. of Move
Expert 1 <10%




Expert 6 < 5%
Expert Probability of PU Due lack of Assistive Device Use
Expert 1 < 1%
Expert 2 2-3 %
Expert 3 1%





As a result the probability that inadequate frequency of move will cause pressure ulcer 
independent of other factors has a lognormal distribution with
. 
Similarly, the probability that not using assistive devices will cause pressure ulcer 
independent of other factors, has a lognormal distribution with parameters
.   .    =0.018, 0.060assist devices on PU assist devices on PUµ σ = . 
Figure 4-16 and Figure 4-17 show the average distribution of the population variability 
distribution sets. 
 
 Figure 4-16.Average distribution of the population variability distribution for effect of frequency of
movement on pressure ulcer 
.  .  0.0672, 0.038fqcy on PU fqcy on PUµ σ= =
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Figure 4-17.Average distribution of the population variability distribution for effect of using assistive 
devices on pressure ulcer 
 
 At this point, we have used GeNIe BBN software’s Noisy-Max option to quantify the BBN with 
Noisy-OR Gate procedure. As explained above, the probability of effect of each risk factor, on 
the risk of pressure ulcer (regardless of other factors), has been calculated from available data and 
experts’ opinion and is presented in Table 4-7. 
 
Table 4-7.Probabilities of the effect of risk factors, independently, on pressure ulcer 
 
Providing this input to GeNIe, we can calculate baseline probability of hospital acquired pressure 
ulcer (Figure 4-18). The model projects 3.3 E-3, for probability of pressure lcer. 
Noisy-OR Gate
Total Records 70090
PU NPU Total Probability Complement
Sensory=1, Circul=0, Skin=0 2 1299 1301 0.001537279 0.998462721
Sensory=0, Circul=1, Skin=0 11 8234 8245 0.001334142 0.998665858
Sensory=0, Circul=0, Skin=1 39 10684 10723 0.003637042 0.996362958
Frqc on PU (adequate) 0.0672 0.9328
Assistive Devic. On PU 0.018 0.982
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Figure 4-18.Probability of hospital acquired pressure lcer 
 
4.4 Pressure Ulcer BBN Validation 
 
As discussed in section 3.6, validation and verification is a vital step in any type of model 
development in general. In developing the Bayesian belief networks for this study, we started 
with a basic draft of a model that contained the important factors and relations between the 
factors discussed in the literature and the input of one of the experts. We then consulted the 
domain experts extensively through multiple sessions f face-to-face interviews and reached to 
the consensus model that is presented here as the final version. This consensus was reached after 
many iterations to the point that all experts agreed that model is now presenting all the known 
major factors affecting the risk of pressure ulcer (and the risk of line infection in the case of 
vascular catheter associated infection).  Naturally, peer review has been a crucial step in  
developing and qualitatively validating these models.  In such a peer review of the BBN models, 
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some steps and methods, suggested by Marcot, et al. (2006) have been generally followed. These 
steps include: 
• Introduction to BBN models 
o Introducing the concepts and general structure of the BBNs 
o Explaining how BBNs could be used to depict the causal and logical influences 
of key risk factors in pressure ulcer (and in line i f ction) 
o Explaining the general concepts of marginal (unconditional) probabilities for 
parent nodes and conditional probabilities of the cild nodes 
• Introduction and display of the specific BBN for pressure ulcer (and line infection) to 
review (this step is repeated after each iteration of the model based on previous 
interviews with the experts) 
o Explaining the objectives of the pressure ulcer (line nfection) BBN models: to 
assess the stochastic effects of the physiological, ntervention related, and 
hospital level factors on the risk of pressure ulcer (line infection) 
o Explaining the nodes in the model, what has been other experts rational to 
include or exclude a node, and also the linkage between the nodes 
• Discussing the preliminary results 
o At the later stages of interview when the consensus on the factors and relations in 
the model is reached, with the available data the conditional probability table is 
constructed and a preliminary run of the model is presented. Also the concept of 
setting evidence and making inference is displayed. This specially helps  and 
familiarizes  the experts when they are asked for their opinion on some the 
probabilities that cannot be obtained from data  
A form was designed based on these steps to guide the BBN development/ validation interviews 
and is available in appendicies A&B. 
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4.4.1 Qualitative Validation of Pressure Ulcer BBN 
 
Qualitative validation and verification of the Bayesian models in this research, is really 
built in the model development process. The example given below is the case of Pressure 
Ulcer BBN.  The first draft of the model went through much iteration in expert 
interviews. Last, we asked our panel of experts to evaluate the last version of the model 
(the qualitative model) in following categories; model completeness, model accuracy, 
ease of understanding and perceived predictive validity, to ensur  sufficient confidence in 
the structure of the model before proceeding to model quantific tion. This evaluation was 
performed through following question: 
1. Completeness. From your perspective, to what extent does this model 
capture all important and relevant phenomena for the risk of pressure 
ulcer? On a scale from 0 to 100, 0 would correspond to a m del that does 
not include some important and relevant details, whereas 100 would 
correspond to a model that includes all details that you consider important. 
What number would you assign? 
2. Accuracy: From your perspective, how accurately or realistically does th  
model depict important factors that influence risk of experiencing pressure 
ulcer? On a scale from 0 to 100, 0 would correspond to a model that is 
unrealistic, over-idealized or inaccurate, whereas 100 would correspond to 
a model that is realistic and accurate. What number would you assign? 
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3.  Ease of understanding: From your perspective, how easy is it to 
understand the overall logic of the model. On a scale from 0 to 100, 0 
would correspond to a model that is difficult to follow, even with 
extensive explanation, and a 100 would correspond to a model that is 
readily understandable. What number would you assign? 
4. Perceived predictive validity: From your perspective, if you were to use 
this model, how well could you predict the risk of pressure ulc r?  On a 
scale from 0 to 100, 0 would correspond to a model that does n t help at 
all with predicting effects, and a 100 would correspond to a model that 
predicts the effects very well. What number would you assign? 
The expert’s response to these questions, are summarized in Table 4-8. 
 
Table 4-8.Expert opinion; qualitative evaluation of pressure ulcer BBN 
 
All the experts unanimously agreed that to their opinion the pressu  ulcer BBN and the 
line infection BBNs contained a comprehensive list of causing factors and the causing 
relations were accurately identified, but they felt more comfortable to score the models in 
the above four categories less than a prefect 100 because no model is ever perfect and 
there maybe factors (even though with marginal effects) that they have missed. This 
Completeness Accuracy Ease of Underestanding Predictive Validity
Expert 1 90 85-90 80 85-90
Expert 2 >90 >90 >90 >90
Expert 3 85-90 90 95 90
Expert 4 90-95 95 95 95
Expert 5 >90 >90 >95 70
Expert 6 >90 >90 >90 >90
Expert 7 95 95 95 85
Expert 8 90 90 90 90
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builds a lot of confidence, at least in the qualitative representatio  of the models.  The 
next section reviews the quantification challenges of Bayesian networks. 
4.4.2 Quantitative Validation of Pressure Ulcer BBN 
 
Relative frequency of hospital acquired pressure ulcer based on data for years 2003 to 
2011 are recorded in Table 4-9 . 
 
Table 4-9.Relative frequency of hospital acquired pressure ulcer; 2003-2011 
 
Compiling the Bayesian belief network, the model projected 0.0033, probability of 
pressure ulcer. 
Available hospital acquired pressure ulcer data, reflected in table above, fits a Normal 
distribution (Figure 4-19) with mean 0.0022. 
 
Figure 4-19.Distribution of the probability of hospital acquired pressure ulcer 
Fiscal Year Hospital Acquiered Pressure Ulcer Total Admissions Probability of Hospital Aquiered Pressure Ulcer
2003 59 32616 0.00181
2004 67 33202 0.00202
2005 78 33351 0.00234
2006 76 33507 0.00227
2007 86 35195 0.00244
2008 104 36912 0.00282
2009 95 35769 0.00266
2010 53 36848 0.00144



















This indicates that there is approximately 30% error in the prediction of the model, for 
pressure ulcer probability. This error is expected, chiefly due to the following reasons: 
a) The modifications we made to the model, without which the quantification of the 
model would have been impossible due to the absence of data 
b) For some of the nodes (e.g. Frequency of Move) we had to elicit expert opinion, 
and since no recorded data is available for such a variable we had no way of 
calibrating experts’ inputs with the actual data. 
c) The quantification of model parameters is based on data for years 2008 and 2009, 
where we had reliable data available to us.  
d) Records only indicated whether the pressure ulcer was actually occurred while the 
patient was hospitalized (i.e. the patient was not admitted with pressure ulcer 
already present), since 2007. Prior to 2007 we only have the total number of 
patients with pressure ulcer (whether they acquired it in the hospital or not), and 
we had the hospital acquired pressure ulcer extrapolated. 
For the above reasons, the projection of the model has a larger error, compare to the 
line infection BBN, where we had data available for all the variables for 2002-2009 
(5% error). As more reliable data becomes available, one will be able to update the 
model with new information and obtain more precise results. This brings about the 
concept of model uncertainty, discussed in the next section. We have 2 ways of 
treating this model uncertainty; at the sub model level (BBN level), or at the hybrid 
model level (feeding a distribution as an input to the system dynamics model rather 
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than a point estimate). We have chosen the former, to avoid the propagation of the 
error at the BBN level to the hybrid model. 
4.4.2.1 Treating Pressure Ulcer BBN Model Uncertainty 
  
Predictive models are generally tools by which the modeler xpresses his or her 
understanding of a particular unknown of interest. Since our knowledge about the true 
nature of this unknown is always incomplete, our expression of it inevitably involves 
uncertainty. In uncertainty analysis, we seek to address this lack of knowledge, with some 
confidence, in terms of the smallest range of possible values, which brackets the true 
value of the unknown of interest [Droguett, 1999]. These uncertainties are either 
associated with the values assumed by the model (“parameter unc tainty”) or with the 
structure of the model (“model uncertainty”). In this section our focus is on treating the 
model uncertainty in a Bayesian framework in order to improve the predictions made by 
pressure ulcer BBN model. 
Predictions made by models contain an error; the error being the difference between the 
values produced by the model and the actual realization of theunknown of interest. In our 
context, , where is the “true value” of pressure ulcer probability and is 
the model’s prediction. In this case, an estimate for the tru  value of probability of 
hospital acquired pressure ulcer is the actual relative frequency of pressure ulcer for a 
particular year. 
In order to improve the pressure ulcer probability prediction, we employ the Bayesian 
framework developed by Mosleh and Droguett (2008) to treat model uncertainty.  
mt pp −=ε tp mp
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We are interested in assessing , the true probability of pressure ulcer. Let’s represent 
the BBN model’s prediction as our evidence, . Our objective is to develop an 
uncertainty distribution of pressure ulcer probability, , given the available evidence 
from our predictive BBN model. In its most general form, when we consider the pressure 
ulcer BBN model as a source of information, this uncertainty can be obtained as follows: 
 
 
where is the posterior distribution of pressure ulcer probability , is the 
prior distribution of , and , the likelihood function, or the probability of 
observing evidence  when the true value for probability of pressure ulcer . 
In this case, the form of information about the model is the performance of the BBN in 
predicting pressure ulcer probability. This information can be represented by the pair 
for year “i” for our model.  
The relationship between the prediction of the model and the unknown  is given 
through the additive error model, where the model estimate is he true value of the 
unknown plus a random error , and  represents the year of available 
performance data. Furthermore, we assume that performance data comes from a 
homogenous population. Since we are adopting an additive error model for pressure ulcer 
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Normal distribution. Since we are dealing with the notion of probability that only 
assumes values between 0 and 1, we will use a truncated Normal distribution, bounded to 
0 and 1. The likelihood function is therefore a truncated Normal distribution with mean





The posterior function of parameters  is:   
 
where is the prior distribution of . 
For the case where the error terms depict a random behavior and display no trend, we can 
assume that are independent realizations of random variable  ,so we will have 
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Substituting this into the posterior function of parameters , we will have 
  
, is a normalizing factor.   
Finally, the likelihood of a new prediction of the model (for a future year) is 
 
The corresponding posterior of the new model prediction is: 
 
Where , is a normalizing factor. 
The model prediction for baseline probability of hospital acquired pressure ulcer is 
available from the pressure ulcer BBN; the actual probabilities of hospital acquired 
pressure ulcer are available in Table 4-9. Using this information, we can update and 
improve our BBN model predictions. 
Figure 4-20 shows the distribution of the posterior function of the prediction of the 
Bayesian method for hospital acquired pressure ulcer probability, taking into the account 
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the performance of the BBN model. This posterior has a me
compared to the average of actual data has 8% of err r (compare to 33% error from the 
original prediction of the BBN).
All calculations have been done using “The Model Uncertainty Software,” a code 
developed by the Center for Risk and 
Park, in 2006 and it is available through this center.
Figure 4-20.Posterior Distribution of Probability of Pressure Ulcer; BBN 
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5 Model Development for Adverse Events; Vascular Catheter-
Associated Infection 
 
In this chapter we will discuss the BBN model develop d for risk of vascular catheter 
associated infection (i.e. line infection). The chapter provides a background on line 




Central Venous Catheter (also called CVC, central line, or Vascular Access Device 
(VAD)), is a catheter that is placed into a large vein in the neck (internal jugular vein), 
chest (subclavian vein), or groin (femoral vein) to give medicines, fluids, nutrients or 
blood products to the patients. Intravascular catheters, as essential components of modern 
medical care, are one of the most commonly inserted m ical devices in the United 
States, and also the most common cause of hospital acquired bloodstream infection, 
alongside urinary catheters. Unfortunately, most hospital acquired infections, in an 
already venerable patient population, are caused by the very same devices that are 
designed and used to provide lifesaving care. A study on medical intensive care units in 
the US has shown that 87% of bloodstream infections are attributed to central line 
(Trautner and Darouiche, 2004).  
Vascular catheters, disrupt the protective barrier of the skin, and can potentially provide 
microorganisms with direct access to the bloodstream, which can cause local or 
systematic complications and in most extreme cases may cause death. In this section, we 
have developed a risk model, using Bayesian Belief Network formalism, to assess the 
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risk of experiencing vascular catheter infection, as a function of patient, and patient-
provider factors.  
5.2 Vascular Catheter-Associated Infection BBN Development 
 
A comprehensive literature review has been conducte to extract what researchers 
believe to be risk factors in line infection. 
Richet et.al (1990), consider underlying disease, mthod of insertion, type of cannula 
(tube), type of dressing used,  duration and purpose of catheterization as important risk 
factor, indicating that the impact of factors such as site of insertion, receipt of 
antimicrobial agents before, during and after catheterization, and the frequency of 
intravenous therapy (IV) are unclear. Moro et al. (1994), conclude from their study, that 
duration of catheterization, jugular insertion, transparent dressing, TPN (total parenteral 
nutrition), second catheterization period and skin colonization and hub colonization show 
significant association with catheter infection. In a other study, Mahieu et al. (2001), find 
that catheterization duration, exit site colonization, hub colonization, insertion at bedside, 
whether or not patient is on antibiotics at insertion and TPN duration among important 
factors that may affect the risk of line infection. 
A Bayesian Belief Network, that includes or reflects the factors introduced in literature as 
factors influencing risk of line infection, has been developed. Additionally factors that the 
panel of experts thought to be of importance have also been included. Figure 5-1 depicts 
this BBN. The validation process of the model has been detailed in section 5.4. 







The risk factors in this BBN, are divided in two broad categories, Insert Phase Risk 
Factors, and Access, Use and Maintenance Phase Risk Factors. 
A. Insert Phase Risk Factors: 
This category of risk factors is concerned with issues and situations that may lead to 
contamination of the insert, and cause the micro-organisms to gain entry during the 
insertion procedure, and subsequently cause blood-stream infection. These factors 
include: 
• Staff Adequacy: Availability of assistance to provider performing the 
procedure, during the insertion. Whether the unit has adequate staff 
available to perform the insertion helps reduce the c ances of sterility 
break in the insert, and may also subconsciously reduc  the chance of 
incompliance of an individual, in following the safety protocols. 
• Insert Provider Proficiency: provider’s proficiency, experience and 
judgment during insertion phase influences the likelihood of insert sterility 
break. Also provider’s proficiency decreases the likelihood of 
unsuccessful attempts to insertion and hence the probability of insert 
sterility breaks. 
• Insert Sterility Break: Concerns unrecognized break in sterile technique. 
• Insert IHI Bundle Compliance: The degree of compliance with the line 
insertion components of Institute for Healthcare Improvement’s (IHI) 
bundle protocol (www.ihi.org), such as hand hygiene, skin preparation and 
use of barrier precautions. 
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• Insert Environment: Optimum environment for procedur , for example 
procedure room controlled environment versus bedsid. This factor also 
encodes whether the line has been inserted in an emerg ncy situation 
which increases the likelihood of insert contamination. 
• Insert gross Contamination: Unrecognized gross contami ation event. 
B. Access, Use and Maintenance Phase Risk Factors: 
This category of risk factors is concerned with issues and situations that may lead 
to contamination of the access area, while the line is in place and infection may be 
introduced to the blood stream during the maintenance phase of the line. These 
factors include: 
• Patient Anatomic Constraint: That influence; 
i. Site selection: for instance subclavian versus less d irable jugular 
or femoral vein 
ii. Choice of de novo insertion versus less desired change over guide 
wire 
iii.  Need to perform site maintenance procedures for example dressing 
change 
• Site Selection Optimum: Addresses the anatomic setting of catheter: 
i. Subclavian vein site: Inserting the line in the chest area  
ii. Jugular vein site: Inserting the line in the neck area 
iii.  Femoral vein site: Inserting the line  in the groin 
• Maintenance Site Optimum: Optimum maintenance of the insertion site; 
the integrity, manipulation and the state of dressing 
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• Access Frequency: Frequency of port access which influences the 
likelihood of access sterility break. In other words the more frequently the 
port is accessed, the higher the exposure of the access site to 
contamination would be. 
• Access Provider Proficiency: Provider’s proficiency, experience and 
judgment during the access or maintenance procedures affect the 
likelihood of access sterility break. 
• Access Sterility Break: Unrecognized break in sterili y during the port 
access or use of the device. 
• Access Gross Contamination: Gross contamination of the site, i.e. access 
port or actual skin insertion site 
• Patient Resistance Factor: Physiological and pharmacological factors, 
influence resistance and susceptibility to infection. 
• Infection: Determines the probability of blood-stream infection given all 
possible states of the risk factors. 
5.3 Vascular Catheter-Associated Infection BBN Quantification 
 
To carry out the quantification of the line infection BBN, certain modifications had to be 
made to the structure of the BBN without compromising the integrity and accuracy of the 
model. In the consensus model shown in Figure 5-1, “Staff Adequacy” and “Insert 
Provider Proficiency” influence an intermediate node “Insert Sterility Break”, which in 
combination with “Insert IHI Bundle Compliance” and “Insert Environment” , affect the 
probability of “Insert Gross Contamination”. A similar node “Access Gross 
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Contamination” also exists in the maintenance phase of catheter lines. Gross 
contamination of insert and gross contamination of access port; influence the probability 
of bloodstream infection. 
Truth is, the contamination event is rarely witnessed but physicians know that it had to 
have occurred given the influencing factors. In the databases used to extract data for line 
infection BBN quantification, no record was found with documentation of a gross 
contamination. If that was ever obvious to the clini ian, they removed the line 
immediately and started over. What we have recorded data on, are the precursors in the 
causal structure. Since data was available on whether these influencing factors (Staff 
Adequacy, Insert Provider Proficiency, Insert IHI Bundle Compliance, and Insert 
Environment) were present for each patient, and we also knew whether this patient had 
an infection or not, we could directly calculate th effect of these factors on the risk of 
infection, eliminating the intermediate nodes without compromising the accuracy or the 
integrity of the model. The same is true for the access and maintenance phase of the 
model, and we can safely remove the intermediate node f “Access Gross 
Contamination”, and directly measure the strength of the effect of the influencing factors 
(maintenance phase risk factors) on the risk of infection. Modifying the BBN, for the 
purpose of quantification, based on the justification provided above, results in the line 
infection BBN, depicted in Figure 5-2. 
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Figure 5-2.Line infection BNN; transformed 
 
Moreover, we have extracted line infection data from ICU patients, as the data were most 
reliable and the results could be extrapolated to the entire hospital. In any given 
institution most of the lines are in the ICU and very few lines on the floors, and in fact 
some institutions have rules were you cannot have a line on the floors. 
We have extracted and analyzed 12897, ICU patient rcords from October 2001 to 
September 2009. Figure 5-3 shows a few records of the data. 
 















































1 Oct-01 1 2 1 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 2
2 Oct-01 1 2 2 2 0 2 2 1 1 1 2
3 Oct-01 1 1 2 1 0 2 1 1 2 2 1
4 Oct-01 1 2 2 1 0 2 1 1 2 2 0
5 Oct-01 0 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
6 Oct-01 0 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2
7 Oct-01 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1
8 Oct-01 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1
9 Oct-01 0 1 2 1 0 2 2 1 1 2 1
10 Oct-01 0 1 2 1 0 2 1 2 1 1 1
11 Oct-01 0 1 2 1 0 2 2 1 1 2 1
12 Oct-01 0 1 2 1 0 2 2 2 1 1 1
13 Oct-01 0 2 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 1
14 Oct-01 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1
15 Oct-01 0 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1
16 Oct-01 0 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1
17 Oct-01 0 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
18 Oct-01 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1
19 Oct-01 0 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
20 Oct-01 0 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2
21 Oct-01 0 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
22 Oct-01 0 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1
23 Oct-01 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1
24 Oct-01 0 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1
25 Oct-01 0 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1
26 Oct-01 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1
27 Oct-01 0 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
28 Oct-01 0 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
29 Oct-01 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1
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To calculate the marginal and conditional probabilities needed for quantification of the 
BBN, we have used parameter learning option of GeNIe BBN software developed by 
University of Pittsburg, PA. To learn parameters and populate the conditional probability 
table for an existing network with defined structure, after importing both the network and 
the data (in the form of a text file), we need to create a mapping between the variables 
defined in the network and variables defined in thedata set. Data records that are 
unavailable could be identified as “N/A”, when importing data to the software. The 
results of the calculated marginal and conditional probabilities are discussed below. 
1. Staff Adequacy  
States: 
i. Adequate: 0.84 
ii. Inadequate: 0.16 
If we could confirm through documentation of a nursing note or the bundle 
checklist that a staff member was available (for assistance), it was declared N/A. 
If there was evidence of staffing, but also evidence of other distracting or 
competing activities, we also declared N/A. Note that the probability calculated 
here is used as a prior, and will be updated with the system dynamics model’s 
output on staff adequacy. 
2. Insert provider Proficiency 
States 
i. Expert : 0.59 




3. Insert IHI Bundle Compliance 
States 
i. Full Compliance : 0.84 
ii. Partial Compliance: 0.16 
Data is extracted straightforward based on the bundle elements. Notably, some of 
the factors for partial compliance are potentially weak influencers of infection, but 
we did not sub segment the compliance.  
4. Insert Environment 
States 
i. Optimal : 0.85 
ii. Suboptimal: 0.15 
When there was evidence in the electronic record documenting where the 
procedure took place, we were able to determine whether the insert environment 
was optimal. An optimal environment indicates that t e environment was the ICU 
patient room (a semi-controlled environment) or the op rating or procedure room. 
A common example of a score of suboptimal environment, would be the trauma 
room, ED or regular non-ICU clinical unit, or during an emergency resuscitation. 
5. Patient Anatomic Constraint 
States 
i. True: 0.11 
 135 
ii. False: 0.89 
6. Site Selection Optimum 
States 
i. Optimal: 0.63 
ii. Suboptimal: 0.37 
7. Access Frequency 
States 
i. High frequency: 0.62 
ii. Low Frequency:0.38 
This is probably the most difficult to score. We based it on the concurrent use of drugs 
and invasive physiological measurements that were carried out. There is no widely 
accepted standard, but if the patient had 4 or more IV infusions, and concurrent central 
venous monitoring, we scored high frequency. All else were low frequency. If the patient 
died quickly, or there was poor documentation of route of administration of drugs or use 
of the line, it was declared N/A.  
8. Access Provider Proficiency 
States 
i. Expert: 0.78 
ii. Novice: 0.22 
This is also difficult to measure, but we assessed based on the primary nurse that was 
assigned. Patients actually have several nurses caring for them throughout a 
hospitalization, but we focused on their primary consistent nurse coverage. 
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9. Access Sterility Break 
 
States 
i. Rare : 0.9 
ii. Common/Major : 0.1 
If we found documentation of a break in the clinical annotation, we scored a major break. 
If there was documentation of access and documentatio  that the dressing was intact and 
that sterile procedures were followed for access and no documentation of a break, we 
gave them a rare break. If there was no documentatio  of access (i.e. absence of 
documentation that the site was inspected, dressing was intact, sterile procedures used, 
etc., then we were skeptical — i.e., suspected that there was a documentation problem, 
not necessarily the absence or presence of a break. So here, we declared N/A. 
10. Patient Resistance Factors 
States 
i. High Resistance Capability: 0.58 
ii. Diminished Resistance: 0.42 
If the patient was profoundly immunosuppressed, as evidenced in a diagnosis like 'Statis 
Post Bone Marrow Transplant', or 'Acute Lymphoma', then we readily scored them as 
diminished resistance. Some patients were receiving broad spectrum antibiotics, and if so, 
we scored them high resistance.  





If a bloodstream infection was identified, and other sources were ruled out, we scored 
true. Note that if a patient developed a bloodstream infection, had a central line, but 
another source of infection was possible, the patient was scored as a false for line 
infection. 
Relative frequency of line infection based on data for years 2002 and 2009 are recorded 
in Table 5-1.Relative frequency of hospital acquired bloodstream infection; 2002-2009. 
 
Table 5-1.Relative frequency of hospital acquired bloodstream infection; 2002-2009 
 
Compiling the Bayesian belief network, using the above probabilities and the conditional 
probability table calculated, the probability of line infection produced by the model, using 
all data from 2002 to 2009, is 0.0322, which is very close to the relative frequency we 
can obtain from total number of line infections in these years, divided by total number of 





















5.4 Vascular Catheter-Associated Infection BBN Validation 
 
Both qualitative and quantitative validation of line infection BBN is discussed in this 
section. 
5.4.1 Vascular Catheter-Associated Infection BBN Qualitative Validation 
 
Similar process was employed to construct the Bayesi n model for line infection, using 
the same panel of experts. After necessary changes and modifications were made to the 
first draft of the model, through multiple interviews with each expert, we asked experts to 
evaluate the qualitative model with respect to completeness, accuracy, ease of 
understanding to ensure sufficient confidence in the structure of the model. Table 5-2 
contains the results of this evaluation. 
 
 
Table 5-2.Expert Opinion; qualitative evaluation of line infection BBN  
 
5.4.2 Vascular Catheter-Associated Infection BBN Quantitative Validation 
 
Compiling the Bayesian belief network, using the above probabilities and the conditional 
probability table calculated, the probability of line infection produced by the model, using 
all data from 2002 to 2009 (Table 5-1 ), is 0.0306. 
Completeness Accuracy Ease of Underestanding Predictive Validity
Expert 1 90 90 80 90
Expert 2 >95 >95 >90 >95
Expert 3 90 90 90 90
Expert 4 90-95 90-95 95 90-95
Expert 5 >95 >90 >95 >80
Expert 6 >90 >90 >90 >90
Expert 7 95 95 95 90
Expert 8 85 85 85 85
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Line infection probabilities for years 2002 to 2009, could be represented by a Weibull 
distribution (as shown in Figure 5-4below), with mean 0.03125 
(and 10 percentile and 90 percentile values of 0.019 and 0.049 respectively).  The value 
produced by the BBN for the probability of line infection has 3% error compared to the 
mean of the distribution of line infection probability from data. 
 































6 Dynamic Model of Hospital-level Factors Affecting the Risk of 
Adverse Events 
 
Using system dynamics formalism, we are going to demonstrate how organizational level 
and policy level contributions to risk change over time, and how policies and decisions 
may affect the general system-level contribution to adverse event risk.  The dynamic 
model developed in this study, also captures the feedback of organizational factors and 
decisions over time and the non-linearities in theses feedback effects.  Given a baseline 
level of certain adverse events risk that every patient is exposed to, due to his or her 
physiological conditions and caregiver’s interventio , we are interested to see how this 
baseline risk may change because of the decisions/plicies at the hospital level with 
regards to pressures to reduce operational costs, optimize length of stay and investments 
in proactive safety interventions. The baseline risk for specific adverse events that are of 
interest in this study (the lit is given in section 3.4.1), which accounts for patient level 
and provider-patient level factors are the out puts of the BBNs. Two such BBNs have 
been developed in this study for the risk of pressure ulcer and the risk of line infection. 
The organizational level factors that may affect these baseline risks however, are 





6.1 Dynamic Model Development 
6.1.1 Introduction 
 
The focus of the dynamic model is a specific hypothesis. Combination of increasing costs 
and decreasing reimbursement has created tremendous financial constraints for healthcare 
organizations and additionally, insurers have increased pressure by imposing penalties for 
adverse events (at least certain adverse events listed n 3.5.2).This situation leaves 
hospitals in the following risk-relevant positions; they will have few resources to invest 
proactively in safety and they will have to make operational decisions (such as reduction 
in staffing) that focus on reducing costs, which nonetheless may increase the risk. 
The use of system dynamics formalism will help us model the evolution of 
internal/external financial and decision/policy factors on safety state of the organization. 
Our emphasis is on capturing the dynamic changes in safety state of the hospital as a 
function of reimbursement, financial penalties imposed by external agencies and 
productivity pressures. In other words we are modeling how, changes in the safety state 
of the organization, subsequently increase or decrease the risk of specific adverse events. 
6.1.2 Model Developing Process 
 
The process of developing the qualitative part of the model is very much similar to the 
development of the qualitative model for the Bayesian Networks. We started with a rough 
draft of the model, that represented how financial st nding of the hospital leads to cost 
reduction strategies and constraints hospital ability to invest in safety, and how these 
decisions may increase risk of adverse events and the feedback effect of these adverse 
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events on hospital’s finances. Peer review has been a vital step in developing and 
qualitatively validating the dynamic model, as well as the Bayesian models. Our general 
framework for building (and qualitatively validating) the qualitative model using domain 
experts, follows the steps suggested by Marcot et al. (2006) in peer review of Bayesian 
Networks, which are quite applicable and useful in a y influence diagram type, 
qualitative causal model building. The process of building the qualitative part of our 
system dynamic model, through interviews with subject matter experts, follows these 
guidelines; 
• First round of the interviews  
• Introduction to system dynamics formalism/models. 
• Explaining how system dynamics could be used to depict causal relationships, 
non-linearities in feedback effects and change overtime. 
• Explaining the hypothesis of interest in the study, that how the financial wellbeing 
of the hospital effects the decisions to reduce costs and constraints investments in 
safety, and how these decisions may affect the risk of adverse events and finally 
the feedback effect of these adverse events on hospital’  finances. This step is 
conducted using the highest level of abstraction of the model. 
• Explaining the detailed version of the first draft o  the model that was developed 
based on literature and with the help of one of the experts. 
• Asking the experts to review the first draft of themodel and alter/modify it in any 
way they see fit, including adding, deleting, modifying any factor or causal 
relation/loop from this draft. 
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• Second round of the interviews 
• Discussing the second draft of the model, that contains all the 
modifications that experts had made to the first draft in the first round of 
interviews. Also explaining the justifications provided by other experts on 
the modifications they had possibly made to the first d aft of the model. 
• Asking the experts to review the second draft and make any modifications 
necessary.  
• Third round of the interviews 
• Discussing the final, consensus model containing all modifications ( after 
a few iterations) 
• Asking experts to rate the qualitative model, from 0-100 , with respect to 
completeness, accuracy, ease of understanding and perceived 
predictability 
• Eliciting experts’  quantitative assessment on some of the nodes of the 
model (this step is discussed in more detail in section 4.3.2) 
 
6.1.3 The System Dynamics Model 
6.1.3.1 Introduction 
 
Decision making, policy and action relating to safety of the hospital is strongly 
influenced by its financial state. Complex relationship between operational expenses and 
reimbursement by external agencies influences overall r venue. Generally, increases in 
operational expenses and decreases in reimbursement rat s lead to a revenue gap. U.S. 
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hospitals have consistent responses to such revenue gap. Usually one or a combination of 
the following strategies, are taken to deal with this revenue gap: 
• Limiting costs associated with managing patients, primarily by reducing length of 
stay (LOS) to a minimum 
• Reducing staffing 
• Limiting expenditures and investments in proactive safety interventions  
To demonstrate and the value and effectiveness of the hybrid technique used in this 
research (combination of system dynamics and Bayesin networks), we have developed a 
model that explores how risk of specific adverse evnts changes over time as a function 
of several system constraints. In particular, we are examining the impact of 
reimbursement, financial penalties and productivity pressures on the risk of hospital-
acquired adverse events such as infections, medication errors, falls and other patient 
injuries. In detail, the model includes: 
• The impact of increasingly (financially) unfavorable  reimbursement policies that 
have been established by private and public insurance companies  
• New financial penalties imposed by private and public insurance companies in 
response to specific adverse events (i.e.,  new policies under which 
reimbursement for care is not reimbursed when a hospital-acquired adverse event 
occurs)  
• Intense production pressures and pressures to reduce length of stay (LOS) in order 
to reduce costs assure reimbursement by insurance companies.  
The model captures the interactions of these factors on the probability of adverse events. 
By using system dynamics formalism, the model captures the effects of feedback 
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reinforcement on risk over time. The model captures the delayed effects of relaxing 
throughput pressure on the risk of adverse events, as reduced revenue eventually leaves a 
hospital with little or no resources to commit to pr active safety investments or maintain 
the current safety measures. In other words, the model not only considers organizational 
factors, but also takes into account the policy enviro ment in which such decisions are 
made and how this changes over time.  
6.1.3.2 Model Structure; Key Variables and Important Feedback Loops 
  
The basic structure of the dynamic model to depict the organizational decisions and 
strategies to control the revenue gap and the effects of these strategies on the adverse 
event risk, has been built on a well-established anvery common system dynamics 
concept, known as downward spiral or vicious circles. The concept has been widely used 
in modeling business processes, and social contexts. For instance, for a manufacturing or 
service providing company, unfavorable revenues mayresult in cost cutting strategies. 
Cost cutting strategies will cause service/quality loss which translates into revenue loss 
due to inferior service/quality which clearly worsen  the unfavorable revenue situation 




Figure 6-1.Revenue deficit-loss of service downward spiral 
 
Figure 6-2, the highest level of abstraction of themodel, depicts the key variables 
influencing the occurrence of adverse events, based on literature, interviews with clinical 
experts and field observations. The hypotheses that are to be validated with data, through 
this model are basically captured in the loop structures, explained in this section. These 
loops examine the effects of the strategies adopted by hospitals in response to their 
revenue gap on the risk of specific adverse events, and the feedback effect of these 










Figure 6-2.System dynamics module; highest level of abstraction 
 
Hospital is providing a service and it costs a certain amount of money to deliver this 
service. Part or all of this cost will be reimbursed by patient’s insurance company, 
according to a predefined arrangement. Bases on the average number of days from 
previous year that each patient has stayed in the hospital for a certain diagnosis-related 
group (DRG), the insurance company informs hospitals of the amount of money that the 
hospital will be reimbursed for treating patients with that specific DRG. This 
reimbursement is subject to denial on the part of the insurance companies, for a number 
of reasons. One such a reason that is still being debated is the possibility that the hospitals 
will not be reimbursed for the cost they bear to care for certain hospital acquired 
conditions. The livelihood of a hospital, or any service providing organization for that 
matter, depends on the profitability of that organiz tion. This imposes a pressure on 
managers and other levels of decision making in the hospital to maximize the differential 
Revenue Gap
Pressure to Close Revenue Gap
(Max. Profit)
Pressure to
Optimize LOS Pressure to Reduce
Operational Costs
Willingness/Ability to Invest in
Proactive Safety Interventions
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cost/reimbursement, and in other words close the rev nue gap. As a response to the 
pressure to close this gap, U.S. hospitals usually adopt one or a combination of the 
following strategies. 
6.1.3.2.1 Strategy 1: Reducing Length of Stay 
 
The unfavorable cost reimbursement differential in hospital creates pressure to maximize 
this differential (maximize profit). One of the ways this pressure manifests itself is 
through the pressure to reduce LOS to a minimum. 
In this model we have considered that the risk of specific adverse events that are of 
interest in this study could be affected in four different ways:  
• Change in the adverse event risk due to shortened LOS,  
• Change in the adverse event risk due to prolonged LOS  
• Change in the adverse event risk due to understaffing, and 
• Change in the adverse event risk due to lack of investment in proactive safety 
interventions 
The pressure to optimize LOS to the minimum required increases the chance that a 
patient will be discharged prior to readiness and before all needs are met. Hence the 
probability that the patient will experience an adverse event increases. Additionally, if an 
adverse event occurs to this patient, he or she will have to return to the hospital for 
treatment of the experienced AE, and therefore he or she is required to spend more time 
in the hospital, which makes the patient prone to the adverse events due to prolonged 
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LOS. A decrease in safety investments also affects the probability of adverse events in all 
three categories of AE.  
6.1.3.2.2 Strategy 2: Reducing Staffing 
 
Another strategy to respond to the pressure to reduce operational costs is reduction in the 
level of staffing.  Staff reduction is based on a wishful thinking that it would be possible 
to care for the same number of patients with less staff, without degrading safety and 
quality of care.  This in short term reduces costs and sets cost/reimbursement differential 
on a favorable path, but in long run it may increase the probability of AEs, and may lead 
to increases in cost in many ways.  
6.1.3.2.3 Strategy 3: Reducing Proactive Safety Investments 
 
While it is in hospital’s best interest to invest proactively in safety, the unfavorable 
revenue may lead to policy decisions that avoid investment in proactive safety 
investments. This in the short time will save the hospital some money but in the long run 
increases the risk of experiencing adverse events. This strategy is analogous to the 
concept of reduced investment in maintenance in engin ering systems. 
 
6.1.3.2.4 Feedback Influences 
 
On the other hand, increase in the number of adverse vents increases the cost for 
hospital in many ways. It costs hospital more to prvide care for the complications 
caused by adverse events. As a result of the AE, patients have to stay longer in the 
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hospital and the hospital will bear the associated costs, and there will be no 
reimbursement for the cost of treating the experienced AE. Additionally hospital’s 
capacity will decrease and the hospital will be unable to admit new patients. Also more 
challenging reimbursement policies will be imposed on the hospital in future. On top of 
that, hospital will suffer the loss of trust and good will on patient’s end. 
Starting from the high level model in Figure 6-2 and after many revisions the model 
evolved to the more detailed version shown in Figure 6.3. Section 6.2 discusses the 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6.2 Dynamic Model’s Quantification 
 
Based on available clinical data and experts’ assessm nt, the formulas for each of the 
nodes, the formulas representing the relationships between the nodes, and in case of the 
constants in the model the respective values of the nodes, have been derived and 
calculated. This section provides detailed discussion on these formulas and values. 
Operating Margin 
One of the measures hospitals use to evaluate how well they are doing financially, is 
“Operating Margin”. Operating margin (OM) is the ratio of operating income divided by 
revenue, and operating income is simply their revenue minus cost. 
 
Hospitals’ fiscal year starts on October first and ends on September thirty first. We have 
operating margin, operating dollars, and cost and revenue data available to us for years 
2003 through 2011, where 2011 data is partial, from October first 2010 to January first 
2011. Table 6-1 contains the available financial data.  
 










Year OM OM Dollars Revenue ( R) Cost ( C)
2003 -3.20% (14,600,000.00)$             $456,250,000.00 $470,850,000.00
2004 1.20% 13,600,000.00$              $1,133,333,333.33 $1,119,733,333.33
2005 3.40% 33,700,000.00$              $991,176,470.59 $957,476,470.59
2006 2.60% 27,500,000.00$              $1,057,692,307.69 $1,030,192,307.69
2007 4.70% 52,388,770.15$              $1,114,654,684.10 $1,062,265,913.94
2008 -0.90% (10,253,429.78)$             $1,139,269,975.04 $1,149,523,404.81
2009 1.30% 14,847,535.95$              $1,142,118,149.97 $1,127,270,614.02
2010 2.10% 24,044,442.35$              $1,144,973,445.35 $1,120,929,003.00
2011 3.50% 40,174,255.76$              $1,147,835,878.96 $1,107,661,623.20
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6.2.1 Soft Factors in the Model: ”Pressures” 
 
To understand how the financial stress, leads to managerial decisions at the hospital level 
to reduce loss and maximize profitability, we have introduced the concept of “Pressure to 
Close Revenue Gap”  into the model, which forces the decision makers to adopt cost 
cutting strategies that may influence the risk of specific adverse events. In other words, 
this pressure creates pressure to reduce length of stay, pressure to reduce operational 
costs (mainly staffing) and affects the organization’s willingness and ability to invest 
proactively in safety.  
Whilst these pressures are extremely real and visible to every health care professional in 
clinical settings (including all the experts intervi wed for this study), they are soft, 
human-oriented factors that because they have not been reflected explicitly in any 
analysis or database for that matter, are very challenging to model mathematically. 
Naturally, expert judgment can play a significant role in, at least subjectively, 
formulating these concepts.  To be able to elicit expert’s opinion on the relationship 
between “Revenue Gap” and “Pressure to Close Revenu Gap”, the concept of pressure 
has to be communicated with the experts in such a way that the outcome of the elicitation 
process is sufficiently reliable. In other words, we had to make sure that the experts had a 
clear understanding of what our vision was about these pressures.   
In modeling soft factors of this kind, different approaches could be found in system 
dynamics literature. Some of these soft factors are e sier to model than the others, mainly 
because some type of proxy (which we possibly have some data on) could be used in 
modeling them. For instance, Sterman (2000), in modeling generic structure for a labor 
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capacitated process uses “Desired Completion Rate / Standard Completion Rate” to 
formulate “Schedule Pressure”. On the other hand, there are also examples in the 
literature that in modeling some the soft factors, have relied solely on subjective 
assessment of the experts and experts’ belief about the certain entity being modeled and 
have not represented the soft factor using a measur  that corresponds to a physical entity. 
For instance, McCabe (1998) has used a scale of 0-1 to model airline employees’ moral, 
and Cooke (2004) has used a similar scale to represnt management and personnel 
commitment to safety in modeling the operational risk in mining industry. 
 In modeling pressures in this model, even though interviews with experts revealed that 
the notion is rather clear to clinical professionals, to further ensure the reliability of the 
elicited information from experts on the soft factors f the model we decided to find a 
measure for these factors that was more tangible. This would allow us to be more 
confident that the questions from experts about the form, shape, effect and value of these 
pressures is being communicated correctly and us analysts, as well as our experts 
understand and mean the same thing about these soft factors. For this we relied on the 
notion of elasticity, used frequently in economics. 
Elasticity, in economics, is the ratio of the percent change in a variable to the percent 
change in another variable, and is used as a tool to measure the responsiveness of a 
function to changes in parameters in a dimensionless manner.  For example “price 
elasticity of demand”, ; 
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Gives percentage of change in demand in response to one percent change in price, given 
all other factors such as income remain constant. 
We will utilize the concept of elasticity, in its general sense, to elicit experts’ opinion on 
the formulation of the four soft factors in the model (Pressure to Close Revenue Gap, 
Pressure to Optimize LOS, Pressure to Reduce Operational Costs, and 
Willingness/Ability to Invest in Proactive Safety Interventions). That is in interviewing 
experts for these soft factors, we anchored our questions on the elasticity concept so that 
the “Pressure to Close Revenue Gap”, etc. is connected to an actual physical measure, but 
the outcome of the elicitation is still subjective. 
1. Pressure to Close Revenue Gap 
Financial stress forces decision makers to adopt cos utting strategies. We have 
established in the qualitative model, that in U.S. hospitals these strategies mainly include 
optimizing LOS, reducing operational costs and limiting proactive expenditure on safety. 
To model “Pressure to Close Revenue Gap” we asked the experts: 
“Lower or negative operating margins will force management to take one or a 
combination of cost cutting strategies. The worse the operating margin gets the higher 
the chances of adopting these strategies. Given the graph below (Figure 6-4), please 
mark what ranges of operating margins corresponds to the likelihood of some kind of 
cost cutting decision being enforced, to your experience. Use the range 0-1 for pressure, 





Figure 6-4.Operating margin-pressure to close revenue gap relationship
 
To facilitate the elicitation process, the experts were given a few forms and graphs and 
were asked to select the form they thought best repres nted the relationship between 
operating margin and pressure to close revenue gap. They were also asked to mark t
threshold values on the graphs. 

























Figure 6-5, shows the format options that were presented 
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Figure 6-5.Operating margin-pressure to close revenue gap relationship; format options
 
Most experts chose the form of a step function, and  few experts picked the inverse S
shaped function. None of the experts believed that this relationship could be represented 
with a linear format. We picked a step function form, and aggregating the turning points 
on the graphs provided by experts, we arrived at the graph depicted in 
Figure 6-6.Expert opinion; operating margin/pressure to reduc revenue gap relationship
 
Given the outcome of the elicitation for the relationship between “Operating Margin” and 
“Pressure to Close Revenue gap”, we have to be able to manipulate this relationship in 
the system dynamics model, that is, the node “Pressu  to Close Revenue Gap” is 
intermediate node between “Operating margin” and ultimately “Risk of Specific Adverse 











calibrate the “Pressure to Close Revenue gap” to ge the best fit to the actual data. In 
order to do this though, we have to convert this step function to the closest parametric, 
functional forms. 
The best parametric function that fitted the experts’ input is a negative Sigmoid function 
in the form of: 
  
Where: 
PCRG: Pressure to Close Revenue Gap 
RG: Revenue Gap 
And, are the parameters of the model. Fitting the negative Sigmoid function to 
experts’ assessments reveals the optimum values for the parameters as; 
 
Figure 6-7, shows the function for “Pressure to Close Revenue Gap” using the optimum 
values for the parameters. 
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Figure 6-7.Operating margin/pressure to 
 
As it is evident from the graph, experts believe that organizational tolerance for loss is 
rather very small, the pressure to make decisions in order to close the revenue gap spikes 
rapidly and dramatically
Additionally, there is always a pressure even thoug very small to maximize profit.
2. Pressure to Optimize LOS
Pressure to close revenue gap, leads decision makers towards cost cutting strategies. One 
of those strategies is optimizing LOS or reducing LOS to the minimum required, which 
we have argued that affects the probability of experiencing certain adverse events. In 
formulating the relationship between pressure to close revenue gap, and pressure to 
optimize LOS, again we have utilized the concept of elasticity in eliciting experts’ 
assessments of such relationship.
A tangible and real entity to clinical professionals, that we could relate to the pressure to 
optimize LOS, is the concept of “
systematically visit unit by unit and decide which patients could theoretically be 
discharged. These meetings are real actions that take pl ce in part in response to the need 
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reduce revenue gap relationship; functional form
, when the hospital is experiencing financial distre s. 
 
 




to reduce LOS, and they actually increase in
need to reduce LOS increases. Nevertheless, depending on the physical conditions of the 
patients these patients may or may not achieve actual discharges of the patients. To be 
able to reliably elicit experts’ opin
utilization review meetings’ frequency as a proxy to evaluate the level of pressure to 
reduce LOS. 
 
To model “Pressure to Optimize LOS” we asked the experts:
“Given your assessment on “Pressure to Close Rev
“Operating Margin”, what is the likelihood of observing a change (increase or decrease) 
in frequency of the utilization review meetings given the level/ranges of organizational 
pressure to close revenue gap, maximize profitabili
these ranges in the graph that best represents this relationship 
6-8)” 
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 frequency (maybe even twice daily) as the 
ion on “Pressure to Optimize LOS” we will use the 
 
enue Gap”, as a function of 
ty and minimize costs?. Please mark 
to your opinion (




Figure 6-8.Pressure to close revenue gap
 
Most experts chose the form of a step function, and a few experts picked the exponential 
function, with different slope
be represented with a linear format. We picked a step function form, and aggregating the 
turning points on the graphs provided by experts, we arrived at the graph depicted in 
Figure 6-9. 
Figure 6-9.Expert opinion; pressure to reduce revenue gap reltionship/pressure to optimize LOS 
relationship 
 
Interestingly enough, most exp
regardless of the financial pressures, there is always some level of pressure to optimize 
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-pressure to optimize LOS relationship; format options
s. None of the experts believed that this relationship could 
 
erts marked the intercept greater than 0, meaning that 
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LOS. In this case also, similar to the case of “Pressure to Close Revenue Gap”, and with 
the same rationale, we have to convert this step function to the closest parametric, 
functional forms. The best parametric function that fitted the experts’ input is a negative 
exponential function in the form of: 
 
Where: 
PRLOS: Pressure to Reduce LOS 
PCRG: Pressure to Close Revenue Gap 
and ,  , are model parameters.  
Fitting the negative exponential function to experts’ assessments reveals the optimum 
values for the parameters as; 
 
Figure 6-10, shows the function for “Pressure to Optimize LOS” using the optimum 
values for the parameters. 











Figure 6-10.Pressure to reduce revenue gap re
form 
 
3. Pressure to Reduce Operational Costs
Another strategy to close revenue gap and maximize profitability, is reducing the 
operational costs. The largest piece of operational costs in hospitals
impacted by such strategies is admittedly staffing. Reduction in staffing that could 
potentially have great impact on the risk of certain dverse events, concerns reduction in 
nursing staff. Physicians are usually not affected greatly by 
since they are able to generate revenue. Before we talk about formulating this node of the 
model, we will briefly discuss how staffing is struct red in the hospitals.
When it comes to staffing, ideally the decision maker nows th
number of staff with certain level of expertise is needed to care for certain number of 
patients with a certain range of problems. So the decision maker looks at the pool of 
nurses and if enough nurses are not available they us  what 
that are nurses who work on temporary assignments usually through specialized 
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lationship/pressure to optimize LOS relationship; functional 
 
decisions to reduce staff, 
 
at optimally, certain 
is known as Per Diem
 
 that is directly 
 nurses, 
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placement agencies or through hospital staffing pools. So in an ideal situation, where 
there is no expenditure constraints you can always optimally staff using per diem nurses, 
but these services are very expensive and they cost much more than using staff nurses 
(i.e. the hourly rate).  
There are a number of ways, in which hospitals takeaction to control and reduce staffing 
costs;  
1. There are many different ways of staffing and each impacts the costs differently. 
Probably the most expensive way, is to staff with hospital’s employees and filling 
the gaps with agency nurses. The first response to pressure to reduce staffing is 
eliminating agency or per diem nurses. Although there are of course exceptions, 
for instance if there is an epidemic of Influenza and the hospital has none of its 
own staff available, agency nurses have to be used regardless. 
2. The second approach to reduce staffing costs is eliminating overtime within the 
hospital’s staff. Overtime is very costly for the hospitals (e.g. time and a half in 
OR), and to assign nurses, they have to make sure to use nurses that are not 
overtime and almost mandate them to cover the shift the hospital needs. Hence in 
tight financial constraints, elimination of overtime is another measure that is taken 
to reduce staffing costs. 
3. Depending on the type of unit you are staffing, there is some flexibility in terms 
of the composition of the staff. There are Registered Nurses (RNs, have 
completed college nursing program and have passed a national licensing exam), 
Licensed Practical Nurses (LPNs), Patient Care Technicians ( PCTs, usually a 
high school degree with some additional training). They have all been trained in 
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patient care, but with different levels of education and experience. In a perfect 
situation, the person who is staffing a floor or a unit would use RNs. But that is an 
expensive model, so the tasks that could be done by LPNs, hence the composition 
changes to say, 2/3 LPNs and 1/3 RNs. As the next st p down, there might be 
some tasks assigned to LPNs that PCTs can do as well, so you change some of the 
LPNs in your staffing composition and replace them with patient care technicians. 
To summarize, eliminating per diem nurses, eliminating staff over time and changing the 
composition of nursing staff are tangible, physical actions that take place in response to 
financial constraints. These changes and cuts neverthel ss are bounded by some 
regulation as well, and there are certain staffing ratios that have to be maintained (this 
ratio slightly varies from state to state), and although there may be instances where these 
regulatory ratios are not maintained, but most hospital  closely follow this regulation and 
avoid running the risk from licensing stand point. 
Now to model “Pressure to Reduce Operational Costs”, given the 3 staffing cost 
reduction strategies discussed above, we asked the experts: 
“Given your assessment on “Pressure to Close Revenue Gap”, as a function of 
“Operating Margin”, what is the likelihood of observing an action regarding the three 
strategies to reduce operational costs (staffing costs), given the level/ranges of 
organizational pressure to close revenue gap, maximize profitability and minimize costs?. 
Please mark these ranges in the graph that best repres nts this relationship to your 
opinion”. Figure 6-11 shows the graphical form suggested to the experts. 
 
Figure 6-11.Pressure to close revenue gap/pressure to reduce operati n
 
From aggregating experts’ opinions, the following step function in 
derived to represent the rela
“Pressure to Reduce Operational Costs”.
Figure 6-12.Expert opinion; Pressure to close revenue gap/pressu  to reduce operational costs relationship
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The closest parametric function to this step function is a negative exponential function in 
the form of; 
Where, 
PROC: Pressure to Reduce Operational Costs
PCRG: Pressure to Reduce Revenue Gap
and are model parameters.
Fitting the negative exponential funct
values for the parameters as;
 
Figure 6-13 shows the function for “Pressure to Reduce Operation l Cost
optimum values for the parameters.
Figure 6-13.Pressure to close revenue gap/pressure to reduce operati nal costs relationship; functional form
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4. Willingness/Ability to Invest in Proactive Safety Interventions 
Given that willingness and ability to invest proactively in safety could technically be 
measured with the actual dollar value makes it a tangible concept in principal. For 
instance the records ideally show how much money is spent each year on safety 
interventions, and there is a direct relationship between willingness to invest proactively 
in safety and the actual dollar amount that get invested. So establishing the relationship 
between pressure to close revenue gap and willingness/ability to invest in safety should 
technically be straightforward. The challenge is though, that there are other reasons for 
investing in safety interventions; some are mandatory, and from data, it is very difficult to 
disentangle annually what investment is voluntary and what is being driven by some 
external regulatory body. Regulatory authorities (e.g. state’s department of health), 
sometimes requires hospitals to demonstrate action on a certain, non-negotiable safety 
activities, additionally the certification body (i.e. The Joint Commission on Accreditation 
of HealthCare Organizations) then they would like hospitals to have a couple of optional 
investments and that is up to the hospitals to decide on what safety aspect they want to 
invest. These investments maybe in response to a finding by a third body payer (e.g. 
CMS) as well. It is very difficult to find out what part of the investment has been elective. 
Due to these challenges and also difficulties to extract quality accounting data that 
differentiates the types of safety investments, and d itionally given that only 9 years of 
financial data was available to us in this study, it is difficult to derive the relationship 
between  pressure to reduce revenue gap, and ability to proactively invest in safety 
empirically. Table 6-2 shows the estimated safety investments and the operating margin 
for years 2003-2011(projected). 
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Table 6-2.Operating margin and safety investment data, 2003-2011 
 
In fact the regression analysis shows a very weak correlation between the operating 
margin and the actual dollars invested in safety (Figure 6-14), which we argue that is due 
to the lack of quality data, as was discussed. 
 
Figure 6-14.Operating margin and safety investment; r gression analysis 
 
To elicit this relationship from our experts, given that the relationship between financial 
situation of the hospital and investments made proactively in safety is a tangible 
relationship, we asked our experts: 
Year OM OM Dollars Estimated Safety Investment
2003 -0.032 -$14,600,000.00 $150,000.00
2004 0.012 $13,600,000.00 $100,000.00
2005 0.034 $33,700,000.00 $350,000.00
2006 0.026 $27,500,000.00 $200,000.00
2007 0.047 $52,388,770.15 $450,000.00
2008 -0.009 -$10,253,429.78 $400,000.00
2009 0.013 $14,847,535.95 $200,000.00
2010 0.021 $24,044,442.35 $200,000.00









df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 44600646353 4.46E+10 4.524206 0.077528042
Residual 6 59149353647 9.86E+09
Total 7 1.0375E+11
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 217578.4857 40967.18893 5.311043 0.001811 117335.3856 317821.5858 117335.3856 317821.5858
X Variable 1 3208679.594 1508534.172 2.127018 0.077528 -482570.55 6899929.737 -482570.5496 6899929.737
 
“Given your assessment 
“Operating Margin”, what is the likelihood of observing change (increase or decrease)in 
the level hospital’s willingness and ability to invest proactively in safety, given the 
level/ranges of organizatio
minimize costs?. Please mark these ranges in the graph that best represents this 
relationship to your opinion”.
Figure 6-15 shows the graphical form suggested to the experts.
Figure 6-15.Pressure to close revenue gap/willingness ability to invest in safety; format options
 
Experts, almost unanimously picked the decreasing exponential format, but with a twist 
that for low pressures on closing revenue gap, the willingness to invest in safety is still 
very high because of the potential cost saving effects and partly the regulat
supervisions and then starts a dramatic decline, hence we have modeled this node as: 
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on “Pressure to Close Revenue Gap”, as a function of 
nal pressure to close revenue gap, maximize profitability and 
  
 







WIPS: Willingness/Ability to Invest in Proactive Safety Interventions
PCRG: Pressure to Close Revenue Gap
and are model parameters. 
Fitting the point estimates provided by experts on the graph, reveals the values of 
parameters: 
 






















6.2.2 Data Driven Factors 
 
In this section, we will discuss the formulation and quantification of other factors in the 
model, including model constants that have been derived from clinical data. 
5. Probability of LOS Too Short to Meet All Needs 
Under high pressure to reduce LOS, not all patients are discharged prior to complete 
readiness, but the likelihood of a patient being discharged before all his/her needs are met 
increases. To capture this probabilistic notion in the model, we can use “Readmissions” 
within 24, 48 or 72 hours of discharge as a proxy. Readmission within 72 hours is 
probably a safe assumption that the patient was discharged inappropriately. That being 
said, there is still much more to it due to patient’s conditions complexity. For instance 
patients with Congestive Heart Failure, CHF, (where heart can’t pump enough blood to 
the organs) and the difference between their hearts maintaining the steady state versus not 
functioning, is a very fine line. Those patients may be admitted and stay in the hospital 
for two days and receive care, and they will be back to the hospital in 4-5 days, and this 
downward spiral continues till they are deceased. These types of discharges could not be 
categorized as inappropriate, because their stay in hospital, after they receive care for the 
first admission, is no longer justifiable, but you know that they will be back within a few 
days.  
We extracted data for 70419 admissions, for years 2006 and 2008. There is a national 
average for LOS, for each diagnosis related group (DRG code). That means, every patient 
is assigned a DRG code (for his/her major diagnosis) upon admission. Each patient 
record we acquired indicates his/her diagnosis code, the national average LOS, the actual 
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LOS of that patient, and of course patient identifier. We also extracted data on all 
admission and discharge dates and times (sometimes multiple admissions and multiple 
discharges). 
Comparing the national average LOS for each patient case, and the actual LOS of that 
patient reveals whether or not a patient was discharged earlier than anticipated, and by 
how many days (hours). At this stage we also eliminated the patient records where the 
patient had been deceased. Next, for the patients that shoed an early discharged we 
checked whether they had been readmitted to the hospital in the next 24, 48 and 72 hours 
of the previous discharge. This enables us to calculate the likelihood of a patient being 
readmitted to the hospital, due to an earlier than anticipated discharge and could be used 
as an indicator that the patient’s LOS has been too short to meet all his or her needs. 
Table 6-3 shows the average probability of LOS being too short to meet all patient needs, 
based on readmissions within 24, 48 and 72 hours. 
 
Table 6-3.Probability of LOS too short to meet all patient’s needs 
 
Additionally, assuming readmission within 72 hours as the indicator of an early and 
inappropriate discharge we can obtain the distribution of the probability of readmission 
within 72 hours (3 days), as a function of how early the patient has been discharged 
compared to the national average of LOS for patient’s diagnosis code. Figure 6-17 
represents this distribution. The data represents a beta distribution with parameters,   
Number of Patients Readmitted Probability of LOS Too Short
Readmission within 72 Hrs 615 0.091300475
Readmission within 48 Hrs 415 0.061609264
Readmission within 24 Hrs 227 0.033699525
Total Early Discharge 6736
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 a=-6.767E=6 and b= -0.0026. 
 
Figure 6-17.Number of days in inappropriate early discharge; pdf 
 



















Figure 6-18.Number of days in inappropriate early 
 
For instance, if a patient is discharged 5 days or less, earlier than the national average of 
LOS for the specific DRG code, there is over 90% chance (the area under the curve, 
shown with the dashed arrow in 
hospital within 72 hours. 
6. Probability of LOS Being Longer Than Needed
Some types of adverse events may increase in likelihood of occurrence, due to 
prolonged LOS, simply because the patient’s exposure to the risk increases. For 
instance prolonged LOS may increase patient’s chances of experiencing pressure 
ulcer because he/she will spend more time in bed. Another example where prolonged 
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discharge; cdf 




LOS increases the risk of adverse event, are falls. The more the patient stays in the 
hospital, the higher the chances of him/her falling. 
Although, the lack of pressure to optimize LOS, at le st commonly, cause patients to 
stay in the hospital longer than they really need,  but experts picture situations where 
patients do over stay in the hospital. 
For instance, if the hospital admits a homeless patient and physicians start insulin 
treatment because the patient has been diagnosed with diabetes, they cannot be 
discharged to the street. Sometimes those patients have to stay till hospital figures out 
where they are going to send the patient.  
Let’s look at another scenario for prolonged LOS. After patient has received care for 
the major diagnosis he or she has been admitted for, if there is still need for more care 
that is not specialty care, the patient will be sent to an “Extended Care Facility” , such 
as a nursing home. If nursing homes are totally full and have no room the patient has 
to be waiting while kept in the hospital for an opening in the nursing home. More 
often than not, nursing homes refuse to accept a patient due to his/her certain 
condition (e.g. MRSA: methicillin Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus, a bacteria 
resistant to antibiotics) to avoid its spread to everyone else in the nursing home, and 
hospital has to find a nursing home that is willing to accept the patient, while the 
patient stays in the hospital. 
Other than these situations, if patients stay for a long periods of time in the hospital 
(and hence, increase their exposure to the risk of certain adverse events), it’s because 
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based on their condition, that is how long it takes for them to receive the care they 
need, and this long length of stay is not affected by low pressure to optimize LOS. 
This is very difficult to model and no data is available that directly indicates what are 
the chances that people will overstay because at the hospital level, there is no pressure 
to reduce LOS. To include this in the model though, we had to come up with a proxy. 
Records show that it usually takes longer to discharge patients on weekends than in 
week days (where hospital is working at 96-98% capaity, and there is a lot of 
pressure to discharge as many patients as possible, if it is appropriate). Our experts 
contributed this to the fact that access to “servics” (e.g. oxygen) is a little more 
difficult in weekends than in weekdays, but not much and low pressure to optimize 
LOS will result in patients staying over the weekend due to these small challenges in 
arranging these services. The pressure to reduce LOS is greatest in weekdays, because 
people come in for elective surgeries and procedures th  next day and the hospitals 
really needs the beds, and this pressure to reduce LOS relaxes a bit during the 
weekend.  
We extracted 77403 patient records from 2003 to 2005, and compared their LOS to 
the national average of LOS for the primary diagnosis code (DRG code). Table 6-4, 
Shows a few records of this data. 30665 patients ou of this population had LOS 
greater than that of the national average. Hence we can estimate the probability of 
prolonged LOS (for any reason) to be,  . On the other hand we know 
that not of this prolonged LOS is due to lower organiz tional pressures to discharge 









Table 6-4.Sample data records extracted to indicate whether the patient had prolonged LOS 
 
Dierks (unpublished data, 2011), has conducted an study of the patients with prolonged 
LOS ( 39% of hospital population), which indicates that all other patients’ conditions 
being equal (relatively), 11%-17 % of these patients with prolonged LOS, have been 
those with weekend/Monday AM discharges. This makes for 4.3 %to 6.6%, of total 
hospital population, having prolonged LOS because the time of discharge is a weekend 
where the pressure to optimize LOS is lowest. We will use the middle of this range for 
our model quantification (5.45% probability of prolonged LOS due to low level of 
pressure to optimize LOS). In performing uncertainty analysis, we will assume a normal 




DRG Code Actual LOS National Average LOS Difference in Actual and Average LOS Prolonged LOS (Yes=1, No=0) LongLOS_Condition: Pressure Ulcer LongLOS_Condition: Fall LongLOS_Condition: Infection LongLOS_Condition: Medication Error
35 48 60 -12 0 0 0 0 0
35 48 60 -12 0 0 0 0 0
35 48 60 -12 0 0 0 0 0
35 144 60 84 1 1 1 1 1
35 24 60 -36 0 0 0 0 0
35 48 60 -12 0 0 0 0 0
35 24 60 -36 0 0 0 0 0
37 72 62.4 9.6 1 0 0 0 0
37 48 62.4 -14.4 0 0 0 0 0
37 48 62.4 -14.4 0 0 0 0 0
37 360 62.4 297.6 1 1 1 1 1
37 48 62.4 -14.4 0 0 0 0 0
37 24 62.4 -38.4 0 0 0 0 0
37 24 62.4 -38.4 0 0 0 0 0
40 24 60 -36 0 0 0 0 0
40 24 60 -36 0 0 0 0 0
40 144 60 84 1 1 1 1 1
44 48 98.4 -50.4 0 0 0 0 0
44 48 98.4 -50.4 0 0 0 0 0
44 24 98.4 -74.4 0 0 0 0 0
44 96 98.4 -2.4 0 0 0 0 0
44 48 98.4 -50.4 0 0 0 0 0
44 72 98.4 -26.4 0 0 0 0 0
44 48 98.4 -50.4 0 0 0 0 0
44 72 98.4 -26.4 0 0 0 0 0
44 192 98.4 93.6 1 1 1 1 1
( 0.045, 0.38)µ σ= =
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6.2.3 Magnitude of the Effects of Cost Cutting Strategies on the Risk of Adverse 
Events 
 
As discussed in section 6.1, the strategies that decision makers take in response to an 
unfavorable revenue, will affect the risk of certain adverse events. In this section we 
discuss the magnitude of these effects. 
7. Magnitude of Change in the Risk of Adverse Event Due to Shortened LOS 
To formulate this node in the model, we have used a combination of subjective and data 
driven approach. We argued that at certain high levels of pressure to reduce LOS, there is 
a chance that some patients will be discharged prior to readiness, and we used 
readmission within 72 hours data, to calculate the probability of early discharge. To find 
out what levels of pressure may cause an early discharge; we used our experts’ subjective 
opinion, using interview guides in appendix D. To elicit this information from the experts 
the following questions were asked: 
“As was discussed in other rounds of interview, the pr ssure to optimize LOS, 
may affect risk of adverse events in two ways, first it may increase the probability 
of experiencing an adverse events, because some patient’s LOS may be too short 
to meet all his/her needs. Second, it may reduce the probability of some adverse 
events because it simply reduces the exposure and if the pressure to optimize LOS 
is too small, some patients may stay in the hospital longer than they really need 
and be exposed to certain adverse events. 
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• To your experience at what level (range) of pressure to optimize LOS, we 
might start to see the effect of this pressure on risk, because the pressure 
is too high that some patients may be discharged a bit prematurely?” 
 
 
Table 6-5 shows experts’ responses and assessments. 
 
Table 6-5.Expert opinion; level of pressure to optimize LOS triggering early discharge  
 
To aggregate experts’ inputs, we will use the Bayesi n method discussed in 4.3.3.2.1, 
which results in a posterior distribution shown in F gure 6-19 with mean 0.6 and variance 
0.01. 
No Pressure=0 0-0.1 0.1-0.2 0.2-0.3 0.3-0.4 0.4-0.5 0.5-0.6 0.6-0.7 0.7-0.8 0.8-0.9 0.9-1 Max Pressure =1



















Figure 6-19.Experts’ opinion on level of pressure to optimize LOS triggering early discharge; aggregatd 
 
We will use the mean value for the quantification of the model, and the variability for 
uncertainty analysis. Now given that the pressure to optimize LOS is at a level that may 
cause some patients to be discharged early, we will have to determine by what magnitude 
does their risk, of specific adverse event changes. Dierks et al. (manuscript in 
preparation, 2011), have conducted a study that measur s the magnitude of change in the 
risk of certain adverse events, not reimbursed by third party insures, due to: Shortened 
LOS, Prolonged LOS, and Understaffing. 
The estimates provided by this study, shown in Table 6-6 have been used in our model 
quantification. According to this study, shortened LOS decreases the baseline risk of 




Table 6-6. Magnitude of change in the risk of hospital acquired adverse events due to staffing, prolonged 
and shortened LOS  
 





Similar to part 7, we elicited experts’ opinion on the levels of pressure to optimize LOS 
that corresponds to changes in risk of adverse events due to prolonged LOS.  
“To your experience at what level (range) of pressure to optimize LOS, we might start to 
see the effect of this pressure on risk, because the pressure is too low that some patients 
may stay longer than they really need to which may increase their risk of being exposed 
to and experiencing certain adverse events?” 
 
Table 6-7, reflects experts’ responses and assessment . 
 
Table 6-7.Expert opinion; level of pressure to optimize LOS triggering prolonged LOS 
 
 
Aggregated experts’ assessments, shown in the distribution below (Figure 6-20), has a 
mean of 0.11 and variance 0.03. 
No Pressure=0 0-0.1 0.1-0.2 0.2-0.3 0.3-0.4 0.4-0.5 0.5-0.6 0.6-0.7 0.7-0.8 0.8-0.9 0.9-1 Max Pressure =1



















Figure 6-20.Experts’ opinion on level of pressure to optimize LOS triggering prolonged LOS; aggregated 
 
The estimates provided by Dierks et al. (manuscript in preparation, 2011), shown in 
Table 6.6, have been used in our model quantification. According to this study, prolonged 
LOS increases the baseline risk of pressure ulcer and line infection by 25% and 5% 





9. Magnitude of Change in Risk of Adverse Event Due to Understaffing 
Dierks et al. (manuscript in preparation, 2011), estimate the magnitude of change in 
the risk of certain adverse events due to understaffing, shown in Table 6.6. But the 
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characteristics of “being understaffed” or “staff adequacy” are not clearly defined in 
the literature, and have not been modeled and formulated before. The following is a 
discussion on our approach to characterize and model “understaffing” and “staff 
adequacy”, probabilistically using patient complexity scores. 
• Complexity Score Distribution and Probability of Understaffing 
Determining the probability of a unit being understaffed is not a trivial task. The 
notion of nurse to patient ratio, which is a mandatory ratio to be maintained by 
hospitals, is usually maintained by hospitals due to consequences imposed by 
regulatory authorities. Experts believe that the concept of understaffing and staff 
adequacy goes way beyond the nurse-patient ratio. The staffing ratio only tells you 
how many nurses with a RN degree you need to have given the census on the hospital 
floor, but no two patients are exactly equivalent ad sometimes there is a sudden 
increase in intensity of the workload where although you might be having the 
required staffing ratio but the adequacy of staffing drops because of that. Since there 
is not clinical data or reliable data for that matter, exists of adequacy of staffing we 
had to find a measure that best represents the concept of staff adequacy. For this 
purpose, we have utilized “Case Mix Index (CMI)”, which is the average Diagnosis 
Related Group (DRG) weight for all of a hospitals Medicare patients, and can be used 
as an indicator of patient’s complexity of illness (Steinwald and Dummit, 1989).  
The basic idea is, that a combination of high pressure to reduce operational costs (i.e. 
staffing) and high level of patient complexity, will lead to inadequate staffing 
situation. 
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We have extracted patient complexity score data, for 970 days (from August 31st 
2008, to April 29th 2011), for 33 units in the hospital. From this data we have 
calculated the mean and the median of complexity score  for each floor, each day. 
What is challenging though using the mean is that, t e average value of complexity 
can be calculated for each floor but the complexity score is not normally distributes 
for each floor. For instance if you have 10 patients on 1 floor, on any given day, we 
may have 9 patients with complexity of 1, and one patient with complexity of 18. The 
average of these complexities for this floor at this day is 2.7. On the other hand a 
floor with 10 patients that all have complexity of 2.7, also gives an average 
complexity of 2.7. What is unclear is whether complexity composed of 9 easy 
patients and one difficult patient is different from average complexity of 2.7, where 
everyone has a complexity index of 2.7. 
However, to characterize the workload based on the complexity of the patients more 
realistically, we will use the median complexity score for each floor, each day. 
Assuming homogeneity of data from all 34 units, thecomplexity score distribution 
for all units (34 units), and all days (970 days) best fits a Weibull distribution, with 
parameters , (mean= 1.745, and variance= 0.287) which is used as 
a representative of the distribution of complexity scores hospital wide. Figure 6-21, 
shows this distribution, and Table 6-8, contains the descriptive statistics of this 
distribution. 
4.87, 1.832α β= =
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Std. Deviation 0.53559 
Coef. of Variation 0.30696 
Std. Error 0.09323 
Skewness 2.2682 







25% (Q1) 1.4834 
50% (Median) 1.5992 





Table 6-8.Case-mix complexity distribution across ho pital; descriptive statistics 
In presence high levels of pressure to reduce operational costs (due to unfavorable 
revenue gap), a unit with high patient complexity. Using experts’ opinion, we can 
formulate a combination of level of patient complexity and pressure to reduce operational 


































Figure 6-22.Calculating the probability of understaffing
 
For instance, when pressure to reduce operational costs is “P” (given by experts), and 
complexity score of the unit is at “C”, the probability of the unit being understaffed is the 
area under the curve in  
Figure 6-22,to the right of
To determine combinations of complexity scores and cost reducing pressures that may 
cause understaffing, experts were asked to provide their
interview question; 
“- The pressure to reduce operational costs, may affect risk of adverse events due 
to understaffing. Assume that when there are pressu to cut operational costs, the 
organization may respond by reducing 
staff (at a lower cost).” 
• To your experience what level (range) of pressure to reduce operational 
costs are great enough such that some patients may experience an adverse 
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 the complexity level “C”.  
opinion through the following 
umbers of staff or staffing with less experienced 
 
event because the unit is not suff
numbers of staff, or lower quality of staff?)
*You may use an arrow to indicate a precise point or circle one of the 
ranges above to indicate a broader range estimate.
The idea is that the impact of lower staffing nu
experienced staff may depend on the complexity of the case mix. With this 
assumption in mind, suppose we take the average of the complexity scores 
across all units in the hospital and all inpatient days. Please indicate in 
the table below
begins to influence the probability of an adverse ev nt 
complexity of the patient population.
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iciently staffed (either due to lower 
 
 
mbers and/or less 
, where the pressure to reduce operational costs/staffing 










Table 6-9.Experts’ opinion; combination of level of pressure to reduce operational cost, and complexity score effecting the probability of adverse events due to 
understaffing
E5,E10 E2, E3,E4.E6 E11 E1
E7,E9, E14
E5,E13 E2,E3,E4,E6,E7 E11,E13 E1
E8,E10,E13,E14
E5 E2,E3,E4,E6,E7 E11 E1
E14
E5 E2,E6,E12,E14 E3,E4,E11 E7,E8,E10 E1
E5 E2,E4,E6 E3,E14 E1,E3,E7,E8 E3 E3
E10,E11
E2,E12 E4,E5,E6,E14 E11,E13 E1,E8,E10,E13 E7 E3
E13
E2 E4,E5,E6,E12 E11 E1 E8,E10 E3,E7
E14
E2,E4,E5 E6 E1 E8 E7,E10 E3
E14
E5 E2 E5,E6 E1,E4,E13 E7,E8,E14,E11 E10,#13 E3,E13
E13
E2,E5 E6 E1,E4,E7,E8 E3,E10
E9,E12,E14,E11







































































































Each expert , marked in a table like Table 6-9, what combinations of organizational 
pressure to reduce operational costs and staff cuts, and complexity of patient population 
may start to influence the probability of a patient xperiencing an adverse event, due to 
understaffing. Table above reflects the collective experts’ assessments. 
To use these assessments in the model, we have discr tized the space shown in Table 6-9 
above, into three bounds, in a way that covers as many expert assessments as possible: 
A. Low Pressure- High Complexity: where pressure to reduc  
operational cost is between 0 and 0.3, and complexity is above 
2.2 (yellow area).  
B. Medium Pressure- Medium Complexity: where pressure to 
reduce operational cost is between 0.3 and 0.6, and complexity is 
between 1 and 2.2 (orange area).  
C. High Pressure- Low Complexity: where pressure to reduc  
operational cost is greater than 0.6 and complexity is less than 
1(red area).  
If the combination of the level of pressure to reduce operational costs and complexity of 
patient population falls in any of the above; A, B or C categories, we assume that there is 
a certain probability (determined in Table 6.6) that the patient will experience a certain 
adverse event (in the case of our study, pressure ulc r or line infection), due to 
understaffing (of various forms such as inadequate number of staff, inadequate 
experience of staff, etc.).   
iE
 
With the three critical limits for low, medium 
probability that complexity exceeds these limits from the CDF of case
distribution in Figure 6-21
Figure 6-23.Case-mix complexity distribution across hospital; 
 
Hence:  
Probability of complexity exceeding C1=2 is 0.1
Probability of complexity exceeding C2=1 is 0.95





and high complexity, we can obtain the 








10. Magnitude of Change in Risk Due to the Lack of Investm nt in Safety 
Interventions 
It is almost possible to distinguish how much of safety related investments directly 
affect which adverse event, and what the exact magnitude of change in risk of adverse 
events is contributable to how much of these investm n s.  The data available in this 
study, on overall safety related investments and the relative frequency of the two 
adverse events we have studied in this research (pressure ulcer and line infection) 
does not reveal meaningful correlation between the two. Table 6-10 shows the 
prevalence of pressure ulcer and the expenditure on safety from 2003 to 2011, no 
meaningful information could be extracted regarding the effect of change in the 




Table 6-10.Safety investment data and prevalence of pressure ulcer  
 
For example between years 2006 and 2007, there is 125% increase in safety investments, 
yet data shows 15% increase in the prevalence of pressu e ulcer. 
Experts’ opinion on magnitude of effect of ability to invest in safety on the risk of 
hospital-acquired conditions has been solicited through the following question and the 
aggregated results are reflected in Table 6-11. 
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“Assume that the pressure to reduce the revenue gap, will affect the level of 
willingness/ability to invest in proactive safety investments. The worse the 
financial situation gets, the less investments are made in safety programs.  
Assume that the more we spend on safety the less th chances of experiencing 
adverse events will be. If this willingness to invest in safety is a scale between 0-1 
(0 meaning no ability/willingness to invest in safety, and 1 meaning highest level 
of ability/willingness to invest in proactive safety interventions); 
• (a )Based on your experience at what level (range) of this willingness do 
we start to see changes in the risk of adverse event?  
*You may use an arrow to indicate a precise point or circle one of the ranges above to 
indicate a broader range estimate. 
 
Expert’s responses to this question are reflected in Table 6-11 below. 
 
No Pressure=0 0-0.1 0.1-0.2 0.2-0.3 0.3-0.4 0.4-0.5 0.5-0.6 0.6-0.7 0.7-0.8 0.8-0.9 0.9-1 Max Pressure =1
















Table 6-11.Experts’ opinion; level of ability/willingness to invest in safety and the effect of risk of adverse 
events 
 
Aggregating these estimates, using the Bayesian methods for expert assessments 
aggregation yields to the distribution below (Figure 6-24), with mean 0.22and variance 
0.15. 
 
Figure 6-24.Experts’ opinion on level of ability/willingness to invest in safety and the effect of risk of 
adverse events; aggregated 
 
F. (b) Based on your experience, what is the magnitude of change in the risk 
of adverse events when there is an increase or decrease in investment in 
elective/proactive safety programs? Use the table below to indicate the 
relationship between changes in investments and magnitude of effect on 
risk of adverse events. 
Experts’ responses to this question, have been collected and summarized in Table 6-13 (
represents expert i). One of the experts did not prvide an answer to this particular iE
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question. Also, interestingly enough, three of our experts did not feel like the maximum 
limits of decrease and increase to the probability of adverse events suggested by us at the 
interview forms (Maximum 5% increase and decrease in the probability of adverse 
event), did justice to the magnitude of effect of sa ety investments on probability of 
adverse events. Hence they set up their one limits. For instance Expert 2 believed that 
high investments in proactive safety interventions can reduce the risk of adverse events 
by 25%, medium size investments could decrease the risk by 15%, and low investments 
could double the risk and increase it 100%. To aggre ate experts’ opinion, in assessing 
the magnitude of change in the risk of adverse events due to lack of investment in 
proactive safety interventions, we have discretized the space in Table 6.13, into 3 
categories: 
A. High Ability/Willingness to Invest Proactively in Safety (yellow area) 
B. Medium Ability/Willingness to Invest Proactively inSafety (orange area) 
C. Low Ability/Willingness to Invest Proactively in Safety (red area) 
In each of these areas, we aggregate experts’ opinion by taking the weighted average, due 
to the lower number of experts (3 out of 13) who believ d in much larger impacts of 
safety investments on risk of adverse events. The results of aggregation could be seen in 
Table 6-12 . 
 
Table 6-12.Experts’ opinion on magnitude of change i  the risk of adverse events due to lack of investm nt 
in safety; aggregated 
 
 
Willingness/Ability to Invest in Proactive Safety  Interventions Magnitude of Change in Risk of Adverse Event Due to lack of Safety Investments
High (>0.6) -13%
Medium (>0.3 but <0.6) -4%
Low (<0.3) 19%
 







6.2.4 Other Constants of the Model 
 
In order to calculate the cost of caring adverse evnts, we need to find out how much 
impact a specific adverse event has on the LOS and how much longer patients will have 
to remain in the hospital to be treated for the adverse event they have experienced while 
in the hospital.  
11- Increase in the LOS Due to the Adverse Event 
1. Increase in the LOS Due to Pressure Ulcer 
 Using 627,595 patient records for years 2008-2010, we identified 86 admission diagnosis 
codes, common between pressure ulcer cohort (patients who did experience pressure 
ulcer while in the hospital) and non-pressure ulcer cohort (other patients who did not 
acquire pressure ulcer in hospital). Then, we averaged the LOS for all patients in the first 
(pressure ulcer cohort) and the second (non-pressur ulcer cohort) group, for each of the 
admission diagnosis codes. The difference between, average LOS of the two groups, 
naturally reveals how much longer do people who acquire pressure ulcer in hospital, will 
have to stay in the hospital compared to patients who did not experience pressure ulcer. 
Table 6-14, shows the average LOS for both cohorts, for each of the admission diagnosis 
group.   
It is worthwhile noting that, for a couple of the admission diagnosis codes (which 
sometimes only had one patient), we realized that people who had experienced pressure 
ulcer had actually stayed shorter than people with the same diagnosis code in non-
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pressure ulcer cohort. This is due to the fact thatese patients are either discharged to 
other departments, or they are deceased. 
Extracting this outlier data, the increase in the LOS due to experiencing pressure ulcer, is 
best presented by a Gamma distribution, with parameters , and 
mean 15.88 days. 
Figure 6-25, shows this distribution. The mean of this distribution is days, which shows 
on average people who experience pressure ulcer stay 14 days longer in the hospital, 
which agrees with the studies we found in the literature. For instance Beckrich and 
Aronovitch (1999) found in a study that the increased in LOS due to pressure ulcer is 
between 14-17 days. 
 





































According to Healthcare Financial Management (www.hfm.org), the average cost of 
hospital stay (years 2003-2008), is $2000 for Medicare patients and $2500 for Non-
Medicare patients. Also other costs of treating pressure ulcer such as dressings, ointments 
and specialty beds are estimated to be around $300, per-day. 
 
2. Increase in LOS Due to Line Infection 
A few studies could be found in the literature that ve focused on estimating the 
increase in the LOS, and associated costs due to hospital acquired line infection. Some of 
these research studies have concentrated on specific hospital population such as low birth 
weight infants (Payne, et al.  2004) and intensive car  unit patients (Digiovine, et al. 1999 
and Gracia-Garmendia et al. 1999), for instance. Thre are also studies that have focused 
on the general population of the hospital.  Battista Orsi, Di Stefano and Noah (2002), 
estimate the increase in the LOS due to hospital acquired line infection to have a mean of 
19.9 days and median of 15 days. Studies also sugget that estimated additional cost per 
patient due to treatment (replacement of the central venous line (CVL) (approximately 
$200), X –Ray and drug administration (approximately $500, antibiotic costs (between 
$100 and $250 per day) to be close to $3500, plus the cost of the hospital stay.  Kim et al. 
(2011), Battista Orsi, Di Stefano and Noah (2002) and Digiovine, et al. (1999), have 





6.3 Dynamic Model’s Validation 
 
Model validation is an essential aspect of any model building methodology in general, 
and system dynamics modeling in particular. It is a process that involves both formal 
(quantitative) and informal (qualitative) tools. A model is a simplification of real world to 
serve a useful purpose and helps us understand a problem/situation. Hence, it has to be 
determined whether it is good enough for its purpose. The process involves two aspects; 
first verification, which means ensuring that the equations are technically correct 
(debugging), and second, validation, which means ensuri g that the structure of the 
model and the assumptions made meet the purpose that the model is intended to serve 
(Coyle and Exelby, 2000). It is worth mentioning that a valid model is naturally verified; 
however verification does not guarantee the validity of a model. As Coyle (1977) puts it, 
validation is “the process by which we establish sufficient confidence in a model to be 
prepared to use it for some particular purpose”. This confidence building process is a 
gradual process that is embedded throughout the methodology and starts in the stage of 
model conceptualization and development and continues even after the implementation of 
policy recommendations made as the result of the model utput (Barlas, 1994, Forrester 
and Senge, 1980). Although model validation takes places in all the stages of modeling, 
most of formal (quantitative) validation activities are performed after the model has been 
constructed. 
There are to schools of thought in viewing model vaidity; first, the empiricist 
philosophy, which sees a valid model as an objectiv representation of a real system. In 
this view models are either correct or incorrect and empirical facts would reveal its truth 
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or falsehood. In this philosophy, validity is a matter of accuracy rather than usefulness. 
Second, the more recent relativist school of thought sees a valid model as one of the 
many possible ways to describe and represent a real situ tion and believes while no 
model representation is superior to another in an absolute sense, some could be proven to 
be more effective and generally models lie in a spectrum of usefulness. System dynamics 
model validation literature seems agree with the relativist approach to model validity. 
Hence, besides formal (quantitative) and objective validation of the model, subjective, 
qualitative and informal components must be involved in validation process to determine 
the usefulness of a model with respect to a particular purpose (Barlas, 1994). 
6.3.1 Informal / Qualitative Model Validation 
 
The informal/ qualitative model validation has been built in the process of model 
development. The first draft of the model, and the corresponding hypothesis that the 
financial wellbeing of a healthcare organization i.e. a hospital influences the managerial 
decisions to reduce costs (e.g. optimizing the length of stay, controlling the operational 
costs) and expenditure on proactive safety interventions, which in turn effect the risk of 
experiencing specific adverse events, and the change in the risk of experiencing such 
adverse events influences the financial standing of the hospital that had originated such 
dynamics in the system, was discussed and validated with the experts in multiple 
interview sessions. After gathering domain experts’ input on the hypothesis under study 
in general, and the key players and important factors and relations and feedbacks in 
particular, the next round of interview discussed the updated version of the model that 
incorporated all the inputs/suggestions/modifications that the experts made to the 
previous draft of the model. This procedure was followed in 3 rounds of face-to-face 
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interview with each expert until a consensus was rech d on the current version of the 
model presented in this thesis. Each expert was then asked to rate the model in terms of 
completeness, accuracy, ease of understanding and perceived predictability. Experts 
provided their assessment of the qualitative represntation of the model through the 
following questions: 
1. Completeness. From your perspective, to what extent does this model capture all 
important and relevant phenomena for the particular problem that we are 
studying? On a scale from 0 to 100, 0 would correspond to a model that does not 
include some important and relevant details, whereas 100 would correspond to a 
model that includes all details that you consider important. What number would 
you assign? 
 
2. Accuracy: From your perspective, how accurately or realistically does the model 
depict important feedback effects, and causal chains that influence risk of 
experiencing adverse events? On a scale from 0 to 10, 0 would correspond to a 
model that is unrealistic, over-idealized or inaccurate, whereas 100 would 
correspond to a model that is realistic and accurate. What number would you 
assign? 
 
3. Ease of understanding: From your perspective, how easy is it to understand the 
overall logic of the model. On a scale from 0 to 100,  would correspond to a 
model that is difficult to follow, even with extensive explanation, and a 100 
 205 
would correspond to a model that is readily understandable. What number would 
you assign? 
 
4. Perceived predictive validity: From your perspective, if you were to use this model, 
how well could you predict the change in the risk of specific adverse events as a 
function of the organizational factors/decisions that influence risk of AEs?  On a 
scale from 0 to 100, 0 would correspond to a model that does not help at all with 
predicting effects, and a 100 would correspond to a model that predicts the effects 
very well. What number would you assign? 
Table 6-15, reflects the summary of experts’ assessm nt of the system dynamics model. 
 
Table 6-15.Expert opinion; qualitative evaluation of system dynamics module (organizational level 
contributions to risk) 
 
The procedure that was followed for peer review of Bayesian network models, discussed 
in section 4.1.3 was also observed here in informal/qu itative validation of the system 
dynamics model as well. The interview guide that was used to develop/validate and 
evaluate the model could be found in appendix C.  
 
Completeness Accuracy Ease of Underestanding Predictive Validity
Expert 1 90 90 95 85-90
Expert 2 90 90 90 75
Expert 3 85 85 90 80
Expert 4 90-95 90-95 90-95 85-90
Expert 5 70-80 70-80 80-90 70-80
Expert 6 85 85 85 85
Expert 7 >90 >90 60 Need to see results
Expert 8 100 100 75-80 50
Expert 9 90 90 90 Estimates could be good
Expert 10 90 90 100 100
 
6.3.2 Formal/ Quantitative Model Validation
 
The ultimate objective in system dynamics model valid
structure of the model is valid. Although we will evaluate the accuracy of the model 
behavior through certain tests, but this is only meaningful if we are sufficiently confident 
in the structure of the model. Logically the va
validity of the structure and follows by evaluating the accuracy of the behavior of the 
model (Barlas, 1994). Barlas (1996) provides a framework for such a sequence of 
formal/quantitative validation, and we generall
presented model in this study. 




ation is to establish that the 
lid tion process starts with testing the 
y follow this framework for validating the 





6.3.2.1 Direct Structure Tests 
 
Direct structure tests assess the validity of the model equations individually, and compare 
them directly to the available knowledge. These tests could be done in two forms; 
• Empirically  
• Theoretically 
 The empirical structure test compares model equations against data available from the 
real system being modeled. Theoretical structure test involves comparing the model 
equations to the general knowledge on the system found in the literature and/or from 
domain experts. Forrester and Senge (1980), list Structure and Parameter verification test 
(comparing the structure and constant parameters of the model against the knowledge of 
the system conceptually (literature/experts) and numerically (data)) and dimensional 
consistency test (dimensional analysis of model equations to ensure that the 
dimensions/units of the equations and parameters ar consistent). 
1) Dimensional Consistency: After careful review of the units used for model 
parameters and equations, Vensim’s “Units Check” (from the menu select: 
Model>Units check) feature was used to ensure dimensional consistency, and no 
inconsistencies were found. 
2) Structure and Parameter Verification: The structure and parameter verification in 
the case of our mode, involves a combination of empirical and theoretical 
approach. Some of the equations of the model namely “pressure to Close Revenue 
Gap”, “Pressure to Optimize LOS”, “Pressure to Reduc  Operational Costs” and 
“Willingness to Invest in Proactive Safety Interventio s” have been validated with 
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experts, since no empirical information is available for these equations. On the 
other hand, the rest of the equations in the model, inc uding Probability of 
Understaffing, Probability of LOS Too Short to Meet Needs”, etc., have been 
obtained from actual data and other empirical studies available. Section 4.3.2 has 
detailed discussion on how the equations of the model are obtained. 
 
6.3.2.2 Structure-Oriented Behavior Tests 
 
This general category of structure testing indirectly assesses the validity of the structure 
by applying certain behavior tests.  These tests are strong behavior tests that could help 
the analyst discover possible structural flows. One type of such tests is the Extreme 
Condition test, which assigns extreme values to select d parameters of the model and 
compares the behavior generated by the model to the be avior that is expected or 
observed of the real system being modeled under the same extreme conditions (Barlas, 
1994).  
A number of these tests have been performed on the model. As an example of extreme 
condition testing, we assign a value of 1 (maximum) pressure to close revenue gap, which 
should drive the pressure to optimize LOS and pressu  to cut operational cost to the 
maximum limit (1), and willingness/ability to invest in proactive safety interventions to 
minimum (0). It also increases the risk of adverse ev nt (in this case risk of pressure 
ulcer) by 80%. It’s worth mentioning that the risk doesn’t exponentially increase because 
at the end of each year, we set the value of pressur  ulcer risk to its baseline value 
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coming from the Bayesian network. Figure 6-27 and Figure 6-28 show the results of 
these tests. 
 
Figure 6-27.Extreme case testing; pressure variables in the model when pressure to close revenue gap is t 
maximum 
 














Pressure to Close the Revenue Gap : extreme test
Pressure to Cut Operational Cost : extreme test
Pressure to Optimize LOS : extreme test











Real Risk : extreme test
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6.3.2.3 Behavior Pattern Test 
 
The two categories of tests above, direct structure test and structure-oriented behavior test 
are designed to assess the validity of the structure of the model. After building adequate 
confidence in the structure, we can apply a number of tests that are designed to evaluate 
the accuracy of the model in reproducing the major behavior patterns of the real system 
being modeled. Many types of behavior pattern tests could be found in the literature. 
Forrester and Senge (1980) discuss a number of these tests, including Behavior 
Reproduction test, Behavior Predictions test, Behavior Anomaly test and Surprise 
Behavior test among others. The test we have used to evaluate the accuracy of model 
output is a Frequency Generation test, which falls into the category of Behavior 
Reproduction tests.  The goal here is to see how well th  model reproduces the 
patterns/values that we have observed in the real system. The general idea is to: 
1. Calibrate the model based on data available for years 2003-2007 
2. Use the model to predict the risk of adverse event (pressure ulcer and line 
infection) for years 2008-2010 
3. Evaluate the accuracy of model prediction with point by point comparison 
4. Compare the pattern produced by the model for all the years (2003-2010) with the 
pattern observed from real data 
We should mention that, in the literature on modeling and simulation, a wide range of 
tests could be found that are based on point-by-point comparison of observed 
behavior and behavior produced by the model, but these tests are generally less 
appropriate for system dynamics models. This is because system dynamics models 
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are usually long term and policy oriented. (Forrester and Segne, 1980, Barlas, 1996). 
Never the less with limited financial data and reliable adverse event data available 
(only seven years), this test would build confidence in the accuracy of the model, as 
well as the structural validity. 
We have performed the steps 1 through 4 above, in section 7.1, and have evaluated 














7 The Hybrid Model; Analysis and Results 
 
Section 3.3, explains how the hybrid model which consists of a system dynamics module 
(to represent the contributions of organizational and policy level factors to the risk of 
adverse events and the feedback effects of these policies) and a Bayesian Belief Network 
module (to represent individual patient level and patient provider level factors’ 
contribution to the risk of certain adverse events), functions.   
The basic idea is to understand what the base line risk is for any patient for a certain 
adverse event depending on his/her physiological conditi ns and provider’s decisions in 
treating this patient, through a Bayesian network. On the other hand, under the influence 
of financial wellbeing of the hospital and throughput pressures, certain decisions are 
taken at the hospital level that would affect this ba eline risk level, either positively (risk 
reduction), or negatively. The combination of the two modeling formalisms will inform 
the decision maker of the overall risk of specific adverse events to be expected, given the 
individual patient conditions and the existing levels of financial pressures in the system.  
 
7.1 Evaluation and Validation of the Hybrid Model 
 
Our goal here is to see whether the combination of system dynamics model and the 
Bayesian belief networks (the hybrid model) can reproduce the patterns and the values or 
risk of specific adverse events from actual clinical data. 
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7.1.1 Hybrid Model Performance; Risk of Pressure Ulcer 
 
Step 1: Calibrate the model based on data available for years 2003-2007 
Nine parameters ( ), that determine the shape of the pressure functions (Pressure 
to close the revenue gap, Pressure to optimize LOS, Pressure to cut operational costs and 
Willingness/Ability to invest proactively in safety interventions) have been calculated the 
way that best fit experts’ input on these pressures (s ction 6.2.1). 
Based on data for 2003-2007, we calibrate/optimize these values, so that the error (i.e. 
error between model’s prediction on risk of pressure lcer and the actual relative 
frequency of hospital acquired pressure ulcer obtained from clinical data, for each year) is 
minimized. 
Doing so, the following values are obtained for : 
 











































Step 2: Use the model to predict the risk of pressure ulcer for other years 
In the hybrid model, baseline risk of pressure ulcer is provided by  the pressure ulcer 
BBN model. However, the system dynamic model and the pressure ulcer BBN, share a 
same node; Understaffing probability (or as is called in the BBN, probability of staff 
adequacy). So the following steps are taken in the hybrid model, for calculating the risk 
of pressure ulcer for each year: 
1. Calculate the baseline probability of pressure ulcer from pressure ulcer BNN 
2. Input the baseline probability of pressure ulcer to the system dynamics model 
3. The system dynamics model, calculates the probability of understaffing (or staff 
adequacy) for year “i”  
4. The pressure ulcer BBN reads this value (probability of staff adequacy) from the 
system dynamics module, and calculates a new baseline probability of pressure 
ulcer for year ‘i+1” 
5. Go to step 1 
Figure 7-1 depicts risk of pressure ulcer for different years projected by the hybrid 
model, versus the actual clinical data for relative frequency of hospital acquired 
pressure ulcer. Table 7-1 shows the error of hybrid mo el’s predictions for risk of 











Table 7-1.Hybrid models’ error in predicting the probability of pressure ulcer for each year 
 
Note that the baseline risk of pressure ulcer, remains the same from 2004-2011. This is 
due to the fact that the input from system dynamic odel to pressure ulcer BBN, the 
probability of understaffing (i.e. probability of staff adequacy), remains the same at 0.1. 
This is expected, because the particular institution that we have gathered our clinical data 







0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Time (Year)
Real Risk of PU : Current dmnl
Risk of PU from Data : Current dmnl/Year
Year Baseline Risk of Pressure Ulcer Hybrid Model :Risk of Pressure Ulcer Data: Actual Risk of Pressure Ulcer Error
2003 0.0024 (from BBN) 0.0022 0.00181 18%
2004 0.0025 0.0021 0.00202 4%
2005 0.0025 0.0023 0.00234 2%
2006 0.0025 0.0022 0.00227 3%
2007 0.0025 0.0022 0.00244 11%
2008 0.0025 0.0022 0.00282 28%
2009 0.0025 0.0022 0.00266 21%
2010 0.0025 0.0022 0.00144 35%
2011 0.0025 0.0022 0.00165 25%
Average Error 15%
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from is financially well and the pressure to close financial gap is very low throughout 
these years. 
7.1.2 Hybrid Model Performance; Risk of Line Infection 
 
For the hybrid model, consisting of the system dynamics module and line infection BBN, 
we will follow the same steps as section 7.1.1. 
Step 1: Calibrate the model based on data available for years 2002-2006 
Nine parameters ( ), that determine the shape of the pressure functions have been 
calculated the way that best fit experts’ input on these pressures (section 6.2.1). 
Based on data for 2002-2006, we calibrate/optimize these values, so that the error (i.e. 
error between model’s prediction on risk of pressure lcer and the actual relative 
frequency of hospital acquired pressure ulcer obtained from clinical data, for each year). 












































Step 2: Use the model to predict the risk of line inf ction for other years 
In the hybrid model, baseline risk of pressure ulcer is provided by line infection BBN 
model. However, the system dynamic model and the lin  infection BBN, share a same 
node; Understaffing probability (or as is called in the BBN, probability of staff 
adequacy). So the following steps are taken in the hybrid model, for calculating the risk 
of line infection for each year: 
1. Calculate the baseline probability of line infection from line infection BNN 
2. Input the baseline probability of line infection to the system dynamics model 
3. System dynamics model, calculates the probability of understaffing (or staff 
adequacy) for year “i”  
4. Line infection BBN reads this value (probability of staff adequacy) from system 
dynamics module, and calculates a new baseline probability of line infection for 
year ‘i+1” 
5. Go to step 1 
Figure 7-2, depicts risk of line infection for different years projected by the hybrid 
model, versus the actual clinical data for relative frequency of line infection. 
Table 7-2, shows the error of hybrid model’s predictions for risk of line infection, 
compared to the actual data.  
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Time (Year)
Average Risk Data : Line infection dmnl/Year
Real Risk of Line Infection : Line infection dmnl
Year Baseline Risk of Line Infection Hybrid Model :Risk of Line Infection Data: Actual Risk of Line Infection Error
2002 0.0302 (from BBN) 0.038 0.0498 31%
2003 0.031 0.0382 0.0385 1%
2004 0.031 0.0382 0.03677 4%
2005 0.031 0.0382 0.03195 16%
2006 0.031 0.0288 0.02315 20%
2007 0.031 0.0361 0.02164 40%
2008 0.031 0.0323 0.0241 25%
2009 0.031 0.0271 0.02 26%
Average Error 20%
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7.1.3 Hybrid Model Performance; Risk of Line Infection and Pressure Ulcer 
 
One can argue that since the system dynamic model is capturing the organizational level 
contributions to risk, it affects the risk of pressure ulcer and line infection, both at the 
same time and if the model is performing correctly, i  should capture these effects on risk 
of both of the adverse events simultaniously. In sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.2, we evaluated the 
effect of decision/policy level factors on each of the adverse events we have modeld 
(pressure ulcer and line infection) separately. Here we will evaluate the performance of 
the model where organizational factors/decisions affect risk of these adverse events 
simultanously. In other words we will quantify the hybrid model that consists of 3 
models: pressure ulcer BBN, line infection BBN and the system dynamics module for 
organizational effect. 
For the hybrid model, consisting of the system dynamics module and both pressure ulcer 
and  line infection BBNs, we will follow the same steps as described in section 7.1.1. 
Step 1: Calibrate the model based on data available for years 2003-2006 
Nine parameters ( ), that determine the shape of the pressure functions have been 
calculated the way that best fit experts’ input on these pressures (section 6.2.1). 
Based on data for 2003-2006, we calibrate/optimize these values, to minimize error 
(difference between model prediction and actual data). In this case though our error term 
consists of error in predication for line infection risk plus error of prediction for pressure 





The payoff function ( ) from this optimization is 1.38E-5. 
Step 2: Use the model to predict the risk of line ifection and pressure ulcer for other 
years 
In the hybrid model, baseline risks of both adverse ev nts are provided by the BBN 
models. Since probability of staff adequacy (i.e. understaffing probability in system 
dynamics model) is shared between both BBNs and the dynamic model, the following 
steps are taken, for calculating the risk of both adverse events for each year: 
1. Calculate the baseline probability of both adverse ev nts from their respective 
BBN 
2. Input the baseline probability of line infection to the system dynamics model 
3. System dynamics model, calculates the probability of understaffing (or staff 
adequacy) for year “i”  
4. The  BBNs read this value (probability of staff adequacy) from system dynamics 
module, and calculates a new baseline probability of adverse event for year ‘i+1” 







































Figure 7-3 and Figure 7-4, depict risks of pressure ulc r and line infection for 
different years projected by the hybrid model, versus the actual clinical data for 
relative frequency of these adverse events. Table 7-3, shows the error of hybrid 





Figure 7-3.Risk of PU; hybrid model predictions foreach year versus actual data calibrating the model 
using both BBNs 
 











Real Risk of PU : Optim total
Risk of PU from Data : Optim total
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Figure 7-4.Risk of line infection; hybrid model predictions for each year versus actual data calibrating the 
model using both BBNs 
 
 


















Real Risk of Line Infection : Optim total
Risk Line Infection from Data : Optim total
Year Hybrid:Risk of Pressure Ulcer  Actual Risk of Pressure Ulcer Error Hybrid:Risk of Line Infection Actual Risk of Line Infection Error
2003 0.0021 0.00181 13.81% 0.0271 0.0385 42%
2004 0.0026 0.00202 22.31% 0.0327 0.03677 12%
2005 0.0022 0.00234 6.36% 0.0278 0.03195 15%
2006 0.0021 0.00227 8.10% 0.027 0.02315 14%
2007 0.0021 0.00244 16.19% 0.0269 0.02164 20%
2008 0.0028 0.00282 0.71% 0.0293 0.0241 18%
2009 0.0022 0.00266 20.91% 0.0275 0.02 27%
Average Error 12.63% Average Error 21%
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7.2 Use of the Risk Model; Hypothetical Examples 
 
A. Patient A’s risk of line infection 
Suppose patient A, is scheduled for a surgery in June 2011, and will need a catheter line. 
Due to his procedure though, he will have to have th  line inserted in femoral vein 
(versus more desirable subclavian vein). Also assume that the patient due to his clinical 
condition and age has diminished resistance. What will be his chances of acquiring line 
infection? 
To answer this question and assess patient A’s risk of line infection, the following 
procedure will be followed using the hybrid model: 
1) Estimate patient A’s baseline probability of line ifection 
This is done by setting the information we have from patient A, as 
evidence to the model (Figure 7-5). In other words: Patient’s Constraint: T 
(with probability of 1), and Patient Resistance Factors: Diminished (with 
probability of 1). Note that we can also set soft evid nce for any node, if 




Figure 7-5.Setting evidence in line infection BBN 
 
 
2) Considering that line infection BBN and the system dynamics module 
have a common node (probability of understaffing or staff adequacy), load 
this probability from system dynamic model into line i fection BBN. 
 
3) Update the line infection BBN with this information to get the baseline 
probability of line infection for patient A (Figure 7-6). 
 
4) The baseline probability of line infection for this patient, increases from 
0.0302 to 0.0386 (28% increase). 
 
Figure 7-6.Compiling BBN to update the probability of line infection
 
5) Input this baseline probabilit
probability of line infection for 2011, using the hybrid model (












Real Risk of Line Infection : Line infection Importance measure
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y of line infection, and predict patient A’a 
’s probability of line infection, influenced by organizational factors
 Real Risk of Line Infection for patient A








The model projects risk of line infection for patient A to be 0.0339 in 
2011, which indicates a 12% decrease. Considering that hospitals 
operating margin for 2011 so far has been at 3.5%, this reduction is 
expected since the production pressures are low and ability to invest 
proactively in safety are high. 
 
B. As another hypothetical example, assume that the hospital at 2011 has operated 
on a 3.5%, and they set a goal of increasing their operating margin 0.2%, each 
year. The hybrid model can predict that in the next 10 years, the baseline risk of 
line infection could be reduced by 13%, from 3.05% to 2.66%.  This implies over 
2.7 million dollars in savings each year. 
 
Figure 7-8.Decline in the risk of line infection over the next 10 years, due to increase in operating mar in 
by 0.2% per year 
 
 












Real Risk of Line Infection : Line infection Importance measure
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Similarly, if hospital at 2011 has operated on a -1%, and their operating margin 
declines 0.2% every year, over the next 10 years, the baseline risk of line 
infection will increase by 23%, from 3.05% to 3.76%, which implies an expected 
over 6 million dollars in expenses 
 
 
Figure 7-9.Increase in the risk of line infection over the next 10 years, due to decrease in operating mar in 




















Real Risk of Line Infection : Line infection Importance measure
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7.3 Uncertainty Analysis 
7.3.1 Uncertainty Analysis; Hybrid Model for Risk of Pressure Ulcer 
 
As a measure of goodness of an estimate, to examine how closely the estimated values 
relate to reality and as a basis for decision making we can perform a set of uncertainty 
analyses (Modarres, 2006). These uncertainty analyses, show the impacts of analyst’s 
assumptions, variability in the parameters, impact of data incompleteness, and the effect 
of expert opinion. These uncertainties are represent d by probability distributions which 
are then propagated through the entire risk model (Smith, 2011). 
When estimating the parameters of the Bayesian networks and the system dynamics 
module, throughout chapter 4 of this dissertation, we have represented the uncertainties 
with the appropriate probability distributions. In discussing the hybrid model’s 
performance in previous section, 7.1, we have used the mean values of those 
distributions. In this section, we will study the effects of parameter uncertainties using 
their respective probability distributions, on the ybrid model as a whole. Many uni-
variate or multi-variate uncertainty analyses could be performed to propagate parameter 







a) Uni-variate: baseline risk of pressure ulcer uncertainty; Uniform (0.001,0.003) 
 
 Figure 7-10.Confidence bounds for model predictions  risk of pressure ulcer as a result of 
uncertainty over baseline risk of pressure ulcer 
 
Figure 7-11.Risk of pressure ulcer from clinical data 
 
b) Multi-variate: probability of prolonged LOS and ; Normal (0.045,0.38) and 
baseline risk of pressure ulcer uncertainty; Uniform (0.001,0.003) 
SensitivityPU
50% 75% 95% 100%
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Figure 7-12.Confidence bounds for model predictions  risk of pressure ulcer as a result of uncertainty 
over baseline risk of pressure ulcer and uncertainty over the probability of prolonged LOS 
 
7.3.2 Uncertainty Analysis; hybrid Model for Risk of Line Infection 
 
Similar to the case of hybrid model for risk of pressure ulcer, many uni-variate or multi-
variate uncertainty analyses could be performed to propagate parameter uncertainty over 
the hybrid model.  Below are two examples of these uncertainty analyses runs. 
a) Uni-variate: baseline risk of line infection uncertainty; Weibull distribution  
( 3.221,  0.0312)α β= =  
 
SensitivityPU
50% 75% 95% 100%










Figure 7-13.Confidence bounds for model predictions  risk of line infection as a result of uncertainy 
over baseline risk of line infection 
 
 
Figure 7-14.Risk of line infection from clinical data 
a) Multi-variate: probability of prolonged LOS and ; Normal (0.045,0.38) and 
baseline risk of pressure ulcer uncertainty; Weibull distribution 
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Average Risk Data : Line infection
( 3.2206, 0.03119)α β= =
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Figure 7-15.Confidence bounds for model predictions  risk of line infection as a result of uncertainy 
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7.3.3 Uncertainty Analysis; hybrid Model for Risk of Line Infection and Pressure Ulcer 
Combined 
 
Similar to what we discussed in sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2, many uni-variate or multi-
variate uncertainty analyses could be performed to propagate parameter uncertainty over 
the hybrid model that consists of the dynamic model and two BBNs for pressure ulcer 
and line infection risks.  Below is an example of these uncertainty analyses runs. 





Figure 7-16.Confidence bounds for model predictions  risk of line infection as a result of uncertainy 





( 3.2206, 0.03119)α β= =
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7.4 Importance Measures 
 
An important step in any risk analysis activity is to identify the elements of the system 
that have the most contribution to system risk. Thecommon metrics used in identifying 
such contributions is the importance ranking. Identification of major risk contributors 
using importance measures can give direction to risk management activities, and guide 
allocating resources into areas which will have the highest impact on the system’s risk 
reduction (Modarres, 2006). Birnbaum, Fussel-Vesely (FV), Risk Reduction Worth 
(RRW), and Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) are among commonly used risk 
importance measures.  
7.4.1 Risk Reduction Worth 
 
The Risk Reduction Worth (RRW) importance, measures change in risk of the system, 
when a risk element is perfect; i.e. a component’s failure probability is assumed to be 
zero. In other words it measures how much system’s risk could be improved if one event 
could be fixed, and shows, theoretically, what is the limit of the performance 
improvement of the system (Modarres, 2006).  
 
Where R is the total system risk, and , is system risk when risk element “i” is 
made perfect. For instance, some of the risk elements in the case of this study could be 









“Pressure to Optimize LOS” ( ), “Pressure to Cut Operational Costs” ( ) and 
“Willingness/Ability to Invest in Proactive Safety Interventions” ( ).  
Since the hybrid model, has a dynamic element built into it (the system dynamics 
module), which captures how decisions and policies that contribute to the risk of specific 
adverse events evolve over time, using risk importance measures we can  also project 
how the importance of these decisions in system risk, may evolve and change over time. 
7.4.2  Dependencies in Risk Importance Measure’s Quantification 
 
Due to the fact that the modules in the hybrid methodology; the system dynamic module 
and the Bayesian network, may share one or more nods (i.e. Staff Adequacy in the 
model we have developed here), can cause dependencies. To eliminate this dependency, 
the following procedure needs to be followed.   
1. Find the risk of specific adverse event (i.e. R) using the hybrid model for a 
specific year. 
2. If the event of the interest (risk element), is in the Bayesian belief network, 
assume perfect condition for ; propagate the Bayesian network one time and 
store the intermediate probability of adverse event to be used by the second layer 
of the hybrid model (i.e. the system dynamics module), while still assuming 
perfect condition for in the system dynamics module, and quantify the hybrid 
model, which will project how system risk will evole over time assuming perfect 








3. If the event of the interest (risk element), is notin he Bayesian belief network, 
find , by quantifying the hybrid model again  
4. The risk reduction worth measure of the event of interest is obtained from: 
 
5. Assuming decision is taken, which means : 
a.   relaxing pressure to optimize LOS 
b.   relaxing pressure to cut operational costs 
c.   relaxing safety investment constraints 
This procedure is inspired by the procedure Wang (2007) has proposed for calculating 
importance measures in static models, consisting of ESDs, FTs and BBNs. 
7.4.3 Example; Importance Measure for Pressure to Optimize LOS in the Risk of Line 
Infection 
 
To obtain importance measure for pressure to optimize LOS, for example, we need to 
calculate the risk of line infection for each year, when the pressure to optimize LOS is at 
minimum 0. We also need to calculate risk of line ifection for each year without 
interfering with model variables, which we have done and the results are reflected in 
Table 7-2. We do this for pressure to cut operationl cost and willingness/ability to invest 
proactively in safety. Table 7-4 shows the importance measure for these 












Table 7-4.Importance measures of pressure functions in the model for years 2002-2009 
 
We can compare the importance of these pressures year b  year, or we can alternatively 
compare their average importance over the course of 8 years. The results indicate that 
investment in proactive safety interventions is the most important decision factor in terms 
of influencing risk. Operational budget is the second most important influencing factor in 
risk, and optimizing LOS comes third. 
Year Hybrid Model :Risk of Line Infection Risk of Line Infection; pressure to optimize LOS=0 Importance Measure
2002 0.037 0.0382 0.968586387
2003 0.0372 0.0385 0.966233766
2004 0.0275 0.0384 0.716145833
2005 0.0275 0.0384 0.716145833
2006 0.0343 0.029 1.182758621
2007 0.0295 0.0364 0.81043956
2008 0.0265 0.0289 0.916955017
2009 0.0264 0.0272 0.970588235
Average importance over 9 year period 0.905981657
Year Hybrid Model :Risk of Line Infection Risk of Line Infection; pressure to cut operational costs=0 Importance Measure
2002 0.037 0.0367 1.008174387
2003 0.0372 0.0368 1.010869565
2004 0.0275 0.0369 0.745257453
2005 0.0275 0.0369 0.745257453
2006 0.0343 0.0267 1.284644195
2007 0.0295 0.0337 0.87537092
2008 0.0265 0.0291 0.910652921
2009 0.0264 0.0271 0.974169742
Average importance over 9 year period 0.944299579
Year Hybrid Model :Risk of Line Infection Risk of Line Infection;Willingness to invest in safety=1 Importance Measure
2002 0.037 0.0284 1.302816901
2003 0.0372 0.0283 1.314487633
2004 0.0275 0.0274 1.003649635
2005 0.0275 0.0271 1.014760148
2006 0.0343 0.0271 1.265682657
2007 0.0295 0.0281 1.049822064
2008 0.0265 0.0284 0.933098592
2009 0.0264 0.0271 0.974169742
Average importance over 9 year period 1.107310921
 
Figure 7-17 .Importance measures of model’s pressure functions over time
 


















7.5 Model Requirements for Application 
 
The evaluation and the validation of the individual modules (BBNs and the system 
dynamic module) and the hybrid model, show that the models developed here have 
potential to be used as a predictive model for decision making purposes, and to capture 
the major dynamics of healthcare organizations that have an effect on the risk of adverse 
events. We have demonstrated this with limited data that was available to us. To further 
strengthen confidence in the accuracy and predictive power of the model, additional 
rigorous validation with additional data is required. This involves; 
• More expert opinion, from a diverse set of hospitals, on the soft factors in the 
model  
• More adverse event data from a variety of hospitals, though finding clean 
reliable clinical data, as we have tried to collect and use in the models in this 
study, could be challenging to say the least 
• Meticulous modeling of the cost and reimbursement structure. The data we had 
available on financial records, consisted of operating margins and total revenue 
and cost for a few years. Detailed modeling of cost and reimbursement structure 
will not only increase the accuracy but also make the model a dynamic model in 
its true sense. 
• Modeling more adverse events (in addition to the two BBNs we have developed 
so far for line infection and pressure ulcer) 
In the models we have developed in this study, some factors are hospital-specific factors. 
For instance hospitals may respond to revenue gap differently. In our interviews with the 
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experts, they revealed that while hospitals do takeone or a combination of three decisions 
we have modeled here (optimizing LOS, reducing operational costs, and level of 
investment in safety) to address revenue problems, but the order and intensity in which 
they implement these decisions may differ from hospital to hospital.  
Perhaps, collecting expert opinion from different ca egories of hospitals and modeling the 
pressure functions for that specific hospital category, will customize the model for a 

















8 Summary and Conclusion 
 
In this study, we have proposed a hybrid modeling methodology, capable of modeling the 
risk of hospital acquired adverse events, more realistically. This hybrid modeling 
environment, consists of Bayesian belief networks and system dynamics modeling 
formalism. The Bayesian belief networks are used to capture patient level, and patient 
provider level factors that may affect the risk of a certain adverse event. On the other 
hand, using system dynamics formalism, we can capture risk contributors at the level of 
organization, including production pressures, pressure to reduce operational costs; 
pressures to optimize (minimize) length of stay andpressures that impose limitations on 
what healthcare organizations can spend on proactive safety interventions. These 
pressures are mainly imposed upon the system, by financ al constraints. On the other 
hand external agencies and third party payers (e.g.insurance companies) increase this 
pressure by penalizing the hospital for the occurrence of adverse events. 
Employing this methodology, we have developed a dynamic model for system level risk 
factors, and two Bayesian network models for two specific adverse events; pressure ulcer, 
and line infection. 
These models have been developed using the factors we found in a thorough literature 
search (believed/proven to be influencing risk factors both at the hospital level model 
(SD), and specific adverse event models (BBNs)), and expert opinion. A Panel consisting 
of 17 experts from a number of healthcare organizations, with years of clinical and 
patient safety experience, was interviewed in person, in multiple sessions (resulting in 
over 120 hours of interview) in the process of developing and validating these models. 
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We also used 8 years clinical data from one of Harvard’s teaching hospitals, to validate 
the models, both the BBN level, and the hybrid model. 
This new approach provides a more realistic view and captures the dynamics of 
risk/safety as a function of policy and organizational decisions. The methodology could 
be used as a tool to predict the unintended consequences of internal and external 
decisions and policies on safety, and as a tool to investigate the impacts of policy 
modifications and to optimize decision making. It is also conceivable to use at the level 




Aside from the usual administrative challenges in arranging interviews with the domain 
experts, who typically have extremely busy schedules, perhaps the most important 
challenge is obtaining reliable and relevant data for developing and validating the 
models.  In validating the models, we have tried to use clinical data as much as possible 
and elicited experts’ opinion, where data was unavail ble or unreliable. Not all the factors 
we have in the model are actually observed and record d in hospitals (e.g. staff 
adequacy). As our clinical experts put it, healthcare data is quite “messy”. 
 Especially in the case of the dynamic module, that we have used soft factors to represent 
system level pressures (e.g. pressure to optimize LOS), we had to solely rely on experts’ 
assessment. We have made effort to calibrate these opinions with the data that was 




The contributions of this research could be summarized as follows in two 
categories; A) Risk modeling methodology and B) Causal model development 
A. Risk modeling methodology 
o Selection and integration of suitable methods for modeling risk in 
healthcare 
o Hybrid SD/BBN  
o Development of uncertainty/sensitivity analysis procedure for the hybrid 
methodology 
o Development of RIM for the hybrid methodology 
B. Causal model development 
o Development of dynamic model for organizational level decisions/factors 
o Development of BBN causal models for 2 common adverse vents 
o Collection and analysis of data and expert opinion for model construction 
and parameter estimation 
o Introduction of new parameters to address cause and effect relations 
among tangible and intangible phenomena 
o Use of Bayesian methods for inference with expert opini n 
o Use of Bayesian model uncertainty treatment method to improve model 




8.3 Future Work 
 
The next logical step for this study would be evaluating and validating the model with 
more data.  
• Data for more  number of years 
• Clinical data and expert opinion from more experts and variety of hospitals 
We have used a 9 years of clinical data to evaluate the performance of the model. We 
have calibrated 9 parameters (for pressure functions) f these models using these 
data. One can question the confidence level on this cal bration, where 9 degrees of 
freedom are determined with only 9 years’ worth of data. Also, all of the experts that 
participated in this study and provided their opinion on various aspects of the models, 
are clinicians and healthcare professionals that are practicing in some the world’s best 
hospitals. We need to incorporate expert opinion and lso clinical data from other 
hospitals that do not necessarily fall into this category. 
Another aspect of this model that could be improved is that some of nodes in the 
model need to be modeled in more detail. More specifically for operating margin, that 
is basically the driving engine of the hybrid model, we have only used the estimates 
available to us for operating margins and total cost and reimbursement for a few 
years. More comprehensive modeling of the cost and reimbursement structure is 









A. Introducing experts to the concept of Bayesian belief networks, the 
structure and the concept of conditional probabilities 
B. Introducing the preliminary BBN model for risk of pressure ulcer 
C. Eliciting expert’s opinion about the factors and relations in the model, 
addition or deletion of the factors if necessary based on experts judgment 
D. Eliciting expert’s quantitative assessment on some f the parameters of the 
model 





 Appendices A through D contain the interview guides that we have used to elicit 
expert opinion in the process of developing and quantifying BBNs and the system 
dynamics model. Each interview guide was designed an  used for different 
purposes that are explained accordingly at the beginning of the forms. These 







Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs): A brief introduction
Bayesian Belief Networks are a specific form of influence diagrams. BBNs are graphical 
models of causal relations among a set of variables (factors), where variables are 
represented as nodes of the graph and the interaction between the variables (causality
arcs (directed edges) between the nodes. Any pair of unconnected nodes of such a graph 
indicates independence between the variables represented by nodes. Hence, BBNs, or 
probabilistic networks in general, capture a set of dependence and independence 
properties associated with the variables represented by nodes in the network. To specify 
the strengths of these dependence relations, we use conditional probabilities. 
In short, BBN is a directed acyclic graph that represents causality relationships betwee
variables and consists of: 
 
A set of variables 
A set of directed arcs linking pairs of nodes; an arc from X to Y means that X has a direct 
influence on Y (we call X the parent node and Y the c ild node)
Each node has a conditional probability table tha












baseline risk of specific adverse events: 
Pressure Ulcer – Model Validation 
Interview Guide for First Round 
 
 




















What is your position or role in …………………………… (Your organization)?  Please 
describe your daily work and/or responsibilities in your current role. 
How long have you worked in the ………………………. (Your unit)? 
What is your professional/educational background? 
 
Model 1-Pressure Ulcer 
As you know, every hospitalized patient is venerable to a certain level of risk 
experiencing pressure ulcer. Factors that influence this risk can be categorized into: 
Patient level factors (relating to patient’s conditions) 
Physician-Patient level factors (relating to the trea ment of the patient) 
From your perspective what are the most important fc ors that influence the risk of 
experiencing pressure ulcer, while a patient is in the hospital? Based on the brief 
introduction provided on influence diagrams could you please sketch a diagram that 
shows these important factors and how they impact the risk of experiencing pressure 
ulcer? 
 
Response to Base Model  
Take a look at this diagram. Based on the influence diagram you provided, let’s fill in 
parts that you mentioned, but that are missing from this model. Also, I see a few events in 
this diagram that you didn’t mention.  
[Interviewer will iteratively work with the interviewee/subject to incorporate or exclude 








Completeness: From your perspective, to what extent does this model capture all 
important and relevant phenomena for the particular problem that
scale from 0 to 100, 0 would correspond to a model that does not include some important 
and relevant details, whereas 100 would correspond t  a model that includes all details 
that you consider important. What number would you assign
Accuracy: From your perspective, how accurately or realistically does the model depict 
important factors that influence risk of experiencing pressure ulcer? On a scale from 0 to 
100, 0 would correspond to a model that is unrealistic, over
whereas 100 would correspond to a model that is realistic and accurate. What number 
would you assign? 
Ease of understanding: From your perspective, how easy is it to understand the overall 
logic of the model. On a scale from 0 to 100, 0 would co
difficult to follow, even with extensive explanation, and a 100 would correspond to a 
model that is readily understandable. What number would you assign?
Perceived predictive validity:
well could you predict the risk of pressure ulcer?  On a scale from 0 to 100, 0 would 
correspond to a model that does not help at all with predicting effects, and a 100 would 
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Final Comments 
Do you have any other comments that you want to make? Feel free to elaborate on 




























A. Introducing experts to the concept of Bayesian belief networks, the structure and 
the concept of conditional probabilities 
B. Introducing the preliminary BBN model for risk of line infection 
C. Eliciting expert’s opinion about the factors and relations in the model, addition or 
deletion of the factors if necessary based on experts judgment 
D. Eliciting expert’s quantitative assessment on some f the parameters of the model 


















Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs): A brief introduction
Bayesian Belief Networks are a specific form of influence diagrams. BBNs are graphical 
models of causal relations among a set of variables (factors), where variables are 
represented as nodes of the graph and the interaction between the variables (causality
arcs (directed edges) between the nodes. Any pair of unconnected nodes of such a graph 
indicates independence between the variables represented by nodes. Hence, BBNs, or 
probabilistic networks in general, capture a set of dependence and independence 
properties associated with the variables represented by nodes in the network. To specify 
the strengths of these dependence relations, we use 
In short, BBN is a directed acyclic graph that represents causality relationships betwee
variables and consists of: 
 
A set of variables 
A set of directed arcs linking pairs of nodes; an arc from X to Y means that X has a direct 
influence on Y (we call X the parent node and Y the c ild node)
Each node has a conditional probability table 










risk of specific adverse events: 
Line Infection – Model Validation 
























What is your position or role in …………………………… (Your organization)?  Please 
describe your daily work and/or responsibilities in your current role. 
How long have you worked in the …………………………. (Your unit)? 
What is your professional/educational background? 
Model 2-line infection 
As you know, every hospitalized patient is venerable to a certain level of risk 
experiencing line infection. Factors that influence this risk can be categorized into: 
 
Patient level factors (relating to patient’s conditions) 
Physician-Patient level factors (relating to the trea ment of the patient) 
From your perspective what are the most important fc ors that influence the risk of 
experiencing line infection, while a patient is in the hospital? Based on the brief 
introduction provided on influence diagrams could you please sketch a diagram that 
shows these important factors and how they impact the risk of experiencing line 
infection? 
Response to Base Model  
Take a look at this diagram. Based on the influence diagram you provided, let’s fill in 
parts that you mentioned, but that are missing from this model. Also, I see a few events in 
this diagram that you didn’t mention.  
[Interviewer will iteratively work with the interviewee/subject to incorporate or exclude 












Completeness: From your perspective, to what extent does this model capture all 
important and relevant phenomena for the particular problem that we are studying? On a 
scale from 0 to 100, 0 would correspond to a model that does not include some important 
and relevant details, whereas 100 would correspond t  a model that includes all details 
that you consider important. What number would you assign?  
Accuracy: From your perspective, how accurately or realistically does the model depict 
important factors that influence risk of experiencing pressure ulcer? On a scale from 0 to 
100, 0 would correspond to a model that is unrealistic, over-idealized or inaccurate, 
whereas 100 would correspond to a model that is realistic and accurate. What number 
would you assign? 
Ease of understanding: From your perspective, how easy is it to understand the overall 
logic of the model. On a scale from 0 to 100, 0 would correspond to a model that is 
difficult to follow, even with extensive explanation, and a 100 would correspond to a 
model that is readily understandable. What number would you assign? 
Perceived predictive validity: From your perspective, if you were to use this model, how 
well could you predict the risk of pressure ulcer?  On a scale from 0 to 100, 0 would 
correspond to a model that does not help at all with predicting effects, and a 100 would 
correspond to a model that predicts the effects very well. What number would you 
assign?  
Final Comments 
Do you have any other comments that you want to make? Feel free to elaborate on 
anything that we have already discussed.











A. Introducing experts to the concept of dynamics modeling; the structure 
and the concept of building blocks of system dynamics 
B. Introducing the hypothesis and the preliminary SD model for capturing 
organizational level contributors to the risk of adverse events 
C. Eliciting expert’s opinion about the factors and relations in the model, 
addition or deletion of the factors if necessary based on experts judgment 
D. Eliciting expert’s assessment on the shape and forms f the soft factors in 
the model (i.e. pressure functions) 




















Modeling dynamic aspects of adverse events risk: 
Model Validation 
Interview Guide-Round 1&2 
 
Background 
What is your position or role in …………………………… (Your organization)?  Please 
describe your daily work and/or responsibilities in your current role. 
How long have you worked in the …………………………. (Your unit)? 
What is your professional/educational background? 
System Dynamics-A brief introduction 
SD is an approach to modeling systems and how they c ange overtime. It is a simulation 
based, differential equation modeling tool that is used when: 
Formal model is complex  
Analytical solution is impossible or very difficult to obtain  
It has been used in variety of problems such as corporate strategy, dynamics of diabetes, 
cold war arm race, HIV combat with human immune system . 
The building blocks of a SD model: 
 
Stocks: accumulation of a measureable entity 
People, parts, money or intangibles such as happiness (Ford,99) 
Population
Birth Death
Birth Rate Deat Rate




Characterize the state of the system  
Generate information for decision making 











Response to Integrated Model –System Dynamics Model 
 
Please take a look at this diagram. This model captures the overall responses/decisions to 
revenue gap in US hospitals and their effect on risk of experiencing specific adverse 
events. It also captures the feedback effect of this risk on the same revenue gap that 





























































                   













































































































                                                    
                                                    
                                                                                                                    





































































































Pressure to close revenue gap







                                   


































































































































































                                                                 
 




















































































































































Pressure to close revenue gap
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Change in Probability of Experiencing
Adverse Event Due to Under-Staffing
Change in Probability of Experiencing
Adverese Event Due to Short LOS
Change in Probability of Experiencing





















Completeness: From your perspective, to what extent does this model capture all 
important and relevant phenomena for the particular problem that we are studying? On a 
scale from 0 to 100, 0 would correspond to a model that does not include some important 
and relevant details, whereas 100 would correspond t  a model that includes all details 
that you consider important. What number would you assign? 
Accuracy: From your perspective, how accurately or realistically does the model depict 
important feedback effects, and causal chains that influence risk of experiencing adverse 
events? On a scale from 0 to 100, 0 would correspond t  a model that is unrealistic, over-
idealized or inaccurate, whereas 100 would correspond t  a model that is realistic and 
accurate. What number would you assign? 
Ease of understanding: From your perspective, how easy is it to understand the overall 
logic of the model. On a scale from 0 to 100, 0 would correspond to a model that is 
difficult to follow, even with extensive explanation, and a 100 would correspond to a 
model that is readily understandable. What number would you assign? 
Perceived predictive validity: From your perspective, if you were to use this model, how 
well could you predict the change in the risk of specific adverse events as a function of the 
organizational factors/decisions that influence risk of AEs?  On a scale from 0 to 100, 0 
would correspond to a model that does not help at all with predicting effects, and a 100 








Do you have any other comments that you want to make? Feel free to elaborate on 
anything that we have already discussed. 










A. Eliciting expert’s quantitative assessment on some f the parameters of the  

























Modeling dynamic aspects of adverse events risk: 
Model Validation 
Interview Guide-Round 3 
You have previously expressed your opinion about the way the revenue gap creates the 
pressure to close this gap throughout the organization, and how this pressure manifests 
itself in the forms of “Pressure to Optimize LOS”, “Pressure to Reduce Operational 
Costs” and” Willingness to Invest in Proactive Safety Investments”. Considering the 
model above, please answer the following questions. 
As was discussed in other rounds of interview, the pressure to optimize LOS, may affect 
risk of adverse events in two ways, first, it may increase the probability of experiencing 
an adverse events, because some patient’s LOS may be too short to meet all his/her 
needs. Second, it may reduce the probability of some adverse events because it simply 
reduces the exposure and if the pressure to optimize LOS is too small, some patients may 
stay in the hospital longer than they really need an  be exposed to certain adverse events. 
To your experience at what level (range) of pressure to optimize LOS, we might start to 
see the effect of this pressure on risk, because the pressure is too high that some patients 
may be discharged a bit prematurely? 
 
To your experience at what level (range) of pressure to optimize LOS, we might start to 
see the effect of this pressure on risk, because the pressure is too low that some patients 
may stay longer than they really need to which may increase their risk of being exposed 
to and experiencing certain adverse events? 
 
 
No Pressure=0 0-0.1 0.1-0.2 0.2-0.3 0.3-0.4 0.4-0.5 0.5-0.6 0.6-0.7 0.7-0.8 0.8-0.9 0.9-1 Max Pressure =1
No Pressure=0 0-0.1 0.1-0.2 0.2-0.3 0.3-0.4 0.4-0.5 0.5-0.6 0.6-0.7 0.7-0.8 0.8-0.9 0.9-1 Max Pressure =1
    
 
 
2- The pressure to reduce operational costs, may affect risk of adverse events due to 
understaffing. 
To your experience at what level (range) of pressure to reduce operational costs are great 
enough such that some patients may experience an adverse event because the unit is not 
sufficiently staffed (either due to lower numbers of staff, or lower quality
*You may use an arrow to indicate a precise point or circle one of the ranges above to 
indicate a broader range estimate.
 
The idea is that the impact of lower staffing numbers and/or less experienced staff may 
depend on the complexity of 
take the average of the complexity scores across all units in the hospital and all inpatient 
days. Please indicate in the table below, where the pressure to reduce operational 
costs/staffing begins to influence the probability of an adverse event as a function of the 
complexity of the patient population.
 
No Pressure=0 0-0.1 0.1-0.2 0.2-0.3
 
 
the case mix. With this assumption in mind, suppose we 
 
0.3-0.4 0.4-0.5 0.5-0.6 0.6-0.7 0.7-0.8 0.8-0.9 0.9-1 Max Pressure =1
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 of staff?) 
 
    
 
Assume that the pressure to reduce the revenue gap, will affect the level of 
willingness/ability to invest in proactive safety investments. The wors
situation gets, the less investments are made in safety programs.  Assume that the more 
we spend on safety the less the chances of experiencing adverse events will be. If this 
willingness to invest in safety is a scale between 0
invest in safety, and 1 meaning highest level of ability/willingness to invest in proactive 
safety interventions);  
 Based on your experience at what level (range) of this willingness do we start to 
see changes in the risk of ad
*You may use an arrow to indicate a precise point or circle one of the ranges above to 
indicate a broader range estimate.
Based on your experience, what is the magnitude of change in the risk of adverse events 
when there is an increase or d
Use the table below to indicate the relationship betwe n changes in investments and 
magnitude of effect on risk of adverse events.
 





















































No Pressure=0 0-0.1 0.1-0.2 0.2-0.3
 
 
e the financial 
-1 (0 meaning no ability/willingness to 
verse event?  
 
 
ecrease in investment in elective/proactive safety programs? 
 
0.5-0.6 0.6-0.7 0.7-0.8 0.8-0.9 0.9-1
Highest Pressure =1
0.3-0.4 0.4-0.5 0.5-0.6 0.6-0.7 0.7-0.8 0.8-0.9 0.9-1 Max Pressure =1
267 
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